Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender security features by monitoring for unauthorized modifications to specific registry keys (DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, or the WinDefend service start type) in conjunction with related process execution activity (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, reg, or MpCmdRun) that includes keywords associated with defender configuration changes.
This rule detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender security features by monitoring for unauthorized modifications to specific registry keys (DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, or the WinDefend service start type) in conjunction with related process execution activity (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, reg, or MpCmdRun) that includes keywords associated with defender configuration changes.
Matches known SHA-256 hashes of AvisLoader toolkit components recovered from an exposed staging server: the Windows loader client, UAC-bypass helper, and process-hiding DLL
This rule detects modifications to Microsoft Defender antivirus exclusions. Adversaries often add paths or files to the exclusion list to prevent the detection of malicious tools or staging folders during cyberattacks. The rule monitors both command-line execution of PowerShell (Add-MpPreference/Set-MpPreference) and direct registry modifications related to Windows Defender paths.
Detects the use of the Add-MpPreference cmdlet with -ExclusionPath, or processes spawned by CRUDEEXCLUDE.exe, which are associated with configuring Microsoft Defender exclusion paths. This is often used by adversaries to evade detection by excluding malicious files or directories from antivirus scanning.
This rule detects Windows executable files that attempt to masquerade as legitimate software installers for Telegram, KeePass, or Pictory. These filenames and branding artifacts are associated with social engineering campaigns known to distribute malware families such as HEAVYGRAM and CRUDEEXCLUDE.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process related to Electron (a framework often used for cross-platform desktop applications) executes a hidden, obfuscated PowerShell command, followed by a subsequent PowerShell command to modify Microsoft Defender settings by adding an exclusion path for the 'AppData' directory within 10 minutes of the first process.
Detects execution of PowerShell scripts attempting to modify Windows Defender settings by adding directory exclusions (including the C:\ drive) via cmdlets like Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference, or WMI/CIM methods, often followed by a forced Group Policy refresh. This pattern is associated with malicious staging activity, including malware loaders like LausivLoader.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task configured to run under the SYSTEM account that executes a command to add a Windows Defender exclusion using Add-MpPreference. This technique is often used to ensure persistence of security exclusions by re-applying them automatically with high privileges, even if an interactive user attempts to remove them.
Detects 32-bit Windows PE files packed with UPX that exhibit a zeroed compile timestamp, a characteristic often associated with staged SalatStealer or XenoRAT binaries observed in Operation CameraSwarm.
Detects attempts to modify Microsoft Defender settings, such as adding file path exclusions via PowerShell, Registry manipulation, or Scheduled Tasks, as well as disabling Tamper Protection. These actions are commonly used by attackers to evade security monitoring by hiding malicious files or disabling protective features.
Detects the PUROSANGUE malware loader, which achieves execution by being sideloaded as 'vsdbg.dll' alongside a legitimate debugger executable. The detection leverages YARA rules focusing on specific artifacts such as a hardcoded build path, a custom Base16 alphabet, and a structural anomaly in the PE file's .reloc section compared to the declared base relocation directory size, alongside known malicious hash values.
Detects a suspicious sequence of activity involving persistence via Registry Run keys (specifically targeting SMQDService or winappx entries) followed by modifications to Microsoft Defender configuration (adding exclusions via PowerShell) within a two-hour window on the same device.
Detects a suspicious sequence of activity involving persistence via Registry Run keys (specifically targeting SMQDService or winappx entries) followed by modifications to Microsoft Defender configuration (adding exclusions via PowerShell) within a two-hour window on the same device.
Detects Microsoft Defender (MsMpEng) performing scan or remediation actions against non-standard filesystem paths, specifically NT object-manager namespace paths or CLFS-driver-prefixed paths. This behavior is indicative of an exploitation attempt (e.g., CVE-2026-69414) where an attacker uses symbolic links and CLFS driver namespaces to redirect the Defender scanning engine to arbitrary files on the system, potentially allowing file reads as SYSTEM.
Detects suspicious PE files that masquerade as Mozilla Firefox by using Firefox-related product names and metadata, but lack valid Mozilla Corporation code-signing signatures and are located within the ProgramData directory.
Detects the use of the wevtutil.exe utility to clear the Microsoft-Windows-Defender/Operational event log, a technique used by adversaries to disrupt security monitoring and hide malicious activity.
This rule detects potential attempts to tamper with or bypass Windows Defender by monitoring for files or processes named 'ShieldCrash' occurring in close temporal proximity to the creation or modification of files within Windows Defender's shadow or scan directories (BaseNamedObjects\Restricted\WD_SHADOW_ or WD_SCAN). This behavior is often associated with malware attempting to evade security detection.
Detects pre-encryption defensive measures employed by the Monkey ransomware C++ variant. This rule triggers on behaviors including Microsoft Defender exclusion management, disabling of AMSI or ETW components, manipulation of system security settings via registry, and attempts to clear PowerShell or command-line history to facilitate anti-forensic evasion.
Detects the use of the 'Add-MpPreference' PowerShell cmdlet with the '-ExclusionPath' parameter, which is used to add file, folder, or extension exclusions to Microsoft Defender. Attackers frequently use this technique to prevent security software from scanning or detecting malicious files or directories.
This rule detects the use of the 'Add-MpPreference' PowerShell cmdlet with the '-ExclusionPath' argument to add specific file or directory paths to Microsoft Defender's exclusion list. This behavior is a common technique used by adversaries to bypass security controls by ensuring malicious tools or scripts are not scanned by Windows Defender. The rule specifically alerts on exclusions related to common staging areas or specific tools such as Telegram Desktop, SSH cache folders, and package management directories.
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