Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
276 detections
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Detects when a modification (create, update or replace) action is taken that affects mutating or validating webhook configurations, as they can be used by an adversary to achieve persistence or exfiltrate access credentials.
etects the full TeamPCP lateral movement pattern: listing secrets across namespaces followed by privileged alpine pod creation in kube-system. Correlation rule.
Detects deployments of pods within the kube-system namespace, which could be intended to imitate system pods.
System pods, created by controllers such as Deployments or DaemonSets have random suffixes in their names.
Attackers can use this fact and name their backdoor pods as if they were created by these controllers to avoid detection.
Deployment of such a backdoor container e.g. named kube-proxy-bv61v, could be attempted in the kube-system namespace alongside the other administrative containers.
System pods, created by controllers such as Deployments or DaemonSets have random suffixes in their names.
Attackers can use this fact and name their backdoor pods as if they were created by these controllers to avoid detection.
Deployment of such a backdoor container e.g. named kube-proxy-bv61v, could be attempted in the kube-system namespace alongside the other administrative containers.
Detects curl or wget accessing the default Kubernetes service account token path. Adapted from Unit 42 reporting on Slow Pisces and React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) campaigns.
Detects TCP connections to ports commonly associated with reverse shells,
C2 frameworks, and attacker tooling, as observed by Tetragon eBPF kernel-level
network monitoring. After initial container compromise, attackers establish
outbound connections on non-standard ports to maintain command and control.
Tetragon provides full process context (binary, pod, namespace, parent process)
tied to the network event, enabling high-fidelity correlation.
C2 frameworks, and attacker tooling, as observed by Tetragon eBPF kernel-level
network monitoring. After initial container compromise, attackers establish
outbound connections on non-standard ports to maintain command and control.
Tetragon provides full process context (binary, pod, namespace, parent process)
tied to the network event, enabling high-fidelity correlation.
Detects attempts to access or exfiltrate the default Kubernetes service account token file using web utilities like curl or wget. This activity is commonly observed in attacks by threat actors such as Slow Pisces to escalate privileges or move laterally from a compromised pod into backend cloud infrastructure.
Detects the execution of a 'kubectl get secrets' command with specific parameters ('--all-namespaces', '-o json', '|| true') via a 'bash' process on Linux systems. This activity is indicative of bulk Kubernetes secret enumeration, a technique used by the TeamPCP stealer as described by Microsoft.
Detects the specific OpenSSL command line arguments used by TeamPCP (Trivy compromise) to encrypt stolen credentials before exfiltration using a hybrid AES-256-CBC scheme. This rule looks for the 'openssl' executable being run with 'enc -aes-256-cbc' or 'enc -aes-256' and a passphrase specified via a file using '-pass file:'.
Detects the creation of highly privileged Kubernetes pods in the 'kube-system' namespace matching the naming convention 'node-setup-*', indicative of TeamPCP lateral movement techniques. These pods request elevated privileges such as 'hostPID', 'hostNetwork', and 'privileged'.
Detects the execution of `kubectl` commands designed to dump all secrets across all namespaces within a Kubernetes cluster. This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to gain access to sensitive credentials, as observed in supply chain compromises.
Detects the execution of `kubectl` commands designed to dump all secrets across all namespaces within a Kubernetes cluster. This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to gain access to sensitive credentials, as observed in supply chain compromises.
Detects interactive shell execution within a container in a production, using 'exec'. The execution of `cat`, followed by network connections. This would be communicating with a service that runs arbitrary commands.
Rule to detect where there are role bindings and high-risk actions (verbs) applied within production or default namespaces. This rule specifically looks for these high-risk actions (verbs), excluding actions by the 'system:clusterrole-aggregation-controller' user, which is a legitimate system process.
Detects the deletion of Kubernetes log events, which could indicate an attempt at defense evasion or covering tracks by an attacker. The rule looks for 'delete' operations on 'Event' resources while excluding actions by 'ci-admin*' or 'system:*' users to reduce false positives.
Detects activity where there are role bindings and high-risk actions (verbs) applied.
This could be indicative of Privilege Escalation.
This could be indicative of Privilege Escalation.
Detects interactive shell execution within a container in a production Kubernetes namespace, using the 'exec' command.
Running this command in a pod allows a user to establish a temporary shell session and execute any process/commands in the pod.
Running this command in a pod allows a user to establish a temporary shell session and execute any process/commands in the pod.
The following detects interactive shell execution within a container in a production K8s namespace.
This could be indicative of an attacker with a compromised user account attempting to control a container.
This could be indicative of an attacker with a compromised user account attempting to control a container.
Detects deleting of K8s log events. Indicating Defense Evasion tactics, and covering of tracks.
This rule detects large volumes of outbound network traffic originating from Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) clusters to external destinations over non-standard ports. It specifically looks for traffic allowed by Palo Alto firewalls, excluding common ports like 80 and 443, and flags transfers exceeding a defined data threshold (e.g., 100MB). This behavior can indicate data exfiltration attempts where adversaries use alternative protocols to bypass standard monitoring.
This detection identifies when a user or service principal executes a command inside an AKS pod ('kubectl exec') and then, using the same identity, accesses data in a sensitive Azure Blob Storage container within a short time frame. This pattern can indicate an attacker, having gained initial access to the Kubernetes API, is using a pod as a pivot point to discover and exfiltrate sensitive data.
Detects interactive administration commands (exec, attach, port-forward) within a sensitive Kubernetes namespace. Such activity can be legitimate but warrants scrutiny in high-value environments as it allows direct interaction with containerized applications and data.
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