Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,056 detections
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This rule monitors for network connections and process activities associated with known malicious indicators, including file hashes, C2 IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs. It maps these activities to identify potential command and control communication or other malicious network activity occurring on endpoints.
Sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over a rolling 30-day window for known RevStealer indicators: exact SHA-256 matches against all 13 published file hashes, and exact-host matches (via parsed URL host, not substring) against the confirmed C2 domain meta7.archscreen68.one. An empty, extensible IP list is included for when a malicious IP is published.
Detects the installation of unauthorized AI-related browser extensions followed by outbound network communication from the browser process to known external AI service API endpoints within one hour. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration via shadow AI tools, bypassing standard enterprise DLP controls.
Detects the installation of unauthorized AI-related browser extensions followed by outbound network communication from the browser process to known external AI service API endpoints within one hour. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration via shadow AI tools, bypassing standard enterprise DLP controls.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious local command execution (via PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) that mirrors the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern, followed by an OAuth application consent grant or device-code authorization by the same user within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by tricking a user into authorizing a malicious application after establishing local execution on their endpoint.
Detects anomalous access to the SharePoint WebPartPages.asmx SOAP endpoint, specifically using the GetWebPartPageConnectionInfo method. This query identifies patterns consistent with the exploitation of CVE-2026-65660, where adversaries attempt to smuggle WebPart template markup (e.g., <%@ Register, XamlServices) after legitimate preview methods have been disabled.
This rule detects potentially malicious POST requests to SharePoint endpoints (such as AddGallery.aspx) that include indicators of WebPartMarkup or ToolPane payloads. This activity attempts to bypass the SPUtility.EnsureAuthentication() check that is typically enforced on the ToolPane.aspx page, potentially allowing unauthorized code execution or configuration manipulation.
This rule detects suspicious activity where a user account executes multiple disparate reconnaissance or discovery commands within a 30-minute window. It monitors for the execution of common Windows administration and discovery tools like dsquery, nltest, net, nslookup, and tasklist using specific, non-standard arguments indicative of network or domain reconnaissance.
Detects the 'mscopilot.exe' binary performing token manipulation operations (DuplicateTokenEx, ImpersonateLoggedOnUser, SetThreadToken) followed by the creation of a new process with a different security context (CreateProcessAsUserW) within a five-minute window, indicative of C2 agent functionality.
Detects credential-dumping modules (such as nanodump, hashdump, and lsadump variants) associated with AdaptixC2 framework being invoked or used by the 'mscopilot.exe' process. The rule monitors for command-line arguments indicating credential extraction, unauthorized attempts to open handle to lsass.exe, and access to sensitive registry hives (SAM, Security, LSA) by the suspect process.
Detects Windows Event 4662 indicating the use of DS-Replication-Get-Changes or DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended rights from a host that is not a known domain controller. This behavior is highly indicative of credential dumping via DCSync, commonly associated with tools like Mimikatz.
Detects anomalous Kerberos TGT (4768) or TGS (4769) requests where the ticket lifetime exceeds typical domain policy (10 hours), or where the KRBTGT account is explicitly referenced as the target, both of which are high-fidelity indicators of Golden Ticket forgery attacks.
Detects the creation or modification of WMI Event Subscriptions (Filters, Consumers, and Bindings) using administrative tools like wmic, powershell, or mofcomp. This behavior is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence or facilitate execution via WMI event triggers.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects anomalous lateral movement behavior where a user account authenticates via NTLM (Logon Type 3) to at least three different hosts within a 10-minute window and subsequently accesses administrative network shares (ADMIN$ or C$) on one or more of those target systems.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, powershell, diskshadow) to delete volume shadow copies or backup catalogs. This activity is commonly associated with ransomware operations intended to inhibit system recovery.
This rule detects various forms of process injection (Remote Thread, APC, Map View of Section) targeting common, high-value Windows processes such as explorer.exe, lsass.exe, and web browsers. This behavior is a common technique used by attackers to gain persistence, elevate privileges, or execute code within the context of legitimate system or user-level processes to evade detection.
Detects a sequence of multiple RDP authentication failures (Event ID 4625, Logon Type 10) from a specific source IP, followed by a successful RDP authentication (Event ID 4624, Logon Type 10) from the same source IP. This pattern indicates a successful credential brute force or password spraying attack against RDP, which is a common initial access vector for ransomware and lateral movement.
Detects Kerberos TGS requests using RC4 encryption (0x17), which is a common indicator of Kerberoasting. By monitoring Event IDs 4768 and 4769 for this specific encryption type, this rule identifies potential attempts to offline-crack service account passwords.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or Event ID 4698 that involve scripting interpreters (powershell, wscript, mshta, cmd) and suspicious command line arguments often associated with malicious activity, such as encoded commands, hidden windows, or network resource access, specifically when executing under the SYSTEM account context.
Detects Kerberos TGT (4768) or TGS (4769) tickets that exhibit anomalous characteristics often associated with forged tickets (e.g., Golden Ticket). The rule flags tickets using weak encryption (RC4-HMAC, legacy DES), tickets requested for stale/disabled accounts, or tickets with lifetimes exceeding standard domain policy thresholds.
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