Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors SCIM (System for Cross-domain Identity Management) logs for high-volume identity management operations, including account creation, deletion, or entitlement grants within a short 15-minute window. A trigger occurs if an actor performs 10 or more creations, 10 or more deletions, 10 or more entitlement grants, or 3 or more administrative role grants. This behavior may indicate an account compromise performing bulk manipulation of identities to maintain persistence or elevate privileges.
Detects a single Entra ID session (SessionId) being used from two different countries within one hour at a travel velocity no physical journey could achieve. This is a signature of a stolen session/refresh token being replayed by an actor from a different location than the legitimate user.
This rule detects potential malicious activity associated with the 'ClickFix' technique, commonly linked to Midnight Blizzard. It identifies a sequence of events where a device attempts to resolve or fetch a 'wpad.dat' file (a common indicator of proxy configuration manipulation or man-in-the-middle attempts) followed shortly thereafter by the execution of 'powershell.exe' or 'mshta.exe' spawned from 'explorer.exe' on the same host within a 30-minute window. This pattern is indicative of a user being coerced into executing malicious scripts under the guise of fixing connectivity or security prompts.
Detects sign-ins from the same user account occurring from two different countries within a short time window, where the implied travel velocity exceeds physically achievable speeds, indicating impossible travel or anomalous geolocation change consistent with a hijacked account or API key credential, with special attention to sudden access from China-based infrastructure.
Detects successful sign-ins using the device code authentication flow that are infrequent for a specific user and location. This flow is often targeted by attackers attempting to bypass MFA or perform device phishing, as it requires the user to manually authorize the device on a separate platform.
Detects anomalous device code authentication patterns by monitoring SigninLogs for accounts utilizing the device code flow across multiple countries or with a high volume of attempts within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of potential device code phishing or automated authentication abuse.
This rule monitors for high-volume deletion of Azure Recovery Services backup items or vaults performed by a single user across multiple subscriptions or regions within a 2-hour window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to inhibit system recovery by destroying cloud backups before performing other destructive operations like ransomware or data wiping.
This rule monitors for potentially malicious activities involving Azure AD Connect synchronization accounts. It flags anomalous sign-in events (e.g., interactive sign-ins or sign-ins originating from unauthorized IP addresses) and tracks when these sync accounts are granted privileged roles within the environment.
This rule monitors for potentially malicious activities involving Azure AD Connect synchronization accounts. It flags anomalous sign-in events (e.g., interactive sign-ins or sign-ins originating from unauthorized IP addresses) and tracks when these sync accounts are granted privileged roles within the environment.
Detects non-interactive sign-ins (refresh-token usage) for Microsoft Purview Communication Compliance reviewer accounts (Administrator, Analyst, or Investigator roles) that originate from IP addresses not observed for the user in the previous 21 days. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft or session hijacking attempting to bypass multi-factor authentication.
This rule detects 'impossible travel' activity performed by users assigned to sensitive Microsoft 365 Communication Compliance roles. It monitors Azure Sign-in logs for successful authentication events occurring within a short timeframe (1 hour) from multiple distinct geographic locations (countries) or different autonomous system numbers (ASNs). This behavior is characteristic of an adversary utilizing stolen session tokens or compromised credentials to access protected administrative functions.
Detects non-interactive sign-in events using specific Microsoft application IDs (Intune for Education, Intune portal) to access Microsoft Graph that do not have a corresponding successful or failed Conditional Access policy record. This suggests potential circumvention of Conditional Access policies or service-level activity bypassing standard authentication auditing.
Detects non-interactive sign-in events using specific Microsoft application IDs (Intune for Education, Intune portal) to access Microsoft Graph that do not have a corresponding successful or failed Conditional Access policy record. This suggests potential circumvention of Conditional Access policies or service-level activity bypassing standard authentication auditing.
This rule detects instances where a user grants an OAuth application consent to perform sensitive actions in an Azure AD environment. It specifically filters for high-risk scopes (such as Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite, or Directory.ReadWrite) granted to applications with publishers other than Microsoft Corporation, which is often indicative of OAuth consent phishing attacks or malicious application integration.
Detects sign-in events using 'deviceCode' authentication or single-factor authentication via mobile/desktop clients where the device identifier has not been seen in the previous 30 days. This pattern can indicate an adversary using a new device to access an account, potentially utilizing stolen sessions or bypassing MFA.
Detects a Node or Bun process reaching the cloud instance metadata service. The keyv/cacheable
stage-2 collector targets EC2 IMDS and ECS task metadata as the entry point to a broader sweep
covering AWS credential chains and Secrets Manager across all regions, GCP service account
keys, Azure client secrets, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens, GitHub
Actions OIDC request tokens and npm tokens. On a build agent this pattern is the clearest
signal that credential theft is in progress.
stage-2 collector targets EC2 IMDS and ECS task metadata as the entry point to a broader sweep
covering AWS credential chains and Secrets Manager across all regions, GCP service account
keys, Azure client secrets, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens, GitHub
Actions OIDC request tokens and npm tokens. On a build agent this pattern is the clearest
signal that credential theft is in progress.
This rule detects potential account takeover or persistent access via MFA manipulation by correlating recent MFA-related sign-in failures with subsequent successful identity management operations such as updating security info or registering a new MFA method. This behavior pattern is frequently associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing or vishing attacks where an attacker compromises credentials, overcomes MFA challenges, and then establishes their own MFA device to maintain persistent access.
This KQL detects possible impossible travel sign-in patterns by identifying users who had successful Entra ID sign-ins from different countries within a short time window of 4 hours.
This rule detects instances where a user grants an OAuth application consent to perform sensitive actions in an Azure AD environment. It specifically filters for high-risk scopes (such as Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite, or Directory.ReadWrite) granted to applications with publishers other than Microsoft Corporation, which is often indicative of OAuth consent phishing attacks or malicious application integration.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity against accounts classified as having a high blast radius. It correlates three stages of behavior: observed failed authentication attempts (brute force) against a high-blast-radius account, a password reset for that same account, and a subsequent successful logon outside of standard business hours (using Logon Types 3 or 10). The rule uses a password reset event as the mandatory anchor and flags suspicious sequences of events leading up to or following this change.
This rule identifies potential post-Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session hijacking by correlating suspicious initial authentication events (e.g., AiTM indicators, unusual behavioral flags) with subsequent successful sign-ins originating from known residential proxies or anonymization VPN providers within a 24-hour window.
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