Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous access to Microsoft 365 services (OneDrive, SharePoint, Mail) where the user activity is characterized by a high volume of operations (more than 30) across a diverse set of objects (more than 15) within a one-hour window. The detection focuses on activity originating from specific common automation/scripting User-Agents (Microsoft Graph, Python httpx/requests) that deviate from typical, focused service account behavior.
This rule detects suspicious, high-volume file access or download operations in SharePoint and OneDrive. It filters for activities performed by specific user agents commonly associated with automated scripting tools (e.g., python-requests, Microsoft.Graph.Client), which indicates potential automated exfiltration or unauthorized bulk data collection.
This rule monitors for various types of events (user logons, network connections, API audits, cloud app events, and email traffic) originating from a specific CIDR block (160.79.104.0/21), which is flagged as suspicious or unauthorized.
Detects inbound traffic, sign-ins, and email activity originating from the Anthropic IP range 160.79.104.0/21.
Detects inbound traffic, sign-ins, and email activity originating from the Anthropic IP range 160.79.104.0/21.
Detects inbound traffic, sign-ins, and email activity originating from the Anthropic IP range 160.79.104.0/21.
This rule detects various event types (email, identity authentication, network connections, and cloud audit logs) originating from or interacting with the specific IP address range 160.79.104.0/22 to 160.79.111.0/22, which is associated with known malicious activity.
Detects anomalous, large-scale cloning or mirroring of code repositories combined with targeted access to infrastructure-as-code configuration files (e.g., .tfvars, .tfstate) or automated exfiltration of CI/CD build artifacts. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to exfiltrate proprietary source code or sensitive secrets stored within repositories.
Detects anomalous, large-scale cloning or mirroring of code repositories combined with targeted access to infrastructure-as-code configuration files (e.g., .tfvars, .tfstate) or automated exfiltration of CI/CD build artifacts. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to exfiltrate proprietary source code or sensitive secrets stored within repositories.
Detects inbound emails that use a combination of finance-related keyword patterns in the domain and ActiveCampaign-specific relay infrastructure naming conventions. This technique is often used in phishing campaigns to bypass filters by leveraging trusted third-party email service provider infrastructure.
Detects instances where a user performs an interactive login followed by a non-interactive login within a 1-hour window, where the source IP address and geographical location of both sessions differ. This behavior is indicative of potential session hijacking or token theft where an attacker is using stolen session artifacts from a different location.
Detects instances where a user performs an interactive login followed by a non-interactive login within a 1-hour window, where the source IP address and geographical location of both sessions differ. This behavior is indicative of potential session hijacking or token theft where an attacker is using stolen session artifacts from a different location.
Detects instances where a user performs an interactive login followed by a non-interactive login within a 1-hour window, where the source IP address and geographical location of both sessions differ. This behavior is indicative of potential session hijacking or token theft where an attacker is using stolen session artifacts from a different location.
This rule detects modifications to Group Policy Objects (GPO) or Microsoft Entra (formerly Azure AD) policies that weaken established security controls. For GPO, it monitors Event ID 5136 for changes to security-relevant attributes (e.g., disabling firewall or real-time monitoring) in Active Directory. For Entra, it monitors audit logs for administrative operations that reduce security posture, such as disabling MFA, lowering authentication trust, or deleting Conditional Access policies. It includes filters to exclude legitimate, documented change management activities.
This rule detects modifications to Group Policy Objects (GPO) or Microsoft Entra (formerly Azure AD) policies that weaken established security controls. For GPO, it monitors Event ID 5136 for changes to security-relevant attributes (e.g., disabling firewall or real-time monitoring) in Active Directory. For Entra, it monitors audit logs for administrative operations that reduce security posture, such as disabling MFA, lowering authentication trust, or deleting Conditional Access policies. It includes filters to exclude legitimate, documented change management activities.
Detects active phishing threat-intelligence indicators whose domain name uses one of the disposable TLDs observed across IronToll's 73+ rotating lookalike domains (.cfd, .sbs, .icu, .buzz, etc.). Scoped to the structured ThreatType classification only — dropped the free-text 'Description has phishing' fallback, since KQL's 'has' is a substring/token match with no negation awareness (e.g. a description stating an indicator is 'not related to phishing' would still match), which could pull in indicators unrelated to actual phishing activity.
Detects active phishing threat-intelligence indicators whose domain name uses one of the disposable TLDs observed across IronToll's 73+ rotating lookalike domains (.cfd, .sbs, .icu, .buzz, etc.). Scoped to the structured ThreatType classification only — dropped the free-text 'Description has phishing' fallback, since KQL's 'has' is a substring/token match with no negation awareness (e.g. a description stating an indicator is 'not related to phishing' would still match), which could pull in indicators unrelated to actual phishing activity.
Detects emails delivering links to IronToll government-impersonation traffic-fine/payment portals (Egyptian and Moroccan justice-ministry lures), correlated with Safe Links click-through telemetry for the same URLs.
This rule monitors for interactions with a list of known malicious phishing domains across email ingestion, user click events, and device network activity. It identifies potential exposure to phishing campaigns by tracking domain matches in incoming email URLs, user-clicked links, and outbound device network connections.
This rule monitors for interactions with a list of known malicious phishing domains across email ingestion, user click events, and device network activity. It identifies potential exposure to phishing campaigns by tracking domain matches in incoming email URLs, user-clicked links, and outbound device network connections.
This rule monitors for interactions with a list of known malicious phishing domains across email ingestion, user click events, and device network activity. It identifies potential exposure to phishing campaigns by tracking domain matches in incoming email URLs, user-clicked links, and outbound device network connections.
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