Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects inbound HTTP requests directed at known file paths associated with malicious PHP web shells commonly dropped within the Elementor plugin directory of WordPress installations, including attempts to pass parameters to the web shell for command execution.
This rule detects network communication associated with the REVSTEALER 'EtherHiding' technique. It monitors for POST requests to Polygon network RPC endpoints containing specific contract interaction signatures ('eth_call' with '0x4965e13f' and a specific contract address), as well as TLS connections to known malicious domains and fallback RPC providers used to resolve C2 instructions from blockchain data.
This rule detects network communication associated with the REVSTEALER 'EtherHiding' technique. It monitors for POST requests to Polygon network RPC endpoints containing specific contract interaction signatures ('eth_call' with '0x4965e13f' and a specific contract address), as well as TLS connections to known malicious domains and fallback RPC providers used to resolve C2 instructions from blockchain data.
Detects the FTP STOR command uploading a file with a .pcap extension to an external host on port 21 or 20 — consolidated from three overlapping detections (generic server, router-specific, and capture-file variants). Indicates an adversary (e.g. Fire Ant/UNC3886) exfiltrating captured network traffic from a compromised network device via FTP.
This rule detects rapid, repetitive connection attempts (TCP SYN) from a source within the internal network to a set of high-value targets (SSH, HTTP, SMB, RDP ports) within the same internal network. Such patterns are indicative of lateral movement or internal network reconnaissance, often performed by adversaries pivoting through a compromised host to discover services on other internal systems.
Detects network requests originating from the Netch gateway tool or similar environments, attempting to fetch auto-configuration profiles for Shadowsocks from the external domain 'www.sheng886.top' using the '/api/v1/internal/shadowsocks/auto-config' endpoint. The rule specifically matches the Go-http-client user agent, which is common in automated scripts and Go-based proxy tools.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests for static image assets (jpg, jpeg, png, gif, webp, svg) where the Referer header originates from a .shop top-level domain. This behavior may indicate an unauthorized use of brand image assets, often associated with fraudulent e-commerce sites or phishing campaigns using lookalike or disposable infrastructure.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests for static image assets (jpg, jpeg, png, gif, webp, svg) where the Referer header originates from a .shop top-level domain. This behavior may indicate an unauthorized use of brand image assets, often associated with fraudulent e-commerce sites or phishing campaigns using lookalike or disposable infrastructure.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests for static image assets (jpg, jpeg, png, gif, webp, svg) where the Referer header originates from a .shop top-level domain. This behavior may indicate an unauthorized use of brand image assets, often associated with fraudulent e-commerce sites or phishing campaigns using lookalike or disposable infrastructure.
This rule detects high-volume DNS resolution of domains ending in the .shop TLD from internal hosts, which may indicate interaction with a cluster of infrastructure used by the DoppelCart fake-shop campaign.
This rule detects high-volume DNS resolution of domains ending in the .shop TLD from internal hosts, which may indicate interaction with a cluster of infrastructure used by the DoppelCart fake-shop campaign.
Detects high-frequency DNS query responses for domains ending in '.shop' from external sources within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of domain churn often associated with 'DoppelCart'-style fake e-commerce shop infrastructure.
Detects high-frequency DNS query responses for domains ending in '.shop' from external sources within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of domain churn often associated with 'DoppelCart'-style fake e-commerce shop infrastructure.
Detects high-frequency DNS query responses for domains ending in '.shop' from external sources within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of domain churn often associated with 'DoppelCart'-style fake e-commerce shop infrastructure.
Detects high-volume, potentially malicious activity where a client requests a large number of distinct hostnames ending in .shop from a single destination IP address within a short time frame, which may indicate infrastructure used for phishing or fraudulent e-commerce storefronts similar to DoppelCart-style activity.
Detects high-volume, potentially malicious activity where a client requests a large number of distinct hostnames ending in .shop from a single destination IP address within a short time frame, which may indicate infrastructure used for phishing or fraudulent e-commerce storefronts similar to DoppelCart-style activity.
Detects network communication to Firebase infrastructure (.firebaseio.com) initiated by Android devices, which may indicate command-and-control (C2) activity associated with the Mantax Otax malware family. This rule tracks initial connections and should be correlated with specific suspicious domains for higher confidence.
Detects high-frequency, repeated access to a specific fraud-tracking or canary token link by sources utilizing rotating VPNs or proxies over an extended period. This behavior is indicative of automated probing or credential validation attempts associated with the Phantom Deal campaign.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic originating from internal hosts directed towards a specific set of domains associated with passkey/MFA/SSO-themed vishing lures. These domains are identified as potential components of phishing campaigns designed to deceive users into disclosing authentication credentials.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the PEEP Browser RAT, specifically HTTP beacons targeting the URI path '/api/commands'. It monitors for unique HTTP headers ('X-PEEP-Agent-Id', 'X-PEEP-Agent-Key') and connections to known malicious infrastructure.
Detects Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts against Grafana instances using the 'X-Grafana-URL' header. The rule identifies requests attempting to access internal network ranges, link-local addresses, or cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254, localhost) via the Grafana MCP interface, particularly when non-GET HTTP methods are used to potentially mutate internal resources.
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