Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

2,594 detections

Detects the use of a specific magic string ('sxcdewqaz!@#') commonly associated with the Fire Ant implant to trigger or activate reverse-tunneling capabilities over TCP ports 443, 541, 8443, and 10443.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
306
Detects SMTP MAIL FROM/Reply-To headers, DNS queries, or TLS SNI matches for known Business Email Compromise (BEC) lookalike domains (e.g., service-nowinc.com, domainlify.net) used for phishing or spoofing organizational identities.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
000
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed towards known phishing domains that mimic Brazilian financial and government portals, specifically targeting 'gerenciadorcaixa.digital', 'aapj.digital', and 'receitafederal.digital'.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects an HTTP GET request to 'dl.php' containing an 'f' parameter (target file) and an 'k' parameter (access token), followed by a response body starting with the 'MZ' header, indicating the successful download of a Windows PE executable as part of a potential phishing campaign stage-2 payload delivery.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
401
Detects an HTTP GET request to 'dl.php' containing an 'f' parameter (target file) and an 'k' parameter (access token), followed by a response body starting with the 'MZ' header, indicating the successful download of a Windows PE executable as part of a potential phishing campaign stage-2 payload delivery.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
101
Detects sustained beaconing behavior originating from the internal network to known malicious HVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing) C2 infrastructure. The rule identifies repeated connection attempts (5 or more TCP SYNs within a 180-second window) targeting specific hardcoded IP addresses on non-standard ports (27015/27017), indicative of a compromised host maintaining persistent C2 communication.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects sustained beaconing behavior originating from the internal network to known malicious HVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing) C2 infrastructure. The rule identifies repeated connection attempts (5 or more TCP SYNs within a 180-second window) targeting specific hardcoded IP addresses on non-standard ports (27015/27017), indicative of a compromised host maintaining persistent C2 communication.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects the specific C2 handshake pattern associated with HVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing) remote access trojans. The rule monitors for a unique sequence of markers, specifically CLIENT_ID, COMPUTER, IDENTIFIER_CHANNEL, and a version string, indicating a malware-specific communication protocol.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
This rule detects attempts to exploit a vulnerability in the WordPress Super Forms plugin (CVE-2026-14894). The rule monitors for malicious file upload requests containing embedded PHP code or attempts to bypass filename extensions for PHP files via the super_submit_form AJAX action.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
105
Detects incoming HTTP POST requests targeting the 'admin-ajax.php' endpoint with parameters associated with a malicious file upload exploit against Elementor Pro (CVE-2026-32475). The rule specifically looks for the 'elementor_pro_forms_send_form' action and the presence of PHP file extensions within form fields, indicating an attempt to upload a web shell.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
105
Detects inbound network traffic originating from IP addresses known to be associated with an exploit campaign targeting the Super Forms plugin (CVE-2026-14894). The rule acts as an indicator of compromise (IoC) match for potential exploitation attempts directed at internal network infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
005
Detects Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts targeting an MLflow server where an attacker-controlled HTTP redirect response forces the server to reach out to the cloud instance metadata service at 169.254.169.254. This rule specifically looks for HTTP 30x redirect status codes where the Location header contains the sensitive metadata service IP address.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
003
Detects Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts targeting an MLflow server where an attacker-controlled HTTP redirect response forces the server to reach out to the cloud instance metadata service at 169.254.169.254. This rule specifically looks for HTTP 30x redirect status codes where the Location header contains the sensitive metadata service IP address.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
003
Detects outbound network traffic associated with the Tailscale VPN protocol, specifically identifying potential unauthorized or personal tailnet communication channels. The detection monitors for TLS SNI strings ending in '.ts.net' and WireGuard handshakes on UDP port 41641. These indicators are common to all Tailscale client activity and require environment-specific exclusions of sanctioned Tailscale infrastructure to minimize noise.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
000
Detects potential exfiltration activity by identifying HTTP POST/PUT requests to known suspicious domains, including specific operator-controlled hosts and anonymous file sharing services, as well as the use of HTTP Range headers for bulk API data exfiltration.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
000
Detects indicators of cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks aimed at stealing web session cookies. The rule covers the injection of malicious scripts into client responses, anomalous CORS preflight responses that could facilitate data exfiltration, and subsequent HTTP callbacks or beaconing containing cookie data to external endpoints.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
000
This rule detects command-and-control (C2) communication patterns associated with the 'soraki-proxy.workers.dev' domain, a Cloudflare Workers-hosted proxy service. Additionally, it identifies potential malicious mTLS implants by flagging non-standard TLS handshakes that use self-signed or auto-generated certificates missing standard organization (O) fields in the subject DN.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
000
Detects Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts against Grafana instances using the 'X-Grafana-URL' header. The rule identifies requests attempting to access internal network ranges, link-local addresses, or cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254, localhost) via the Grafana MCP interface, particularly when non-GET HTTP methods are used to potentially mutate internal resources.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
003
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to suspicious .ru domains and DNS queries for these domains, indicative of C2 beaconing activity likely associated with a supply chain compromise affecting the Pub.dev ecosystem.
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Nate Dunning@nateossprey
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects network activity associated with the ProRAM C2 infrastructure. The rule monitors for DNS resolutions, TLS SNI field matches, and specific HTTP WebSocket upgrade patterns directed towards the 'clash-verge-upgrade.com' domain.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
003
Detects anomalous outbound HTTP traffic directed to /cli/check containing a specific 'X-CLI-Token' header value. This pattern is indicative of a Command and Control (C2) beaconing mechanism used by a compromised CLI tool or supply chain implant to verify connectivity or receive instructions.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
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