Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,141 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,292
246
196
179
104
Contributors
738
670
569
284
148
Categories
1,163
747
693
623
440
Platforms
39,934
7,265
6,535
3,865
3,645
3,141
Products / Services
2,849
742
268
187
182
MITRE Techniques
871
856
778
768
738
CVEs
13
5
2
1
1
IDS Classtypes
3
2
2
2
1
IDS Protocols
9
1
1
This rule detects when a user or administrator grants consent to an Azure AD or Office 365 application for permissions that provide significant access to mail, files, contacts, or directory data. This activity is a common vector for illicit OAuth consent attacks, where adversaries gain persistent access to sensitive data without requiring direct user credentials.
Detects successful assignment of highly privileged roles (Global Administrator, Privileged Role Administrator, Security Administrator, Exchange Administrator) to a user in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). This is often a sign of privilege escalation or persistence establishment by an attacker.
This rule identifies potential mass phishing campaigns by monitoring O365 email activity for high-volume outbound mail from newly registered or observed domains. It specifically flags senders that have no prior historical activity in the last 90 days, have a domain age of less than 30 days, and exhibit a low variation in email subjects across a large volume of recipients, which is characteristic of automated bulk phishing.
This rule detects potential reconnaissance activity in Microsoft 365 environments by monitoring Graph API requests. It specifically looks for large-scale user enumeration patterns or queries containing keywords associated with HR, payroll, or sensitive financial information, often indicative of an adversary attempting to identify high-value targets. The detection focuses on both standard 'List' operations and specific URI patterns used for bulk data extraction.
Detects a high volume of file uploads (greater than 50) to OneDrive or SharePoint by a single user within a 5-minute window, potentially indicating bulk exfiltration of data.
Detects Microsoft 365 OAuth access tokens issued via device_code grant — the mechanism abused by the EvilTokens phishing kit — followed within 1 hour by mailbox forwarding rule creation for the same account, indicating persistent BEC access post-compromise.
This rule detects potential phishing emails originating from the gasparinutrition.com domain. It identifies suspicious email delivery patterns involving the use of Google Workspace relay (gappssmtp.com) combined with DKIM misalignment and DMARC failures, indicating possible domain spoofing or unauthorized relay usage.
Detects the SearchLeak (CVE-2026-42824) attack chain targeting M365 Copilot. The rule monitors for a three-stage sequence within 1 minute: (1) A user accessing a crafted Enterprise Search URL with an injected prompt in the query string; (2) Evidence of bulk data access (MailItemsAccessed or FileAccessed, 5+ events); and (3) An outbound HTTP request to a Bing image search endpoint containing exfiltrated data encoded within a long (>500 chars) 'imgurl' parameter, indicating a potential SSRF/CSP bypass exfiltration path.
This rule detects URLs that contain common redirection or link parameters (u=, url=, redirect=, r=, link=, target=, dest=) where the value of the parameter is a long, alphanumeric string that appears to be an encoded domain. This pattern can indicate attempts to obfuscate the true destination of a link, often seen in phishing campaigns or malicious redirection attempts. The rule specifically looks for encoded parameters containing common top-level domains like .com, .net, or .org.
Detects incoming emails where a single URL contains indicators of two or more distinct security vendor rewriting services. This technique is used by adversaries to create multi-layered redirect chains to bypass automated scanners and deliver malicious content, as seen in Tycoon2FA and Sneaky2FA campaigns.
This rule detects emails containing multiple obfuscated URLs from common URL shortening services (bit.ly, tinyurl, short.link) originating from external senders. It specifically looks for emails with 3 or more such URLs within a one-hour window from the same sender.
This rule detects potential phishing attempts by identifying emails with URLs that originate from outside the internal company domain (@company.com). It specifically looks for emails where the subject line contains keywords like 'click', 'confirm', or 'update', and where multiple such emails (3 or more) are sent from the same external sender to the same recipient.
Detects instances where a guest user or an external account (identified by the #EXT# suffix) performs an operation to add a new member to a Microsoft 365 Group. This behavior can be indicative of a guest account being compromised or misused to escalate privileges or gain unauthorized access by modifying group memberships.
This rule detects when sharing inheritance settings are modified in SharePoint. This could indicate an attempt to broaden access to sensitive information, a misconfiguration, or an attacker attempting to maintain access or exfiltrate data.
This rule detects potentially malicious reconnaissance or enumeration activity by identifying a high volume of Microsoft Graph API requests (GET requests) to sensitive directory endpoints (users, groups, directoryRoles, servicePrincipals) from a single application identity (AppId) and IP address within a short time window.
Detects high frequency of denied Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) requests for a specific user and IP address, indicating potential 'MFA fatigue' or 'MFA bombing' attacks where an adversary attempts to force a user to approve a push notification or code verification.
This rule detects when a user grants an OAuth application permissions within an Azure AD or Office 365 environment, specifically monitoring for highly sensitive permissions such as 'Mail.Read', 'Files.ReadWrite', 'User.Read.All', or 'offline_access'. The rule cross-references the application ID against a known list to filter out pre-authorized applications and assigns a risk score based on the combination of granted permissions, flagging suspicious, unrecognized applications.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange inbox rules that configure automatic forwarding or redirection of email to external domains. Attackers often use this technique to exfiltrate email data, maintain persistence, or monitor communications.
This rule detects anomalous high-volume file download activities from Microsoft SharePoint and OneDrive for Business, which may indicate data exfiltration. The rule aggregates download events by user and IP address over 10-minute intervals and triggers when the download count exceeds 200, excluding known service/backup accounts.
Detects automated enumeration patterns via the Microsoft Graph API, specifically targeting bulk directory pulls (requests with $top=999) and keyword-based searches for sensitive organizational data (payroll, HR, finance). This rule aggregates activity by user session to identify suspicious volumes and diversity of requests.
This rule monitors Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) sign-ins for indicators associated with the 'Payroll Pirate' campaign. It identifies non-interactive OAuth/token-based authentication requests originating from residential Internet Service Provider (ISP) ASNs using devices marked as unmanaged. It further elevates risk by detecting impossible travel (same user accessing from multiple IPs in a short window) and the use of specific browser User-Agent strings (Firefox or Axios) characteristic of the threat actor's tooling.
Page 89 of 150