Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects high-volume data access or exfiltration from Azure/Office 365 cloud environments via common scripting/automation user-agents. The rule monitors API requests to users, mail, drive, or files endpoints by non-standard clients (e.g., python, curl, Go) from previously unseen locations, calculating a risk score based on the number of endpoints accessed and the total data volume.
This rule detects potential brute force attacks against Microsoft Exchange Outlook Web App (OWA) by monitoring for a high volume of 401 Unauthorized status codes from non-internal IP addresses. It also correlates these authentication events with subsequent post-authentication actions, specifically identifying mailbox logins followed by mailbox searching or export requests, which may indicate account compromise and unauthorized data collection or exfiltration.
Detects malicious Parameter-to-Prompt (P2P) injection attempts targeting Microsoft 365 Copilot by monitoring search query parameters for indicators of natural-language command injection or HTML-based payload injection (e.g., img tags, source manipulation, or data extraction commands).
Detects incoming emails where a single URL contains indicators of two or more distinct security vendor rewriting services. This technique is used by adversaries to create multi-layered redirect chains to bypass automated scanners and deliver malicious content, as seen in Tycoon2FA and Sneaky2FA campaigns.
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-in patterns indicative of an adversary bypassing Conditional Access device compliance requirements using an edge appliance proxy. The rule identifies successful authentication sessions from non-compliant or unmanaged devices that satisfy Conditional Access, often involving impossible travel or multiple source IPs, suggesting the use of an intermediary infrastructure to masquerade as a trusted location.
Detects Microsoft Exchange EWS (Exchange.asmx) requests containing a ReferenceAttachment call where the ProviderEndpointUrl parameter points to a non-Microsoft/external domain. This is consistent with SSRF exploitation techniques, such as those observed in CVE-2026-45504, where an attacker-controlled endpoint is provided to Exchange for fetching WOPI properties.
Detects potentially malicious or anomalous queries within Microsoft 365 Copilot interactions. The rule monitors for patterns indicating attempts at data exfiltration (e.g., HTML/image embedding, image search parameters), unauthorized information extraction (e.g., email or title extraction), or targeting of sensitive authentication-related information (e.g., OTP or MFA codes).
Detects instances where a user account modifies sensitive payroll or banking information (e.g., direct deposit details) shortly after performing a sign-in from an unmanaged device or suspicious context. This behavior is indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) token replay attack targeting HR SaaS applications like Workday to perform financial fraud.
This rule detects potential 'impossible travel' scenarios within Azure AD sign-in logs. It identifies users who successfully sign in to Office 365 from two geographically distant IP addresses within a one-hour window, suggesting a potential compromise or an attempt to bypass security controls.
This rule detects when a single user downloads 100 or more files from SharePoint within a one-hour period. This activity could indicate data exfiltration or unauthorized bulk access to sensitive documents.
Detects OAuth application consent grants or modifications where the application is granted sensitive permissions including Mail.Read, Directory.Read.All, or User.Read.All. These permissions can be abused by attackers to exfiltrate email data or map the organization's directory.
Detects sign-in events using the device code authentication flow (OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant) where the originating IP address is external to the organization's private network. This flow is often abused by attackers to bypass traditional MFA or interact with headless environments via common HTTP client libraries like Python requests, Go-http, or Axios.
Detects instances where a user grants an OAuth application sensitive permissions, which could indicate an illicit consent grant attack where an adversary lures a user into authorizing a malicious application to access their email, files, or directory data.
Detects successful OAuth device code authentication flows targeted at sensitive Microsoft cloud resources (Exchange Online, SharePoint, Teams, Graph) originating from unmanaged or non-compliant devices. This pattern is often indicative of consent phishing or device code phishing attacks where an adversary obtains a device token to gain long-term unauthorized access to user data.
Phishing-as-a-Service kit abusing OAuth device code flow against Microsoft 365
This rule detects a multi-stage phishing campaign involving Gmail-hosted emails containing 'short.gy' URLs. It monitors for three distinct signals: (1) Outbound network connections to 'chongdaotang.net', (2) User clicks on 'short.gy' links arriving from Gmail addresses, and (3) Inbound or BCC-delivered emails from Gmail senders containing 'short.gy' links. This combination is highly indicative of a phishing operation attempting to redirect users to a malicious infrastructure.
Detects a suspicious spike in Microsoft Teams external meeting or chat invitations directed at a single user within a 30-minute window. This behavior is consistent with UNC6692 tactics, where attackers impersonate internal IT helpdesk staff via Teams to perform vishing and social engineering attacks.
Detects the SearchLeak (CVE-2026-42824) delivery vector where a phishing link containing a long encoded 'q' parameter targeting Microsoft 365 Copilot Search is delivered via email to trigger prompt injection and subsequent data exfiltration of sensitive information.
Detects spearphishing attempts using SearchLeak (CVE-2026-42824) which involves delivering malicious Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise search URLs. These URLs utilize prompt injection via the query parameter to target high-value users, aiming to exfiltrate sensitive data such as MFA codes, email contents, or meeting details through the Copilot interface.
Detects the presence of the 'x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential' cookie in requests directed to 'login.microsoftonline.com' originating from a client that does not identify as Windows. This behavioral pattern is associated with session hijacking techniques where an attacker uses a tool (e.g., Device Code Lab) to inject a session cookie into a browser, allowing for unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 services.
Detects Microsoft Graph API requests that perform bulk enumeration of email messages across multiple folders. The rule specifically identifies API queries that request sender (From) and recipient (To, CC, BCC) fields, a behavior consistent with mailbox address harvesting or reconnaissance by an Address Extractor module.
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