Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic identifies the creation of a new service on a remote endpoint using sc.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically monitoring for EventCode 7045, which indicates a new service creation. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or execute arbitrary code on the remote system, potentially leading to further compromise of the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments used to query elevated domain or sensitive groups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to identify high-privileged users within Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further attacks aimed at compromising privileged accounts, escalating privileges, or gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.
The following analytic detects the use of `reg.exe` to export Windows Registry hives, which may contain sensitive credentials. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving `save` or `export` actions targeting the `sam`, `system`, or `security` hives. This activity is significant as it indicates potential offline credential access attacks, often executed from untrusted processes or scripts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain access to credential data, enabling further compromise and lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of WMI command lines used to create or execute processes. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line events that include specific keywords like "process," "call," and "create." This activity is significant because adversaries often use WMI to execute malicious payloads on local or remote hosts, potentially bypassing traditional security controls. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.
The following analytic identifies a LOLBAS process being executed where it's process name does not match it's original file name attribute.
Processes that have been renamed and executed may be an indicator that an adversary is attempting to evade defenses or execute malicious code.
The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code.
Processes that have been renamed and executed may be an indicator that an adversary is attempting to evade defenses or execute malicious code.
The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code.
Detects legitimate applications writing any type of file to uncommon or suspicious locations that are not typical for application data storage or execution.
Adversaries may leverage legitimate applications (Living off the Land Binaries - LOLBins) to drop or download malicious files to uncommon locations on the system to evade detection by security solutions.
Adversaries may leverage legitimate applications (Living off the Land Binaries - LOLBins) to drop or download malicious files to uncommon locations on the system to evade detection by security solutions.
Detects registry modifications related to Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge extension force-install policies (ExtensionInstallForcelist or ExtensionSettings) by processes other than svchost.exe. Attackers may abuse this to install malicious browser extensions for persistence or credential harvesting.
Detects Play-style lateral movement via Group Policy: an executable (.exe/.dll) written to a SYSVOL/GPO path by the same non-machine account that modified a GPO in the same 30-minute window. Attackers use this to push ransomware or Cobalt Strike/SystemBC payloads domain-wide.
Detects file events involving NCrypt.exe, which may indicate process execution or file modification related to cryptographic functions or potential masquerading.
Detects the deletion of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet History logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
The following analytic identifies a popular 3rd party software process being executed where it's process name does not match it's original file name attribute.
Processes that have been renamed and executed may be an indicator that an adversary is attempting to evade defenses or execute malicious code.
Processes that have been renamed and executed may be an indicator that an adversary is attempting to evade defenses or execute malicious code.
This detection identifies potential abuse of SSH "ProxyCommand" or "LocalCommand" by monitoring for suspicious process execution patterns.
Specifically, it looks for instances where ssh.exe (as a parent process) containing "ProxyCommand" or "LocalCommand" in its arguments spawns potentially malicious child processes like mshta, powershell, wscript, or cscript, or processes containing "http" in their command line.
This technique can be used by attackers to execute arbitrary commands through SSH proxy configurations, potentially enabling command & control activities or remote code execution. The detection focuses on commonly abused Windows scripting engines and web requests that may indicate malicious activity when spawned through SSH proxy commands.
Specifically, it looks for instances where ssh.exe (as a parent process) containing "ProxyCommand" or "LocalCommand" in its arguments spawns potentially malicious child processes like mshta, powershell, wscript, or cscript, or processes containing "http" in their command line.
This technique can be used by attackers to execute arbitrary commands through SSH proxy configurations, potentially enabling command & control activities or remote code execution. The detection focuses on commonly abused Windows scripting engines and web requests that may indicate malicious activity when spawned through SSH proxy commands.
The following analytic detects possible credential dumping by identifying suspicious process access to LSASS with credential-dumping-related call traces.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for access masks that combine PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION (0x1000) and PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE (0x40).
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for access masks that combine PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION (0x1000) and PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE (0x40).
The following analytic detects attempts to stop security-related services on an endpoint, which may indicate malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for processes involving the "sc.exe" or "net.exe" command with the "stop" parameter or the PowerShell "Stop-Service" cmdlet. This activity is significant because disabling security services can undermine the organization's security posture, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further attacks like malware installation or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could compromise the endpoint and the entire network, necessitating immediate investigation and response.
Detects the creation, modification or deletion of a WMI permanent event subscription using Sysmon EventID 21.
The following analytic detects the execution of programs initiated by forfiles.exe. This command is typically used to run commands on multiple files, often within batch scripts. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where forfiles.exe is the parent process. This activity is significant because forfiles.exe can be exploited to bypass command line execution protections, making it a potential vector for malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further system compromise.
The following analytic detects programs initiated by pcalua.exe, the Microsoft Windows Program Compatibility Assistant. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process information. While pcalua.exe can start legitimate programs, it is significant because attackers may use it to bypass command line execution protections. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to unauthorized actions, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.
The following analytic detects attempts to dump the LSASS process memory, a common technique in credential dumping attacks. It leverages Sysmon logs, specifically EventCode 10, to identify suspicious call traces to dbgcore.dll and dbghelp.dll associated with lsass.exe. This activity is significant as it often precedes the theft of sensitive login credentials, posing a high risk of unauthorized access to systems and data. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain access to critical credentials, enabling further compromise and lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows error recovery boot configurations using bcdedit.exe with flags such as "recoveryenabled" and "no". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because ransomware often disables recovery options to prevent system restoration, making it crucial for SOC analysts to investigate. If confirmed malicious, this could hinder recovery efforts, allowing ransomware to cause extensive damage and complicate remediation.
The following analytic identifies instances of control.exe loading a .cpl or .inf file from a writable directory, which is related to CVE-2021-40444. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain control over the affected system, leading to further compromise.
The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) using InfoTech Storage Handlers to load Windows script code from a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because it can be used to execute malicious scripts embedded within CHM files, potentially leading to code execution. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
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