Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
200 detections
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Detects the sensitive project-wide CI/CD variable API_TOKEN being exposed to job scopes other than the gitlab-triage automation job that is its only intended consumer, expanding the blast radius of the credential.
Detects the sensitive project-wide CI/CD variable API_TOKEN being exposed to job scopes other than the gitlab-triage automation job that is its only intended consumer, expanding the blast radius of the credential.
Detects a single GitLab token/account holding Owner-level access across an unusually large number of projects (50+), the standing-privilege condition that turned one leaked token into a 55-project supply-chain exposure.
Detects GitLab CI job shell commands that redirect the environment to a .tmp file, a pattern identified in the GnuTLS GitLab token leak.
Detects CI/CD job activity referencing shell commands that redirect the entire environment to a file (e.g. 'env > out.tmp'), the exact pattern that caused a GitLab CI job in the openconnect/ocserv project to dump secrets into a public build artifact, leaking a high-privilege personal access token with Owner access to GnuTLS and 55 other critical projects.
Detects CI/CD job activity referencing shell commands that redirect the entire environment to a file (e.g. 'env > out.tmp'), the exact pattern that caused a GitLab CI job in the openconnect/ocserv project to dump secrets into a public build artifact, leaking a high-privilege personal access token with Owner access to GnuTLS and 55 other critical projects.
Detects the installation of software packages in build or CI pipelines where the package was published to its registry between 30 and 90 days prior to being first used in the environment. This pattern is indicative of potential dependency confusion or typosquatting attacks, where adversaries use newly created packages to deliver malicious code.
Detects the installation of software packages in build or CI pipelines where the package was published to its registry between 30 and 90 days prior to being first used in the environment. This pattern is indicative of potential dependency confusion or typosquatting attacks, where adversaries use newly created packages to deliver malicious code.
Detects anomalous shell processes spawned as children of Git operations ('git apply' with index flags or specific plumbing commands) typical of the Gitea repository RCE vulnerability (CVE-2026-60004). This rule identifies malicious Git hooks triggered by the Gitea service account to execute arbitrary commands.
Detects unauthorized HTTP requests to Gitea containing an 'X-WEBAUTH-USER' header set to 'admin'. This targets CVE-2026-20896, where a misconfigured reverse proxy trust setting allows external users to spoof authentication and gain administrative privileges.
Detects processes spawned by the GitLab Runner binary (gitlab-runner-windows-amd64.exe) where the working directory is set to the GitLab CI/CD build folder (C:\GitLab-Runner\builds\). This activity is indicative of automated job execution which, when occurring on non-developer or unauthorized hosts, may represent command dispatch by an attacker using a rogue or compromised runner for C2 operations.
Detects unauthorized access or modification to common CI/CD credential files (.npmrc, .pypirc, .git-credentials, jenkins credentials.xml) and CI/CD configuration files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml). The rule monitors both file system activities by non-standard processes and the execution of command-line tools that reference these sensitive files.
Detects unauthorized access or modification to common CI/CD credential files (.npmrc, .pypirc, .git-credentials, jenkins credentials.xml) and CI/CD configuration files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml). The rule monitors both file system activities by non-standard processes and the execution of command-line tools that reference these sensitive files.
Detects the GitLab Runner process (gitlab-runner-windows-amd64.exe) spawning PowerShell with command-line arguments indicative of a C2 framework or manual operator interaction, such as '-NoProfile', '-NonInteractive', '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass', and '-Command'. The rule specifically targets instances where these processes are executed under the SYSTEM account, a behavior commonly associated with exploiting CI/CD runners for persistent command execution.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration to a GitLab repository. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to gitlab.com with the URI containing '/git-receive-pack' and a data size greater than 10KB. This pattern is indicative of a 'git push' operation, which could be used to exfiltrate data.
This rule detects a high volume of requests to download repository archives from a GitLab instance. Specifically, it triggers when 10 or more HTTP requests containing '/repository/archive' in the URI and 'gitlab.' in the HTTP host header are observed from the same source IP within a 60-second window. This behavior could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate data by bulk downloading repository contents.
The following analytic detects the use of default or publicly known named pipes associated with Cobalt Strike. It leverages Sysmon EventID 17 and 18 to identify specific named pipes commonly used by Cobalt Strike's Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. This activity is significant because Cobalt Strike is a popular tool for adversaries to conduct post-exploitation tasks, and identifying its named pipes can reveal potential malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an active Cobalt Strike beacon, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
This analytic detects suspicious data transfer activities involving the use of the `split` syscall with the `-b` option, which specifies the size of each output file. This technique can be used by attackers to evade detection by breaking large files into smaller parts, bypassing size-based security controls, and facilitating covert exfiltration of sensitive data. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized use of the `split` syscall with a specified block size, this analytic helps identify potential data exfiltration attempts.
This analytic identifies the bulk creation of ransomware notes (e.g., .txt, .html, .hta files) on an infected machine. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to detect multiple instances of these file types being created within a short time frame (10 seconds). A detection is triggered if 15 or more unique readme paths are observed. This activity is a strong indicator of an active ransomware attack, where the attacker is notifying the victim of the encryption. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to widespread data encryption, rendering critical files inaccessible and potentially causing significant operational disruption.
The following analytic detects suspicious attempts to find credentials stored in password stores, indicating a potential attacker's effort to access sensitive login information. Password stores are critical repositories that contain valuable credentials, and unauthorized access to them can lead to significant security breaches. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized activities related to password store access, this analytic helps identify potential credential theft attempts, allowing security teams to respond promptly and prevent unauthorized access to critical systems and data.
The following analytic identifies the execution of RAR utilities to archive files on a system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, GUIDs, and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as threat actors, including red-teamers and malware like DarkGate, use RAR archiving to compress and exfiltrate collected data from compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to the unauthorized transfer of sensitive information to command and control servers, posing a severe risk to data confidentiality and integrity.
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