Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of .iso or .zip files on Windows user directories (Desktop/Downloads) or with suspicious filenames potentially associated with phishing delivery methods.
Detects the creation of a specific JSON file named 'uploaded_files.json' within a 'SmartUploader' directory by PowerShell. This behavior may indicate an automated process, script, or actor staging data for exfiltration or managing uploaded content via PowerShell.
This rule detects the execution of a batch file named 'doxc.bat' using the Windows command shell (cmd.exe) that subsequently triggers actions related to specific file paths such as 'My_Resume.pdf' or locations in ProgramData, often associated with malicious staging or execution activity.
Detects the execution of processes named 'doxc' or 'hzwzucr_widsisa.exe', or processes matching specific file hashes, when originating from common user-writeable directories like 'ProgramData' or 'AppData'. This behavior is frequently associated with malicious payloads executing in non-standard or user-specific locations to achieve persistence or evasion.
Detects execution of Windows command shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) performing suspicious file deletion or renaming operations involving specific filenames associated with potentially malicious activities or malware components.
Detects the use of the 'net.exe' command-line utility to connect to the hidden IPC$ administrative share on a remote system, which is a common technique used for lateral movement and remote reconnaissance.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity by monitoring for file creation events within a specific 'FitnessPrograms' directory path and the execution of suspicious processes containing keywords related to command-and-control-like behavior (e.g., 'download_and_execute', 'checkCoachInstructions').
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'StandAloneOneDriveUpdater-2626' using either PowerShell or the schtasks utility. This naming pattern is often associated with malware attempting to persist on a system by masquerading as a legitimate OneDrive update process.
Detects the execution of common command-line utilities used for network reconnaissance and discovery, such as arp, nbtstat, net, and ping. These commands are frequently used by adversaries to map network infrastructure, identify active hosts, and discover shared resources on a target network.
Detects execution of command-line tools (cmd.exe or .bat files) triggered by Windows Explorer, where the process command line or parent command line references a shortcut (.lnk) file or specific naming conventions like 'doxc.bat' or 'config.bat'. This pattern is frequently used in phishing attacks to execute malicious payloads disguised as legitimate files.
This rule detects unauthorized persistence attempts by monitoring for the creation of a registry value named 'DailyFitnessTracker' under the HKEY_CURRENT_USER Run key. It triggers when 'reg.exe' is used to add the key, PowerShell is used to set the registry property, or when a general registry event indicates the creation of this specific key. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism designed to launch a potentially malicious or unwanted program upon user logon.
Detects the creation of hard links on a Windows system using utilities such as mklink or fsutil. Specifically, this rule identifies scenarios where a malicious executable located in %APPDATA% is linked to a backdoor binary stored in C:\ProgramData\, a technique used by adversaries to mask the true file path and evade security controls or detection mechanisms.
Detects known PowerShell dropper and embedded StealC payload binaries used in the ClickFix infection chain via exact SHA256 hash equality only
Detects known PowerShell dropper and embedded StealC payload binaries used in the ClickFix infection chain via exact SHA256 hash equality only
Detects the execution of the 'bun' JavaScript runtime invoking 'index.js' in the context of an npm package installation. This pattern is characteristic of the Shai-Hulud worm, which leverages the npm preinstall lifecycle hook to execute malicious code. The rule identifies suspicious process lineage where 'npm' spawns 'bun' for immediate payload execution, allowing for detection of the technique rather than specific artifacts.
Detects instances where AI coding assistants or tools (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Gemini) invoke git.exe to clone or fetch repositories from non-standard (non-GitHub) hosts, followed by a checkout operation within a short timeframe. This behavior may indicate an attacker using automated tools to stage or exfiltrate sensitive code repositories to unauthorized infrastructure.
Detects instances where AI coding assistants or tools (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Gemini) invoke git.exe to clone or fetch repositories from non-standard (non-GitHub) hosts, followed by a checkout operation within a short timeframe. This behavior may indicate an attacker using automated tools to stage or exfiltrate sensitive code repositories to unauthorized infrastructure.
Detects instances where AI coding assistants or tools (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Gemini) invoke git.exe to clone or fetch repositories from non-standard (non-GitHub) hosts, followed by a checkout operation within a short timeframe. This behavior may indicate an attacker using automated tools to stage or exfiltrate sensitive code repositories to unauthorized infrastructure.
Detects git checkout of a bare 40-hex commit SHA or the literal FETCH_HEAD ref, executed by a recognized AI coding-agent process. Narrowed to the Plugin4Shell exploitation fingerprint (checkout of a pinned-SHA-shaped or FETCH_HEAD ref) rather than ordinary branch/tag checkouts, which these agents perform constantly during normal plugin installs.
Detects git checkout of a bare 40-hex commit SHA or the literal FETCH_HEAD ref, executed by a recognized AI coding-agent process. Narrowed to the Plugin4Shell exploitation fingerprint (checkout of a pinned-SHA-shaped or FETCH_HEAD ref) rather than ordinary branch/tag checkouts, which these agents perform constantly during normal plugin installs.
Detects git checkout of a bare 40-hex commit SHA or the literal FETCH_HEAD ref, executed by a recognized AI coding-agent process. Narrowed to the Plugin4Shell exploitation fingerprint (checkout of a pinned-SHA-shaped or FETCH_HEAD ref) rather than ordinary branch/tag checkouts, which these agents perform constantly during normal plugin installs.
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