Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

40,407 detections

Detects non-browser processes connecting to rolimons.com along with other specified services (Discord, food delivery services, or Gmail), or creating a specific evidence file associated with order theft/infostealer behaviors (ubereats_orders.json).
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
13 days ago
11046
IOC sweep for the Optimizely supply chain attack distributing Coruna/DarkSword, covering Sentinel lake/auxiliary tables only (CommonSecurityLog and DnsEvents). Matches firewall/proxy URLs and destination hosts, DNS query names, and IOC IPs against the attacker domains and IPs, using boundary-safe domain matching. Companion to the Defender tables query, which covers Defender network, DNS and file events and the file hashes. The query has no time filter in its body: set the time picker or API timespan to 14 days.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Arnold Chan@slaz
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Hunters
5 days ago
005
IOC sweep for the Optimizely supply chain attack distributing Coruna/DarkSword, covering Sentinel lake/auxiliary tables only (CommonSecurityLog and DnsEvents). Matches firewall/proxy URLs and destination hosts, DNS query names, and IOC IPs against the attacker domains and IPs, using boundary-safe domain matching. Companion to the Defender tables query, which covers Defender network, DNS and file events and the file hashes. The query has no time filter in its body: set the time picker or API timespan to 14 days.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Arnold Chan@slaz
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Defender - KQL
5 days ago
005
Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe creating a scheduled task via schtasks, or tasks registered from JavaScript files placed in specific staging folders such as RoamingState\SessionSync or DiagnosticsCache\WebViewSync, or using specific task name prefixes associated with loaders like ScreenConnect.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Subhankar H@Andrewsec57
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
7 days ago
208
The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows Registry key "DisableAntiSpyware" being set to disable. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically looking for the registry value name "DisableAntiSpyware" with a value of "0x00000001". This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with Ryuk ransomware infections, indicating potential malicious intent to disable Windows Defender. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to disable critical security defenses, facilitating further malicious activities such as data encryption, exfiltration, or additional system compromise.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security Content
6 days ago
007
Detects potential lateral movement or remote code execution where a file (.exe, .dll, .dat, .msi) is written via SMB from a remote source IP, followed closely by WMI execution (WmiPrvSE.exe) spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe referencing ADMIN$ shares and output redirection.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
11 days ago
20030
Detects executable files launched from mounted ISO, IMG, VHD, or VHDX images and correlates the activity with DLL side-loading, outbound public network connections, suspicious executable naming patterns, and the possible delivery source such as WhatsApp or Internet download.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Tun Tun Naing@tuntun
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
13 days ago
13146
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows RunMRU registry key, which stores a history of commands executed through the Run dialog box (Windows+R). It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to monitor registry events targeting this key. This activity is significant as malware often uses the Run dialog to execute malicious commands while attempting to appear legitimate. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an attacker using indirect command execution techniques for defense evasion or persistence. The detection excludes MRUList value changes to focus on actual command entries.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security Content
7 days ago
008
Detects the creation, modification, execution, or known hash matches of suspicious tunneling tools matching the naming convention wust<id>a.exe or wust<id>b.exe staged inside hidden .st<id> directories.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
11 days ago
5024
Detects instances where a MeshAgent process writes a sideload-prone binary and a corresponding loader DLL to the same folder on a device within a short time window, or establishes network connections to a known MeshAgent C2 IP.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
205
Detects a sequence where a scheduled task is created using schtasks.exe and, within one hour on the same device, a local user account is created or a user is added to a group using net.exe or net1.exe.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
005
Detects the creation of keylogger output files (logs.dat) within unusual SystemCertificates\Cache paths, correlated with the presence of specific plugin module files (such as kl.ts, pr.ts, scr.ts) executed on the same device within a one-hour window.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
205
Detects "RegAsm.exe" initiating a network connection to public IP adresses
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
SigmaHQ
4 days ago
004
Detects the abuse of Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) using either bitsadmin.exe or PowerShell's Start-BitsTransfer cmdlet to download files to suspicious directories such as AppData, Temp, or ProgramData, excluding common trusted domains.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Kanan Hatamov@hatamovkanan
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
12 days ago
3030
Detects evidence of the Ethersphere bee-js 13.3.0 and Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 supply chain compromise (SleepyDuck) in Defender XDR. Matches 21 reported SHA256 hashes in file, process and network initiator telemetry, connections to api.frameworkmetrics.xyz, the eight reported hub and relay IPs, the reported webhook.site and pastebin.com paths in URLs and command lines, the ScreenConnect relay IP and service ID in command lines, persistence paths on Linux, macOS and Windows, and the rogue ScreenConnect Client service registry key. Network and process activity from the ~/.solidity implant folder is matched regardless of destination, which keeps the hunt useful after the attacker rotates the hub address through an Ethereum contract. Lookback is 30 days. Coverage depends on Defender for Endpoint telemetry per platform, and SHA256 values are not reliably populated for non-executable files such as tgz, cjs, deb and rpm packages.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Goksel Atakan@gokselatakan
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
13 days ago
22039
Detects a ScreenConnect client executable started with a quoted URL argument containing a GUID v4 in the session parameter, typically spawned by script interpreters like WScript, CScript, or Cmd.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Subhankar H@Andrewsec57
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
7 days ago
007
Detects the execution of the tar.exe utility extracting archive files (-xf or -x) within common temporary or public directories (such as programdata, appdata, temp, downloads, public, tmp, or dev/shm) by non-system actors, potentially indicating staging or unpacking of malicious payloads.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Kanan Hatamov@hatamovkanan
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
11 days ago
2020
This analytic detects ngrok execution on Linux and Windows by process name, regardless of command line, and detects renamed ngrok binaries through combinations of ngrok-specific command-line behavior.
The command-line logic correlates authentication setup with TCP tunneling to RDP or SMB ports, identifies configured all-tunnel startup patterns, and recognizes the Invoke-Ngrok wrapper.
Threat actors have used ngrok to expose internal services, maintain persistence, move laterally, and proxy command-and-control traffic.
Review the collected commands, parent process, user, endpoint, and approved tunnel configuration to determine whether the use is authorized.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security Content
6 days ago
006
This analytic detects DNS lookups to ngrok-managed endpoint domains, agent gateway domains, and CNAME targets, plus a CISA-reported ngrok-themed domain.
Results classify TCP tunnel hostnames, tunnel.us-style agent gateway lookups, and generated-looking endpoint labels, and summarize repeated queries and distinct DNS answers by source and 15-minute interval.
Threat actors have used ngrok to expose internal services, including RDP and SMB, maintain persistence, move laterally, and proxy command-and-control traffic.
Ngrok is also a legitimate developer and remote-access service, so use the query classification, frequency, endpoint context, and approved usage baseline to prioritize investigation.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security Content
6 days ago
006
Detects persistence attempts involving winlogon.exe running from outside the System32 directory, correlated across multiple persistence mechanisms (Registry run keys, service installation, or scheduled tasks) within a 1-hour window.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
004
Detects behavior where the SQL Server process (sqlservr.exe) spawns commands containing multiple OLE automation / ADODB.Stream markers (such as ADODB.Stream, SaveToFile, sp_OACreate, sp_OAMethod, WScript.Shell) or writes executable files directly into sensitive directories such as the Public or Startup folders.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
004
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