Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a potential security risk by identifying instances where a user registers a new security information method (e.g., FIDO2/Passkey) and subsequently logs in using that same authentication method within a 15-minute window. This pattern may indicate an attacker who has gained initial access or compromised credentials and is attempting to establish persistence or facilitate further account takeovers by registering their own multifactor authentication device.
This rule detects a high frequency of sessions related to Azure Cloud Shell or portal consoles initiated from the same IP address within a one-hour window. Frequent access to Azure Cloud Shell can indicate potentially suspicious administrative behavior, reconnaissance, or automated interaction with the cloud environment.
Detects sign-ins from known UNC6671 residential-proxy IPs, ranked by rarity (first-seen for the user) and correlated with a following sensitive account action (MFA registration, mailbox rule change, admin role change).
This rule detects suspicious Microsoft Graph API activity involving the enumeration of user accounts within an organization. It specifically monitors for queries targeting personnel in sensitive roles such as payroll, finance, HR, and administration, as well as bulk enumeration attempts. The detection logic also flags usage of the axios HTTP library, a common tool in such reconnaissance campaigns, and aggregates results by source IP/ASN to identify coordinated efforts, such as those associated with the Storm-2755 threat actor.
This rule detects the file deletion activities on azure blob storage accounts
This rule detects potential account takeover or persistent access via MFA manipulation by correlating recent MFA-related sign-in failures with subsequent successful identity management operations such as updating security info or registering a new MFA method. This behavior pattern is frequently associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing or vishing attacks where an attacker compromises credentials, overcomes MFA challenges, and then establishes their own MFA device to maintain persistent access.
This rule monitors Azure Key Vault operations, specifically focusing on unauthorized or excessive retrieval of secrets, keys, or certificates. It triggers when a specific user or service principal makes 10 or more requests for unique assets within a 10-minute window, which may indicate automated discovery, mass exfiltration, or a brute-force attempt to harvest credentials stored within the vault.
This rule detects a high frequency of sessions related to Azure Cloud Shell or portal consoles initiated from the same IP address within a one-hour window. Frequent access to Azure Cloud Shell can indicate potentially suspicious administrative behavior, reconnaissance, or automated interaction with the cloud environment.
Detects a single user account authenticating from an unusually high number of distinct IP addresses within a short timeframe (1 hour), which may indicate the use of rotating proxy services or account sharing, commonly associated with unauthorized access or reseller activity.
Detects successful sign-ins using the device code authentication flow that are infrequent for a specific user and location. This flow is often targeted by attackers attempting to bypass MFA or perform device phishing, as it requires the user to manually authorize the device on a separate platform.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized command-line activity originating from Power Platform-related execution environments (such as Copilot Studio or Power Platform sandboxes). It specifically monitors for the execution of common system administration binaries like cmd, powershell, or curl, which, when triggered from within a low-code/cloud runtime environment, may indicate a sandbox escape or an attempt to interact with the underlying host operating system.
A GitHub maintainer account related to the keyv/cacheable npm package ecosystem was compromised. The attacker published malicious versions of these packages, which affected more than 400 npm packages. The malware is designed to steal cloud credentials, developer secrets, CI/CD secrets, AI tool configuration files, and cryptocurrency wallet data. It also creates persistence using Claude Code hooks and VS Code tasks.json files, and sends stolen data to attacker-controlled GitHub repositories and C2 domains.
Reference article: https://www.wiz.io/blog/keyv-and-cacheable-npm-supply-chain-attack
Reference article: https://www.wiz.io/blog/keyv-and-cacheable-npm-supply-chain-attack
Detects a user registering a new MFA or authentication method within a short window after multiple failed Entra ID sign-in attempts, without a corresponding verified helpdesk password-reset ticket. This pattern is indicative of vishing or helpdesk-impersonation attacks aimed at hijacking user accounts by circumventing MFA controls.
Detects potential data exfiltration attempts using PowerShell by identifying Invoke-WebRequest usage with specific flags (Put, ContentType, InFile) or encoding patterns (EncodedCommand) while targeting sensitive file extensions, directories, or suspicious network destinations.
KQL Query from file: Hunting Mirage kitten AKA unc1549
Detects sign-in events using 'deviceCode' authentication or single-factor authentication via mobile/desktop clients where the device identifier has not been seen in the previous 30 days. This pattern can indicate an adversary using a new device to access an account, potentially utilizing stolen sessions or bypassing MFA.
This rule monitors Azure Key Vault operations, specifically focusing on unauthorized or excessive retrieval of secrets, keys, or certificates. It triggers when a specific user or service principal makes 10 or more requests for unique assets within a 10-minute window, which may indicate automated discovery, mass exfiltration, or a brute-force attempt to harvest credentials stored within the vault.
Detects anomalous device code authentication patterns by monitoring SigninLogs for accounts utilizing the device code flow across multiple countries or with a high volume of attempts within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of potential device code phishing or automated authentication abuse.
This rule monitors for high-volume deletion of Azure Recovery Services backup items or vaults performed by a single user across multiple subscriptions or regions within a 2-hour window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to inhibit system recovery by destroying cloud backups before performing other destructive operations like ransomware or data wiping.
Detects non-interactive sign-ins (refresh-token usage) for Microsoft Purview Communication Compliance reviewer accounts (Administrator, Analyst, or Investigator roles) that originate from IP addresses not observed for the user in the previous 21 days. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft or session hijacking attempting to bypass multi-factor authentication.
This rule identifies Service Principals in Microsoft Entra ID that have successfully authenticated after a long period of dormancy (defined as 90 days or more). Reactivation of dormant service principals may indicate that an adversary is attempting to revive a persistent access method or abuse credentials that were previously set aside.
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