Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,056 detections
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Detects a sequence of events where a suspected sideloaded process (e.g., masquerading as common tools like curl or vim) is followed within 30 minutes by the registration of a new Windows service, a behavioral pattern associated with the NeedyMantis threat group.
Detects the execution of taskkill.exe to terminate known security software processes, when the command is initiated from sqlservr.exe or via a command shell child process of sqlservr.exe. This activity is a common post-exploitation step after abusing xp_cmdshell to neutralize defenses before deploying further payloads.
Detects the execution of the encryptbase64.ps1 PowerShell script when invoked by a process other than PowerShell or PowerShell Core. This behavior is indicative of NeedyMantis malware attempting to evade detection by executing scripts outside standard script hosts.
Detects specific malicious archive payloads associated with NeedyMantis that contain a second-stage loader and spoofed system DLLs (e.g., dnsapi.dll, ws2_32.dll, msvcrt140.dll). These archives utilize XOR encoding or RtlDecompressBuffer packing and are designed for DLL sideloading.
Detects instances where a Python process spawns a command-line shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or bash) within 15 seconds of starting, while executing common reconnaissance or utility commands. This behavior is indicative of malicious code executing at import-time, a technique often associated with supply chain compromises in Python packages.
This rule detects potential persistence via Python environment variable manipulation (PYTHONPATH) followed by suspicious network activity from a child process of python.exe. It specifically looks for the modification of the PYTHONPATH environment variable using PowerShell on Windows or shell configuration files on Unix-like systems, followed by a python.exe-initiated network connection (like curl) to external domains, which may indicate the execution of a malicious sitecustomize.py hook.
This rule detects instances where Python package management processes (pip or python) perform build or installation tasks, immediately followed by an outbound network connection initiated by the same process tree to a non-PyPI domain. This behavior is indicative of a supply chain attack where a malicious package contains code (e.g., in setup.py) that beacons to an attacker-controlled server upon installation.
This rule monitors the software inventory for vulnerable versions of OpenSSL and WolfSSL libraries. Specifically, it flags instances of WolfSSL prior to version 5.9.4, which are susceptible to peer-authentication bypass vulnerabilities. The rule is intended for patch management and asset exposure tracking rather than detecting active exploitation.
This rule correlates web clicks on Google Sites URLs containing keywords related to GlobalProtect with the subsequent creation or renaming of an unsigned or improperly signed GlobalProtect.msi file on the same endpoint within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a spearphishing attempt using a masqueraded landing page to deliver malicious or unauthorized software.
Detects evidence of potential adversarial interference with Windows Defender updates and MRT.exe (Malicious Software Removal Tool). The rule correlates high volumes of temporary file creation in user directories with unauthorized access to MRT.exe by third-party processes and repeated Windows Defender update failures, indicating a potential attempt to disrupt endpoint security operations.
Detects the execution of 'sqlcmd.exe' when spawned by web application pools (w3wp.exe) or general command shell (cmd.exe) processes that do not appear to be related to authorized database administration or IIS appcmd activity.
Detects the use of 'findstr' or PowerShell to query sensitive configuration files (such as web.config or applicationHost.config) for credential-related keywords like 'connectionString', 'AccountKey', or 'machineKey'. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to harvest credentials or sensitive configuration data stored in cleartext on the filesystem.
Detects the Microsoft IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawning common command-line shells (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) and executing discovery-related commands. This is highly indicative of potential web shell activity where an adversary uses an existing web application vulnerability to gain remote code execution.
Detects the presence of known SHA256 hashes associated with the 'ccrtc' planter PowerShell scripts and C2 SDK JavaScript components. These files were identified as being dropped into 'C:\Windows\Temp' during the STAC4924 webshell intrusion campaign.
Detects a multi-stage activity where PowerShell is used to download a ZIP file, followed by the execution of a batch script (1.bat) that subsequently launches LockScreenContentServer.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DLL side-loading chain designed to execute malicious code via legitimate processes.
Detects the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern where a user is tricked into opening a terminal (Windows Terminal, PowerShell, or PowerShell ISE) and pasting a command. The rule specifically alerts on commands originating from explorer.exe that invoke web download utilities to fetch .zip archives, which are commonly associated with the Lorem Ipsum Loader initial access infection chain.
This rule detects HTTP requests where the User-Agent header indicates a PowerShell execution occurring from a system configured with the zh-CN locale. This pattern is often associated with automated scripts or potential malicious activity masquerading as legitimate PowerShell traffic.
This rule detects network communication with known malicious infrastructure (C2 IPs and URLs), presence of malicious files identified by SHA256 hashes on disk, and execution of known malicious files. It also correlates these activities with specific operator email addresses involved in the malicious campaign.
Detects potential DNS tunneling or command-and-control (C2) traffic by identifying abnormally long DNS query names, which often indicate encoded data channels, and suspicious usage of TXT or NULL DNS records, which are frequently used by tools like Cobalt Strike, dnscat2, and iodine for C2 communication.
Detects web requests targeting Oracle PeopleSoft Integration Broker (PSIGW) endpoints that contain suspicious query parameters associated with exploitation attempts, such as path traversal sequences, command injection patterns, or Java-based class invocations. This rule is designed to identify exploitation attempts against PeopleSoft systems as observed in the mid-2026 ShinyHunters zero-day campaign.
Detects potential NTLM relay attacks targeting Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) web enrollment endpoints, including subsequent certificate requests for sensitive templates. This pattern identifies attackers attempting to relay NTLM authentication to AD CS and potentially requesting certificates for high-privilege templates (e.g., DomainController, SubCA, Machine, or User) to facilitate privilege escalation.
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