Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of the Windows Diskpart utility using a script file, as indicated by the /s command-line argument. This behavior is often associated with malicious actors attempting to perform destructive operations such as removing recovery partitions to inhibit system recovery during ransomware attacks.
Detects the execution of the Rubeus tool, a widely used offensive security tool for Kerberos manipulation, including ticket requests, pass-the-ticket, and credential dumping.
This rule detects file access events targeting sensitive files such as credential stores, configuration files (e.g., .env, config.yaml, wallet.dat), and AWS credential files. This is indicative of an adversary searching for stored secrets or configuration data to facilitate further lateral movement or privilege escalation. The rule excludes common developer tools like code editors and file explorers to reduce noise.
This rule detects the execution of the Rubeus tool, a known C# toolkit for raw Kerberos interaction. The rule specifically alerts on command-line arguments associated with common Kerberos attacks such as Kerberoasting, requesting TGT/TGS tickets, and performing Pass-the-Ticket operations.
This rule detects potential unauthorized use of MeshAgent RMM software by correlating process execution events (mvtcs.exe, MeshAgent) with network traffic to specific IP addresses identified as associated with Settra command-and-control infrastructure. It specifically filters for MeshAgent activity and validates the threat by requiring an established network connection to known malicious endpoints.
This rule detects potential unauthorized use of MeshAgent RMM software by correlating process execution events (mvtcs.exe, MeshAgent) with network traffic to specific IP addresses identified as associated with Settra command-and-control infrastructure. It specifically filters for MeshAgent activity and validates the threat by requiring an established network connection to known malicious endpoints.
Detects a sequence of events consistent with credential dumping of sensitive Windows registry hives (SAM, SYSTEM, SECURITY). The attack involves querying shadow copies using vssadmin, creating a symbolic link to the shadow copy volume via mklink, and copying the hive files from that location. Cleanup attempts using rmdir are also monitored.
Detects anomalous post-exploitation behaviors such as mass file modifications, lateral movement (SMB/RDP), or persistence mechanisms (scheduled tasks/services) following ScreenConnect client session activity. This behavior is indicative of potential exploitation of ScreenConnect to deploy ransomware or move laterally within the network.
Detects evidence of CRPx0 ClickFix ransomware execution by monitoring the HKCU RunMRU registry key for patterns indicating the execution of obfuscated or malicious commands (PowerShell, curl, or base64 encoded strings) consistent with clipboard-hijacking social engineering campaigns.
Detects the use of MSBuild.exe to compile and execute inline code or tasks. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns (such as Task/CodeTaskFactory), execution from non-standard directories (Temp, AppData, Downloads, etc.), and subsequent network or child process activity originating from these MSBuild instances, indicating potential defense evasion or code execution.
Detects rapid, machine-speed, sequential attack-path adaptation by suspected AI agent binaries. The rule monitors for a correlation of four stages occurring within a tight 20-minute window: 1) Failed service connections across three or more distinct protocols (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM), 2) Credential access attempts (Logon events or execution of known credential-dumping tools), and 3) A lateral movement pivot to a new, previously un-targeted internal destination. The rule specifically keys on the InitiatingProcessId and InitiatingProcessCreationTime to ensure the sequence is attributed to a single process instance, distinguishing it from human manual penetration testing activity. Covers T1190, T1210, T1078
Detects rapid, multi-category system and network enumeration performed by AI-assisted development tools (e.g., Cursor, Claude, ChatGPT). The rule triggers when an AI agent process performs a comprehensive scan of the host environment, specifically covering machine/OS identity, network configuration, process listings, installed software, and access to sensitive credential files within a 10-minute window. It requires at least 5 distinct discovery categories and 6 total events to reduce noise from routine debugging. Covers T1082, T1016, T1057, T1518
Detects instances where a web browser process (e.g., Chrome, Edge, Firefox) spawns a command shell (cmd.exe) or PowerShell (powershell.exe). This pattern is frequently associated with malicious 'ClickFix' or 'fake decryption' social engineering campaigns where users are tricked into copying and executing malicious commands into a terminal.
Detects instances where known NetSupport Manager binaries (client32.exe, netsupportmanager.exe, pcicfgnt.exe) are used to perform persistence-related actions, such as creating a new Windows service, adding a scheduled task, or modifying Run/Winlogon registry keys.
Detects the creation of a registry value named 'SnapCart' within the Windows Run keys. Adversaries use Run keys to ensure that malicious programs execute automatically upon user login or system startup, establishing persistence on the compromised host.
Detects indicators of the SparroWocky Trident loader, including specific side-loaded DLLs (winfsp-x64.dll, DukeQt.dll), encrypted payload files with custom magic headers, persistence mechanisms such as specific service names and registry keys, inter-process communication objects (mutexes, events, shared memory), and named pipes used for C2 communication.
Detects ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where users are prompted to copy and execute malicious commands in a shell environment. The rule triggers on process execution of terminal or shell binaries (zsh, sh, cmd.exe, powershell.exe) containing indicators of obfuscated execution or remote code downloading, such as piped shell commands (curl | sh/zsh) or PowerShell encoded command execution.
This rule monitors for a variety of indicators associated with malicious activity, including connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific malicious file hashes or filenames, modifications to Windows system policies (specifically Legal Notice configuration), and changes to Active Directory Group Policy Objects using specified GUIDs.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command-line activity involving the use of encoded, obfuscated, or stealth-focused flags, as well as common patterns associated with fileless payload delivery and execution.
Detects the creation of permanent WMI event subscriptions which can be used by adversaries to establish persistence by triggering malicious code execution upon specific system events. The rule monitors Sysmon events 19, 20, and 21 as well as Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity logs for modifications involving Event Filters, Consumers, and Bindings, specifically looking for CommandLineEventConsumer or ActiveScriptEventConsumer.
Detects the abuse of the Windows built-in utility 'certutil.exe' to download files or decode obfuscated payloads. Attackers frequently use certutil as a Living off the Land Binary (LOLBin) to bypass security controls by leveraging its native capabilities for file transfer (via URL cache) and base64 or hexadecimal decoding.
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