Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,056 detections
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Detects msiexec.exe spawned from explorer.exe, consistent with a user double-clicking a malicious .lnk shortcut, where the command line triggers the installation of an MSI package hosted on a remote HTTP/HTTPS server. This behavior is a known initial access technique used by FIN7 to deliver malicious payloads.
Detects command-line indicators associated with destructive disk-wiping activity, specifically targeting disk structure corruption to render systems unbootable. This rule monitors for unauthorized use of the Windows 'diskpart' utility, direct raw physical drive access, and specific file system utility commands (fsutil) frequently observed in wipers attributed to APT44 (Sandworm).
This rule performs a sweep across device file and process events to identify the execution or presence of files matching a curated list of 161 SHA256 hashes associated with twelve known malicious threat actors and families (Lynx, ANUBIS, Rhysida, LockBit, ALPHV/BlackCat, Qilin, Medusa, The Gentlemen, NetRunner, Genesis, Pay2Key, and Handala). The rule filters out events occurring in known EDR/AV quarantine or sandbox directory structures and dedupes hits on a per-device and per-hash basis within 24-hour windows to reduce alert noise.
Detects endpoint, process, and network activity associated with the 'TaskStomp' threat actor, specifically targeting known malicious file hashes, command-and-control domains, and specific URLs used in their campaigns.
Detects the installation and execution of MeshAgent, a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool, by identifying specific command-line arguments, service names, and renamed binary execution. Adversaries often use RMM tools for persistent remote access and command and control.
This rule monitors network connections initiated by common web browsers (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, brave.exe) to known domains associated with a specific VPN proxy service or subscription-based proxy farm infrastructure. The rule flags endpoints communicating with URLs involved in proxy beaconing, fallback hosting, and subscription API calls.
Detects the installation of a browser extension that requests excessive permissions, including proxy configuration ('proxy' and 'webRequestAuthProvider') and unrestricted host access ('<all_urls>'). This pattern is commonly exploited by malicious extensions, such as the 'VPN for X' family, to perform adversary-in-the-middle attacks or proxy browser traffic.
Detects the BotHelper RAT performing live screen surveillance by identifying repeated high-frequency JPEG frame uploads to the '/api/v1/screen_live.php' endpoint, initiated by the 'msedge_proxy.exe' process.
Detects usage of the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) 'pair' command initiated by processes other than known legitimate Android development tools (e.g., adb.exe, Android Studio). This may indicate an attacker attempting to wirelessly pair a malicious device or gain unauthorized access to an Android device over the network.
Detects anomalous process execution (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wmic.exe, tasklist.exe, taskkill.exe) initiated by the process 'ReportDump.exe'. This activity is indicative of the SectopRAT payload performing remote shell, file management, or process control tasks initiated via a C2 channel.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks (Windows), cron jobs (Linux), or systemd timers where the initiating process is a common scripting or runtime interpreter (e.g., Python, Node.js, PowerShell, Java). This activity is often indicative of persistence mechanisms being established by a compromised agent or script-based process.
Detects unauthorized creation or modification of AI agent system prompts, guardrails, or policy configuration files. This rule monitors for changes made by processes or users other than those identified as authorized CI/CD deployment agents or service accounts, helping to prevent unauthorized tampering with AI agent behavior or safety policies.
Detects instances where AI agent runtime processes (e.g., Python, Node.js) initiate child processes using common Windows Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBAS). This behavior may indicate an AI agent has been compromised or misused to execute unauthorized system commands for defense evasion or post-exploitation activities.
This rule detects unauthorized or anomalous outbound network connections from known AI agent runtime processes to LLM or API endpoints. It helps identify potential data exfiltration by monitoring for connections to destinations outside of an organization's approved allow-list for model providers, effectively catching scenarios where a compromised AI agent is prompted to relay sensitive data to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests initiated by the Windows PowerShell User-Agent where the destination host is a decimal-encoded IP address. This pattern is commonly associated with ClickFix-style social engineering attacks, where users are tricked into executing obfuscated PowerShell commands to download malicious payloads.
Detects a process reading credential store files (Login Data) from multiple Chromium-based browsers, immediately followed by an HTTP POST request to a specific exfiltration endpoint associated with the Psychedelic Stealer malware.
Detects suspicious processes frequently polling Hugging Face repository endpoints (discussions, raw files, commits). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using public code/dataset hosting services as a covert command-and-control (C2) channel to fetch instructions or exfiltrate data, bypassing traditional network filters by blending in with legitimate developer traffic.
Detects the abuse of the CMSTPLUA COM object, a known technique for UAC bypass, to execute a hidden and non-profile PowerShell process. This behavior is associated with malicious activity chains like RemotePanel or BoundSiphon that aim to achieve elevated execution.
Detects the creation of a Windows service that impersonates the legitimate Windows Time (w32time) service name or display name but utilizes a binary located outside of the standard system32 directory. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism, often used by backdoors like RemotePanel to evade detection after initial compromise.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe where the process image is located in the user's local AppData directory under specific suspicious folder names. This behavior is indicative of a user-land installer or potential malware attempting to maintain persistence or execute malicious packages while masquerading as common applications.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe that involves 'keyroll' in the command line. This pattern specifically flags tasks associated with the 'rnpkeys.exe' utility or tasks being created within 'keyroll' directories, which may indicate the deployment or maintenance of unauthorized key management or persistence mechanisms.
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