Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects email activity involving DocuSign-themed messages that contain attachments and also coincide with URL click events that redirect users to Microsoft-related login portals (e.g., login.microsoftonline.com or teams.microsoft.com) containing 'redirect' or 'redirect_uri' parameters. This behavior is indicative of a phishing attempt designed to capture credentials or perform OAuth consent phishing by mimicking legitimate document-signing workflows.
Detects instances where a user performs an interactive login followed by a non-interactive login within a 1-hour window, where the source IP address and geographical location of both sessions differ. This behavior is indicative of potential session hijacking or token theft where an attacker is using stolen session artifacts from a different location.
This rule detects potential spearphishing activity by correlating email attachments containing specific 'Request for Quotation' filenames with subsequent suspicious file creation events on endpoints. It specifically looks for matching attachments (MSG or PDF) from email logs and tracks if similar file patterns appear in Microsoft Outlook content or temporary folders on host devices.
This rule detects potential phishing activity by correlating email delivery events and URL click events against a set of known malicious domains and suspicious URL paths. It identifies when a user receives an email containing a suspicious link or interacts with such a link, providing visibility into potential credential harvesting or malware delivery attempts.
Detects the RejectDirectSend bypass (null SMTP envelope sender + internal-domain spoof). Tightened to require Microsoft's composite auth verdict OR all of SPF/DKIM/DMARC failing (vs. any one), excludes known-approved Direct Send relay IPs, and excludes likely-legitimate bulk/newsletter traffic via BulkComplaintLevel.
Detects Direct Send spearphishing impersonating internal roles (IT/Finance/Procurement) with business-themed lures targeting leadership/finance titles. Rewritten: removed a non-functional sender/recipient substring check and a broken EmailPostDeliveryEvents join that made the rule rarely fire; anchored detection to the actual Direct Send signature (null envelope + domain match) and a direct IdentityInfo join; standardized auth-failure parsing to match the other rules in this set.
Detects Direct Send spearphishing impersonating internal roles (IT/Finance/Procurement) with business-themed lures targeting leadership/finance titles. Rewritten: removed a non-functional sender/recipient substring check and a broken EmailPostDeliveryEvents join that made the rule rarely fire; anchored detection to the actual Direct Send signature (null envelope + domain match) and a direct IdentityInfo join; standardized auth-failure parsing to match the other rules in this set.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access to cloud resources or OAuth applications by identifying sign-ins or API calls originating from IP addresses or locations not previously observed for the user in the 30 days prior to a documented Coder registry compromise exposure window.
This rule correlates Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) identity risk events with sign-in activity and behavioral analytics for a specific user to facilitate forensic investigation of potential identity compromise. It aggregates risk events, anomalous sign-in attempts (including failures or failed conditional access), and suspicious behavioral telemetry from the same source IP addresses associated with identified user risk.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access to cloud resources or OAuth applications by identifying sign-ins or API calls originating from IP addresses or locations not previously observed for the user in the 30 days prior to a documented Coder registry compromise exposure window.
Detects incoming emails where the SMTP envelope sender (MAIL FROM) is blank, but the visible 'From' header displays an internal/accepted domain. This technique is often used to bypass email authentication filters. The rule specifically alerts on cases where SPF, DKIM, or DMARC checks failed or returned 'none', yet the message was still delivered to an inbox or folder, suggesting a configuration gap or allow-list override.
This rule monitors for a multi-stage attack pattern involving two potential indicators: first, it identifies phishing emails containing a 'Google Docs' link combined with an attachment named 'API Logic Flaw'. Second, it detects browser activity involving the paste of JavaScript code or suspicious browser clipboard activity, which may indicate an attacker attempting to execute malicious scripts directly in the user's browser context.
Detects high-risk account modifications, such as adding MFA methods or OAuth consent grants, occurring shortly after a user sign-in. This pattern is indicative of post-AiTM session theft (e.g., NovaCookies) where an adversary uses a stolen session token to modify account settings for persistence or MFA bypass.
Detects non-interactive sign-ins, such as those using refresh or session tokens, originating from an IP address, ASN, device, or country that does not match the user's recent interactive sign-in history. The absence of an MFA challenge for these new contexts is characteristic of session token replay attacks, often associated with AiTM phishing campaigns.
Detects a high volume of outbound emails (more than 20 within a one-hour window) from a single sender containing the subject line 'Payment Transaction Failed Reminder', which is a common pattern for phishing or social engineering campaigns.
Detects a high volume of outbound emails (more than 20 within a one-hour window) from a single sender containing the subject line 'Payment Transaction Failed Reminder', which is a common pattern for phishing or social engineering campaigns.
Detects Microsoft Teams messages sent from an onmicrosoft.com domain that impersonate an 'IT Service Desk' and contain a link to an .msi file hosted on Azure Blob Storage, a common indicator of a phishing lure distributing malicious installers.
Detects the delivery of .mobileconfig files or related configuration profile types (e.g., .plist, .xml) via email. These profiles are used on macOS and iOS devices to modify system settings, such as mail, calendar, or contact synchronization, and can be used to install malicious root certificates to enable Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks. This rule accounts for direct attachments as well as those concealed within zip archives.
Detects a sequence of events starting with a device code OAuth sign-in, followed within two hours by the creation or modification of inbox rules and high-frequency enumeration of email items (contacts, folders, messages, threads, people) via Microsoft Graph API. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise activity where an adversary uses OAuth device code grants to maintain access and subsequently automates inbox analysis or data harvesting.
Detects messages sent, chats created, or members added within Microsoft Teams that involve external participants and contain embedded HTTP or HTTPS links. This behavior is indicative of potential external spearphishing or malicious link distribution through collaborative chat platforms.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user's password is changed or reset by an administrator (or help-desk role) followed within a short time window by that same user registering a new MFA device, potentially indicating a vishing-based account takeover attack (e.g., PREY-0058/UNC6671).
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