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Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects instances where the Terraform CLI tool connects to suspected lookalike domains associated with supply chain compromise attempts (e.g., hashicorp-aws[.]com or hashicorp-terraform[.]io) during common initialization or application workflows. It correlates process execution with network connection logs and optionally validates the presence of a related .terraform.lock.hcl file associated with the malicious origin.
This rule detects the creation or modification of Windows Registry Run keys, which are a common technique used for achieving persistence. The rule specifically monitors for known suspicious or potentially malicious file names (e.g., RuntimeSSH.exe, MicDriver.exe, winappx.exe, MsCache.exe, smqdservice.exe) being added to Run locations, which triggers automatic execution upon user logon.
The following analytic detects a process requesting duplicate-handle and query-limited-information access to winlogon.exe.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for access masks that combine PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE (0x40) and PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION (0x1000).
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for access masks that combine PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE (0x40) and PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION (0x1000).
The following analytic detects duplicate-handle access to known UAC-bypass binaries from a non-standard source path.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10, converts GrantedAccess from hexadecimal, and checks for PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10, converts GrantedAccess from hexadecimal, and checks for PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE.
The following analytic detects potential process injection attempts into executables that are commonly abused leveraging Sysmon EventCode 10.
It identifies Access Mask requests (0x40 and 0x1fffff) to processes such as notepad.exe, wordpad.exe and calc.exe, excluding common system paths like System32, Syswow64, and Program Files.
This activity was associated with the SliverC2 framework by BishopFox.
Monitoring this activity may indicate an initial payload attempting to execute malicious code.
It identifies Access Mask requests (0x40 and 0x1fffff) to processes such as notepad.exe, wordpad.exe and calc.exe, excluding common system paths like System32, Syswow64, and Program Files.
This activity was associated with the SliverC2 framework by BishopFox.
Monitoring this activity may indicate an initial payload attempting to execute malicious code.
This rule detects instances where the Terraform CLI tool connects to suspected lookalike domains associated with supply chain compromise attempts (e.g., hashicorp-aws[.]com or hashicorp-terraform[.]io) during common initialization or application workflows. It correlates process execution with network connection logs and optionally validates the presence of a related .terraform.lock.hcl file associated with the malicious origin.
Detects sophisticated shellcode execution patterns characteristic of MovieReaper, specifically monitoring for the combination of RWX memory protection allocation, manipulation of Vectored Exception Handlers (VEH), and usage of manual syscall stubs (NtProtectVirtualMemory) to bypass EDR user-mode API hooking.
Detects the malicious OIC_Invitation_General_Official.lnk sample used as the entrypoint for PlugX infection chain
Detects anomalous process execution originating from the PaperCut application server process, specifically targeting the SetupCompleted servlet endpoint. This pattern is indicative of an exploitation attempt, such as CVE-2026-81578, where unauthenticated requests trigger backend server actions before proper access validation.
This rule detects the use of 'winget' or 'ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe' to execute Windows Configuration DSC (Desired State Configuration) files, specifically targeting the invocation of 'PSDscResources/Script' resources, 'SetScript', 'TestScript', or 'GetScript' operations. This technique may be leveraged by attackers to execute arbitrary code or maintain persistence through the configuration management framework.
Detects the use of the Windows 'tasklist' utility or command execution via 'cmd.exe' when the command line includes strings associated with common debugging tools (e.g., windbg, x64dbg). This behavior may indicate an adversary checking for the presence of analysis tools or attempting to manipulate running processes, which is often associated with debugger evasion or malicious environment reconnaissance.
Detects the execution of the Rubeus toolset with command-line arguments indicative of Kerberos ticket abuse, including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and Pass-the-Ticket (PTT) techniques. These methods are commonly used by adversaries for credential harvesting and facilitating lateral movement within an Active Directory environment.
Detects the creation of a Volume Shadow Copy followed by an attempt to access or copy sensitive files, specifically the NTDS.dit database or the SYSTEM registry hive, from that shadow copy. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to perform offline credential theft.
Detects the use of the net.exe or net1.exe utilities to create a new user account with a hardcoded password string ('Numlock!123') in the command line. This is a common indicator of automated exploitation, credential hardcoding, or post-exploitation activity.
Detects modifications to the Windows Explorer RunMRU registry key where values contain suspicious commands such as 'powershell', 'curl', or long base64-encoded strings, indicating potential command execution or persistence attempts.
Detects known malicious SilverFox trojan payloads by matching their SHA256 file hashes. This rule operates on file hashing metadata to identify specific binary artifacts associated with the SilverFox threat actor, regardless of the delivery mechanism or download source.
Detects browser-based network requests to 'script.google.com'. This can indicate usage of Google Apps Scripts, which are sometimes abused by attackers for Command and Control (C2) infrastructure, data exfiltration, or as a proxy for malicious payloads, by blending in with legitimate Google traffic.
Detects instances where rundll32.exe is used to execute a DLL file directly from a remote WebDAV-mounted network path (indicated by the 'DavWWWRoot' string). This technique allows for the execution of arbitrary code without writing the malicious payload to the local disk, a common tactic seen in fileless malware delivery and campaigns like ClearFake.
Detects the creation of the file 'nb_hook_dbg.txt' within 'C:\Windows\Temp\', which is a specific debug artifact generated by the PIVOTPIPE loader during the initialization of its HookGate subsystem. This subsystem is responsible for implementing indirect system calls to bypass user-mode EDR hooks by decoding syscall numbers at runtime and utilizing the WoW64 transition.
Detects the loading of amsi.dll by common .NET loader processes, which may indicate attempts to patch or bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in memory. The rule monitors for image load events of amsi.dll and correlates them with process creation events of known loaders such as powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, and others.
This rule detects potential PIVOTPIPE activity by correlating AMSI patching indicators with anomalous memory protection changes. It identifies processes that perform frequent transitions to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE or PAGE_NOACCESS, which is indicative of memory-based obfuscation techniques used to evade memory scanning and detection during sleep cycles.
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