Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
This rule detects attempts to exploit the LiteLLM proxy pass-through endpoint to interact with the cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS). Specifically, it identifies configuration attempts to route traffic to the IMDS IP (169.254.169.254) and subsequent requests to retrieve IAM security credentials, which is indicative of a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack to steal cloud identity tokens.
Detects successful authentication attempts to a LiteLLM proxy instance using the hardcoded default master key 'sk-1234'. This activity indicates potential exploitation of misconfigured instances where default credentials remain unchanged.
Detects the execution of the Bun JavaScript runtime invoking 'index.js' as part of an npm lifecycle event (such as preinstall). This pattern is commonly used in supply chain attacks to execute arbitrary code during the installation of malicious packages.
Detects potential Qilin ransomware binaries following Cisco FMC-based intrusion by UAT-11988. Source intel provides only name-level attribution (no sample hash/byte IOC for the payload), so this is tightened to a valid PE, a plausible ransomware-payload size band, and >=2 occurrences of the family string -- a bare single 'Qilin' substring in an arbitrary PE (e.g. an unrelated app, build path, or AV/report string) is not sufficient to alert on alone.
Detects web requests to 'wp-admin/theme-install.php' containing suspicious query parameters that indicate an attempt to force an unauthenticated theme installation via a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) exploit (Click2Shell). The rule identifies requests with malicious payloads in the 'theme' parameter, specifically looking for indicators that attempt to bypass CSRF protections when originating from an external site or a non-admin session context.
This rule detects when common web server service accounts (e.g., www-data, apache) spawn Unix shell processes (sh, bash, dash) to execute system enumeration commands like 'id' or 'whoami'. This activity is often a sign of post-exploitation behavior following successful web application exploitation, where an attacker attempts to determine their context and privileges on the compromised host.
This rule detects when common web server service accounts (e.g., www-data, apache) spawn Unix shell processes (sh, bash, dash) to execute system enumeration commands like 'id' or 'whoami'. This activity is often a sign of post-exploitation behavior following successful web application exploitation, where an attacker attempts to determine their context and privileges on the compromised host.
This rule detects when common web server service accounts (e.g., www-data, apache) spawn Unix shell processes (sh, bash, dash) to execute system enumeration commands like 'id' or 'whoami'. This activity is often a sign of post-exploitation behavior following successful web application exploitation, where an attacker attempts to determine their context and privileges on the compromised host.
This rule detects potential web shell activity by identifying instances where a web server process creates or modifies a PHP file within a 'wp-content/themes' directory, followed closely (within 15 minutes) by that same web server process spawning a shell process (e.g., sh, bash, cmd.exe).
This rule detects potential web shell activity by identifying instances where a web server process creates or modifies a PHP file within a 'wp-content/themes' directory, followed closely (within 15 minutes) by that same web server process spawning a shell process (e.g., sh, bash, cmd.exe).
This rule detects potential web shell activity by identifying instances where a web server process creates or modifies a PHP file within a 'wp-content/themes' directory, followed closely (within 15 minutes) by that same web server process spawning a shell process (e.g., sh, bash, cmd.exe).
Detects modifications to the /etc/sudoers or /etc/sudoers.d configuration files by non-root users. This activity is often associated with privilege escalation attempts where an adversary attempts to modify sudo policies to grant themselves elevated permissions or bypass password requirements.
Detects modifications to the /etc/sudoers or /etc/sudoers.d configuration files by non-root users. This activity is often associated with privilege escalation attempts where an adversary attempts to modify sudo policies to grant themselves elevated permissions or bypass password requirements.
Detects modifications to the /etc/sudoers or /etc/sudoers.d configuration files by non-root users. This activity is often associated with privilege escalation attempts where an adversary attempts to modify sudo policies to grant themselves elevated permissions or bypass password requirements.
Detects anomalous staging activity associated with the 'PPPoEject' exploit. The rule identifies the creation of GRE or IP6GRE interfaces on bonding devices immediately preceding or concurrent with FUSE filesystem mounting or I/O activity. This pattern matches the exploitation workflow of racing pppoe_sendmsg() skb reallocation via dev_hard_header() to achieve privilege escalation.
Detects anomalous staging activity associated with the 'PPPoEject' exploit. The rule identifies the creation of GRE or IP6GRE interfaces on bonding devices immediately preceding or concurrent with FUSE filesystem mounting or I/O activity. This pattern matches the exploitation workflow of racing pppoe_sendmsg() skb reallocation via dev_hard_header() to achieve privilege escalation.
Detects anomalous staging activity associated with the 'PPPoEject' exploit. The rule identifies the creation of GRE or IP6GRE interfaces on bonding devices immediately preceding or concurrent with FUSE filesystem mounting or I/O activity. This pattern matches the exploitation workflow of racing pppoe_sendmsg() skb reallocation via dev_hard_header() to achieve privilege escalation.
Detects anomalous staging activity associated with the 'PPPoEject' exploit. The rule identifies the creation of GRE or IP6GRE interfaces on bonding devices immediately preceding or concurrent with FUSE filesystem mounting or I/O activity. This pattern matches the exploitation workflow of racing pppoe_sendmsg() skb reallocation via dev_hard_header() to achieve privilege escalation.
Detects unauthorized modifications, creations, or renames of Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) configuration files or core shared libraries (such as pam_rootok.so or pam_permit.so) by non-root users. Attackers often modify these files to bypass authentication mechanisms and achieve privilege escalation. The rule excludes common package management tools to minimize false positives.
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