Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects high-volume password spraying attempts targeting Microsoft 365, originating from the LSHIY LLC IPv6 address space (2a0a:d683::/32). The rule monitors for failed sign-ins using the OAuth ROPC flow via Azure CLI or similar tools, identifying high counts of distinct accounts targeted within a short time frame.
Detects potential zero-click LLM prompt injection attacks against Microsoft 365 Copilot. The rule correlates Microsoft 365 Copilot activity involving external/untrusted URLs or domains with recent inbound email activity to the same user. This pattern is designed to identify scenarios where an attacker leverages an inbound email to trigger a Copilot interaction with malicious external content, potentially leading to unauthorized data access or exfiltration.
Detects potential OAuth device code phishing attacks by identifying HTTP requests to the legitimate microsoft.com/devicelogin URL containing suspicious user_code or device_code parameters. This pattern indicates an adversary is using an OAuth device authorization grant flow to steal tokens or gain unauthorized access without the victim needing to provide credentials directly to the attacker.
This rule detects potential mass emailing or spam activity by identifying instances where a single email account sends more than 100 emails within a one-minute window. This behavior is often characteristic of compromised accounts performing phishing campaigns or bulk unauthorized communication.
This rule detects instances where a user clicks on a URL identified as potentially malicious (phishing-related) and subsequently has a risky sign-in event in Azure AD. The rule correlates URL click events from email with Azure AD sign-in logs, specifically looking for sign-ins marked as risky or originating from suspicious user agents (e.g., specific axios versions). The phishing URLs are identified by keywords such as 'azureapplicationregistration.pages.dev', 'chrnobinson.com', 'workers.dev', '.pages.dev', '.web.core.windows.net', '/oauth2/v2.0/authorize', 'client_id=', and 'scope=openid'.
Detects potentially malicious activity within Microsoft 365 involving the creation of inbox rules for message forwarding/redirection, modifications to mailbox forwarding configurations, or mass outbound email sending. These actions are common indicators of persistent access, email exfiltration, or automated reconnaissance after account compromise.
This rule detects when a user creates two or more email forwarding rules within a one-hour period in Exchange Online. This behavior can indicate an adversary setting up persistence or exfiltration mechanisms for email.
Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules that forward or redirect emails to another recipient. This can be an indicator of an adversary attempting to exfiltrate emails or maintain persistence.
This rule detects potential 'impossible travel' scenarios within Azure AD sign-in logs. It identifies users who successfully sign in to Office 365 from two geographically distant IP addresses within a one-hour window, suggesting a potential compromise or an attempt to bypass security controls.
This rule monitors for potential lateral phishing activity within an organization by identifying internal accounts sending high volumes of emails, correlating this with MailItemsAccessed audit events from unexpected IPs, and detecting OAuth token abuse patterns (such as granting consent or adding credentials) within the Exchange Online environment.
Detects phishing attempts using .ics (calendar) files that originate from the 'groups.outlook.com' domain, often used to deliver meeting invites that contain malicious links or social engineering lures.
This rule detects the creation or modification of inbox rules in Office 365 that involve email forwarding or redirection to external domains. It calculates a risk score based on whether the action occurred outside of typical business hours (08:00-18:00 local time/weekends) and whether the user is performing this action from a previously unseen IP address, which may indicate a compromised account attempting to exfiltrate or redirect emails.
Detects network, DNS, proxy, and email interactions with known Microsoft-themed lookalike domains used in Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing campaigns. These domains impersonate Microsoft login portals to facilitate credential and session token harvesting by kits such as EvilProxy, Sneaky2FA, and Tycoon.
Detects spear-phishing emails associated with UNC1549, utilizing malicious career-themed lures. The rule identifies emails containing specific lookalike domain patterns related to Boeing, Airbus, or Teledyne FLIR, and correlates these with common recruitment-themed email subjects, HR-spoofing sender strings, or the presence of common compressed file attachments (ZIP, RAR, 7Z, ISO).
This rule detects potential phishing activity by correlating emails containing links to a specific suspicious domain and path with network activity (DNS queries or direct network connections) to the same domain. It targets both the initial email delivery and subsequent user interaction (e.g., clicking the link or downloading files).
Detects high-risk administrative or user actions within Microsoft 365 environments that are frequently associated with adversary persistence, data exfiltration, and privilege escalation. The rule monitors for the creation or modification of inbox forwarding rules, addition of mailbox permissions, OAuth application consent grants, bulk mailbox searches, and programmatic access to mail items via EWS or Graph API.
This rule detects potentially malicious reconnaissance or enumeration activity by identifying a high volume of Microsoft Graph API requests (GET requests) to sensitive directory endpoints (users, groups, directoryRoles, servicePrincipals) from a single application identity (AppId) and IP address within a short time window.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) sign-in logs where a single user account authenticates from two different countries within a 10-minute window, which is indicative of potential account compromise or credential sharing.
This rule detects suspicious sign-in attempts to Microsoft services (login.microsoftonline.com, graph.microsoft.com, outlook.office365.com) that occur within 30 minutes of a user clicking on a URL associated with these services. The sign-in is considered suspicious if it originates from a user agent commonly used by automated tools (e.g., axios, curl, python-requests, httpclient, Go-http-client) and is flagged with a 'atRisk' or 'high' risk level by Azure AD. This combination suggests a potential credential compromise following a phishing attempt, where an attacker might be using automated tools to leverage stolen credentials.
Detects anomalous non-interactive OAuth token requests against Microsoft Graph that claim multi-factor authentication (MFA) satisfaction from unmanaged devices. This behavior is indicative of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) token replay attacks, where captured session tokens are reused by an attacker to bypass authentication controls, consistent with tactics used by threat actors like Storm-2755 (Payroll Pirate).
This rule detects attempts to exploit Microsoft 365 Copilot through prompt injection, where attackers inject HTML/script elements into search queries. It specifically identifies when these queries attempt to force Copilot to interact with external URLs via Bing image search (SSRF), potentially exfiltrating sensitive data such as MFA codes, email content, or meeting details to an attacker-controlled external domain.
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