Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
414 detections
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Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user's password is changed or reset by an administrator (or help-desk role) followed within a short time window by that same user registering a new MFA device, potentially indicating a vishing-based account takeover attack (e.g., PREY-0058/UNC6671).
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user's password is changed or reset by an administrator (or help-desk role) followed within a short time window by that same user registering a new MFA device, potentially indicating a vishing-based account takeover attack (e.g., PREY-0058/UNC6671).
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user's password is changed or reset by an administrator (or help-desk role) followed within a short time window by that same user registering a new MFA device, potentially indicating a vishing-based account takeover attack (e.g., PREY-0058/UNC6671).
Detects non-interactive sign-in events involving OIDC or external authentication tokens shortly after a known Coder registry compromise. The rule flags high-risk or at-risk single-factor authentication sessions, which may indicate the replay of stolen tokens harvested during the compromise window.
Detects non-interactive sign-in events involving OIDC or external authentication tokens shortly after a known Coder registry compromise. The rule flags high-risk or at-risk single-factor authentication sessions, which may indicate the replay of stolen tokens harvested during the compromise window.
Detects non-interactive sign-in events involving OIDC or external authentication tokens shortly after a known Coder registry compromise. The rule flags high-risk or at-risk single-factor authentication sessions, which may indicate the replay of stolen tokens harvested during the compromise window.
This rule correlates Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) identity risk events with sign-in activity and behavioral analytics for a specific user to facilitate forensic investigation of potential identity compromise. It aggregates risk events, anomalous sign-in attempts (including failures or failed conditional access), and suspicious behavioral telemetry from the same source IP addresses associated with identified user risk.
Detects non-interactive sign-in events involving OIDC or external authentication tokens shortly after a known Coder registry compromise. The rule flags high-risk or at-risk single-factor authentication sessions, which may indicate the replay of stolen tokens harvested during the compromise window.
This rule correlates Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) risk events identified as 'passwordSpray' with subsequent sign-in logs from the same source IP address within a 60-minute window. This helps identify successful or suspicious authentication activity originating from an IP address previously flagged for password spraying attempts against a specific user account.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user's password is changed or reset by an administrator (or help-desk role) followed within a short time window by that same user registering a new MFA device, potentially indicating a vishing-based account takeover attack (e.g., PREY-0058/UNC6671).
Detects non-interactive sign-in events involving OIDC or external authentication tokens shortly after a known Coder registry compromise. The rule flags high-risk or at-risk single-factor authentication sessions, which may indicate the replay of stolen tokens harvested during the compromise window.
This rule identifies potentially compromised Entra ID accounts by correlating multiple suspicious behaviors within a 14-day window. It aggregates four specific indicators: successful authentication following repeated MFA failures, impossible travel (sign-ins from multiple countries within a short timeframe), unusual hour logons (00:00-05:00), and sign-ins flagged with medium/high risk or reported as compromised. The rule triggers when an account exhibits two or more of these distinct anomalous behaviors.
Detects successful authentication to Microsoft Teams or Slack where MFA was successfully completed, but the device is reported as unmanaged or non-compliant and is accompanied by sign-in risk signals. This behavior is consistent with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) proxy attacks where an attacker captures credentials and session tokens, bypassing MFA, and using the hijacked session from an unrecognized device or location.
This rule identifies potentially compromised Entra ID accounts by correlating multiple suspicious behaviors within a 14-day window. It aggregates four specific indicators: successful authentication following repeated MFA failures, impossible travel (sign-ins from multiple countries within a short timeframe), unusual hour logons (00:00-05:00), and sign-ins flagged with medium/high risk or reported as compromised. The rule triggers when an account exhibits two or more of these distinct anomalous behaviors.
This rule retrieves security anomaly events generated by Microsoft's identity protection or behavioral analysis systems for a specific user account over a defined time range. It leverages the 'Anomalies' table within Microsoft Sentinel to surface identity-related insights, activity patterns, and flagged risks.
This rule detects OAuth authorization requests (targeting Microsoft or Google identity providers) that use 'prompt=none' (silent authentication) and redirect the user to an unexpected or untrusted domain. This pattern is commonly used in OAuth consent phishing or token theft attacks, where an attacker attempts to silently acquire an authorization code by redirecting it to a malicious application server instead of the legitimate service provider's domain.
This rule monitors for high or medium-risk user events and sign-in activities within Azure Active Directory. It correlates data from both the AADUserRiskEvents and SigninLogs tables to identify potentially compromised user accounts.
Tracks changes and activities affecting a specific user account across both on-premises Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID. The query combines Windows Security Events and Entra ID Audit Logs into a single timeline, making it easier to investigate account modifications, privilege changes, MFA updates, directory synchronization activity, and administrative actions impacting a user.
This detection is particularly useful during incident response, insider threat investigations, account compromise assessments, and user lifecycle reviews
This detection is particularly useful during incident response, insider threat investigations, account compromise assessments, and user lifecycle reviews
Correlates Microsoft Entra identity risk detections with subsequent password changes, MFA registrations, and security information modifications. Helps identify potential account compromise scenarios where authentication methods or credentials are altered after suspicious sign-in activity.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID Protection risk telemetry for sign-ins with unfamiliar properties. Microsoft evaluates characteristics such as ASN, browser, device, and location against the user's historical behavior to identify anomalous sign-ins that may warrant investigation.
Detects a successful Microsoft Entra audit event where a new partner tenant is added to cross-tenant access settings. This change impacts trust-related configuration and inter-tenant access policies, requiring validation against approved organizational changes.
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