Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule identifies potential lateral movement or account compromise by detecting accounts that have performed NTLM network logons or authentication (Events 4624/4776) without corresponding Kerberos pre-authentication or interactive logon events within a 15-minute window. This pattern often indicates the use of stolen credentials (e.g., Pass-the-Hash) to access network resources rather than standard interactive user activity.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash lateral movement by identifying NTLM network/remote-interactive logons from a single user account across three or more distinct destination hosts within a 15-minute window, correlated with the usage of common credential-dumping tools or commands on the source host.
Detects the creation of a Volume Shadow Copy followed by an attempt to copy the NTDS.dit file from the shadow copy device path. This sequence is a common technique used by attackers to bypass file locks and extract Active Directory credential databases.
Detects usage of the Rclone utility (or renamed binaries) to transfer data to various cloud storage backends (S3, Mega, pCloud, SFTP, WebDAV). The detection correlates this activity with the execution of common archival tools (7-Zip, WinRAR, TAR) within one hour prior to the data transfer, which is a common behavior of adversaries preparing data for exfiltration.
Detects high volumes of TGS-REQ events using RC4 encryption (etype 0x17) originating from a single account within a 10-minute window, excluding known service accounts and computer accounts. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary attempting to harvest service account tickets for offline brute-force cracking.
Detects the OIC-lure Mustang Panda PlugX infection chain with tightened false-positive controls: requires the console-resize artifact (mode.com with digit,digit args) that precedes the download, requires PowerShell to be parented directly by explorer.exe (filtering out legitimate scheduled-task/management-agent automation that also chains curl+tar), requires curl to combine -L with -k/-s (insecure/silent) flags, narrows all correlation windows to 2 minutes, and excludes shell/utility processes from the final execution match.
This rule detects successful network connections to known malicious IP addresses or the domain 'forgitlab.com', which are associated with the Azazel malware threat infrastructure.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule detects the execution of common Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) and remote access tools when initiated from suspicious parent processes (such as browsers, office applications, or command-line interpreters), originating from common writeable directories (e.g., Temp, Downloads), or executed with command-line arguments indicative of silent/unattended installation. This behavior is often associated with initial access, persistence establishment, or unauthorized remote control of a system.
This rule identifies two distinct security threats on Windows systems: the execution or presence of files matching a known malicious SHA256 hash list, and modifications to the 'PromptOnSecureDesktop' registry key, which could indicate an attempt to weaken User Account Control (UAC) protections.
This rule detects file and process activity originating from or involving specific directories and filenames associated with 'Agta' software, including temporary files such as PowerShell scripts and XML tasks. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized use of backup or testing utilities for malicious purposes, such as script execution or task manipulation.
Detects activity associated with the MALFEX npm supply-chain campaign (also known as Overlord/movinlike). This rule performs a sweep for known malicious file hashes, suspicious process command lines, outbound network connections to malicious domains or IPs, and email communications from identified adversary-controlled accounts.
Detects the installation or execution of known MALFEX malicious packages via npm or Node.js, which are used as entry points for polyglot or disguised payload delivery.
Detects the installation or execution of known MALFEX malicious packages via npm or Node.js, which are used as entry points for polyglot or disguised payload delivery.
Detects the installation or execution of known MALFEX malicious packages via npm or Node.js, which are used as entry points for polyglot or disguised payload delivery.
Detects the use of Mimikatz-style command-line arguments to manipulate Kerberos tickets, including ticket requests, purges, and golden/silver ticket creation attempts.
Detects the use of Mimikatz 'sekurlsa::pth' command for credential manipulation, or the occurrence of SMB/Windows administrative share access (ADMIN$, C$) potentially indicating lateral movement activities.
Detects execution of AgtaBackupAgent.msi via command-line tools such as PowerShell or msiexec.exe. This activity is monitored as it may indicate an attempt to install backup software or potential malicious masquerading using the MSI installer, particularly when using silent flags or accessing from temp directories.
Detects the abuse of the Windows built-in utility 'certutil.exe' to download files from remote locations using the 'urlcache', 'verify', or 'verifyctl' arguments. Attackers often leverage this LOLBIN to download malicious payloads as it is a trusted system binary.
Detects attempts to inhibit system recovery by deleting Volume Shadow Copies or modifying Windows Boot Configuration Data, a technique commonly employed by LockBit and other ransomware families prior to file encryption.
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