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Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential unauthorized use of MeshAgent RMM software by correlating process execution events (mvtcs.exe, MeshAgent) with network traffic to specific IP addresses identified as associated with Settra command-and-control infrastructure. It specifically filters for MeshAgent activity and validates the threat by requiring an established network connection to known malicious endpoints.
Detects the indexed-btree npm malware loader embedded in BTree.prototype.set that spawns a detached hidden Node.js child process and references sharedLoad.min.js
Detects the indexed-btree npm malware loader embedded in BTree.prototype.set that spawns a detached hidden Node.js child process and references sharedLoad.min.js
Detects git checkout of a bare 40-hex commit SHA or the literal FETCH_HEAD ref, executed by a recognized AI coding-agent process. Narrowed to the Plugin4Shell exploitation fingerprint (checkout of a pinned-SHA-shaped or FETCH_HEAD ref) rather than ordinary branch/tag checkouts, which these agents perform constantly during normal plugin installs.
Detects the initiation of the OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant flow via command-line arguments within standard web browsers. This flow is frequently exploited in phishing campaigns to obtain unauthorized access tokens by tricking users into entering a device code on a malicious or attacker-controlled authorization page.
Detects the creation of a shortcut (.lnk) file by the process 'OrionQuests-Setup.exe'. This activity is often associated with installers or applications placing shortcuts on the desktop or in startup folders for persistence or execution initiation.
Detects the execution of PowerShell from a shortcut (.lnk) file, particularly when suspicious command-line arguments such as hidden windows, encoded commands, or bypass flags are utilized. This pattern is commonly associated with initial access via malicious attachments or shortcut files.
This rule detects modifications to the Windows hosts file by unauthorized processes. The hosts file is often targeted by adversaries to redirect network traffic, intercept communications, or prevent access to security-related websites.
Detects instances where a process named firefox.exe attempts to modify or create a registry run key, which is a common persistence technique, but the process file path does not correspond to the legitimate Mozilla Firefox installation directory. This behavior often indicates that an attacker is masquerading as a legitimate browser process to establish persistence.
Detects techniques used by SloppyRAT, including indirect NTDLL syscalls bypassing API hooks (Hell's Gate style), and the use of DJB2 API hashing for NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtCreateThreadEx. It monitors for CallTrace patterns indicating unbacked memory calls into ntdll.dll, detection of hardcoded DJB2 hash constants, or the presence of the B8 (mov eax, imm32) instruction followed by the 0F 05 syscall opcode.
Detects the creation of a file on the system that matches a known malicious SHA256 hash.
Detects the execution of processes containing indicators associated with Alinubx or the string 222024, which are potentially linked to malicious software or unauthorized tools.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of files that contain sensitive keywords (e.g., 'password', 'seed', 'wallet', 'recovery') by processes other than standard system or productivity applications. This activity is indicative of credential or sensitive data harvesting.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service using the service control manager command-line utility (sc.exe). This command is commonly used by attackers to achieve persistence by creating services that execute malicious binaries at startup, or to run processes with SYSTEM privileges.
This rule detects the execution of the legacy finger.exe utility when spawned by common user-facing applications (e.g., browsers, shells, explorer). The detection specifically looks for instances where the command line includes an '@' character, indicating an attempt to query information from a remote host, while excluding standard localhost queries. This pattern is often associated with reconnaissance activity or enumeration of remote users/systems.
Detects instances where a process that is not a known PowerShell host (powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, powershell_ise.exe) loads the System.Management.Automation.dll assembly, which is a strong indicator of an attempt to execute PowerShell code within a different process to evade detection.
Detects the invocation of common command-line interpreters (PowerShell or Windows Command Shell) via process creation events. This is a broad detection for administrative shell activity, which may also indicate malicious script execution or manual adversary interaction.
Detects the loading of the kernel driver 'Alinubx.sys', identified as a renamed instance of the 'CcProtect.sys' driver. This driver is known to be abused in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security software processes from kernel mode, specifically observed in the context of Rapuncel infostealer campaigns.
This rule detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools across the environment. RMM tools are frequently used by IT administrators for legitimate support, but are also commonly abused by threat actors to establish persistence and gain remote access to systems. The rule tracks the first instance of these processes appearing on any device within a 30-day window.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
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