Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
327 detections
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Detects the execution of the 'getevent' utility by a process running with the 'shell' user ID, specifically targeting Android input device nodes. This pattern is indicative of the RatHat malware's AdbTouchCapture module, which is used to monitor touch events to facilitate the unauthorized capture of PINs or pattern locks.
Detects the execution of RatHat, a Go-based Android native daemon masquerading as 'liblocal-service.so'. The rule identifies the malware's use of ADB-derived shell commands to bypass Android Doze mode, prioritize background execution, and tamper with installed applications via pm (package manager) commands.
This rule monitors Android device process events for the execution of 'adb' commands aimed at modifying sensitive system configurations. It specifically tracks attempts to enable accessibility services, toggle wireless debugging, or establish unauthorized ADB pairings. The rule identifies potential malicious intent by aggregating multiple suspicious configuration changes on the same device within a short time window.
Detects anomalous configuration of Android devices by identifying instances where an accessibility service is granted combined with the enabling of wireless ADB debugging or ADB pairing code extraction. This behavior is often associated with malicious applications seeking unauthorized control or remote access to the device.
Detects the RatHat Android malware component using getevent or direct access to /dev/input event files to capture user PINs and patterns. The rule filters for processes running under UID 2000 (shell) or identifying as liblocal-service, which are consistent with the malware's keylogging behavior.
Detects the RatHat malware agent (liblocal-service.so) being staged in the Android /data/local/tmp directory and the subsequent execution of an ADB shell command to automatically re-install the malicious APK, ensuring persistence even after the application has been uninstalled.
Detects the execution of RatHat, a Go-based Android native daemon masquerading as 'liblocal-service.so'. The rule identifies the malware's use of ADB-derived shell commands to bypass Android Doze mode, prioritize background execution, and tamper with installed applications via pm (package manager) commands.
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the Koktevrat Android RAT, specifically identifying periodic TLS beacons (heartbeats) destined for known C2 domains (streams-tv.lol and stream-plus.lat). The behavior suggests the use of Android's AlarmManager to schedule recurring callbacks to the C2 infrastructure.
Detects Koktevrat Stage 2 Android RAT component (com.kowo.ciligeci) that unpacks the RC4-encrypted uoN.css/uoN.apk payload using the RC4 key iOZ
Detects Koktevrat Android RAT APK artifacts via obfuscated component class names (JyfNnJyj, GtVyayDo) and the Stage 2 package identifier com.kowo.ciligeci
Detects Koktevrat Android RAT APK artifacts via obfuscated component class names (JyfNnJyj, GtVyayDo) and the Stage 2 package identifier com.kowo.ciligeci
Detects specific command strings ('proxy_open', 'proxy_data', 'proxy_close') associated with the Koktevrat Android RAT's tunneling functionality. The rule monitors outbound TCP traffic to identify the initiation, data transfer, and termination phases of a proxy connection, leveraging Suricata flowbits to track the state of the C2 tunnel.
Detects a specific credential-harvesting sequence associated with the RatHat malware. This behavior involves an initial malicious overlay drawn over a targeted application to harvest credentials, followed by a secondary fake 'install failed' overlay masquerading as Google Play within a short timeframe (1 hour), occurring when a user attempts to uninstall the malicious application.
Detects unauthorized usage of Android Debug Bridge (ADB) commands for self-pairing or remote connection, along with behavioral indicators linked to the RatHat Go agent, including manual power management exemption settings, silent package installation with permission granting, and persistence via accessibility service enablement.
This rule detects the presence of unauthorized WebView or HTML overlay windows rendered on top of active banking applications on Android devices. This behavior is indicative of credential-theft malware, such as banking trojans, which use overlays to capture user input, including banking credentials, while masking their activity over legitimate finance-related applications.
Detects the use of the 'getevent' utility by processes running under the 'shell' user (UID 2000) or accessing '/dev/input' directories, which is indicative of keylogging behavior often utilized by the RatHat Android malware to capture user input.
This rule detects activities related to potential keylogging or unauthorized input monitoring on Android devices. It flags processes, classes, or raw log data associated with 'UniversalInputMonitor' and monitors for keywords commonly used in password or PIN input fields, or when Android accessibility services interact with masked input fields.
This rule detects potentially malicious Android activity targeting financial and messaging applications (WeChat, Alipay). It monitors for suspicious app installation, abuse of Android accessibility services, and unauthorized overlay window activity which are common techniques used by banking trojans for credential theft and unauthorized transaction interception.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized network communication with AI platforms (OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini) or Telegram from hosts executing suspicious processes or tools, such as 'frpc' (Fast Reverse Proxy), 'liblocal-service.so', or processes interacting with Android Debug Bridge (adb) utilities. This behavior often suggests the use of automated tools, remote tunneling, or interaction with AI models for post-exploitation tasks, such as code generation for malicious scripts or C2 activity.
This rule monitors Android device process events for the execution of 'adb' commands aimed at modifying sensitive system configurations. It specifically tracks attempts to enable accessibility services, toggle wireless debugging, or establish unauthorized ADB pairings. The rule identifies potential malicious intent by aggregating multiple suspicious configuration changes on the same device within a short time window.
This rule monitors Android device process events for the execution of 'adb' commands aimed at modifying sensitive system configurations. It specifically tracks attempts to enable accessibility services, toggle wireless debugging, or establish unauthorized ADB pairings. The rule identifies potential malicious intent by aggregating multiple suspicious configuration changes on the same device within a short time window.
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