Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
289 detections
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This rule set detects various stages of activity related to the 'OpenClaw' malware family and associated campaigns. It includes detection for OpenClaw process execution, exposure of a specific administrative port, execution of shell commands via curl (ClawHavoc delivery), outbound webhook exfiltration, and infostealer access to OpenClaw configuration files.
This rule detects suspicious network connections to known threat actor infrastructure associated with FortiGate exploitation, successful administrative or VPN logins to FortiGate devices from these IPs, and DCSync-style directory replication access (EventCode 4662) on Windows systems. The rule is composed of three distinct parts targeting different aspects of the attack chain.
This rule detects various stages of an attack chain, starting from an Apache ActiveMQ exploit (CVE-2023-46604) leading to LockBit-style ransomware. It identifies process creation anomalies (java.exe spawning certutil.exe for downloads), network connections to known Metasploit C2 infrastructure, the presence of specific ransomware file hashes, and attempts to clear Windows event logs, all indicative of the described attack scenario.
This rule detects various stages of the CastleLoader malware activity, including C2 communication, process hollowing using AutoIt and jsc.exe, and known malware hashes. It correlates network traffic to a specific C2 server, identifies suspicious process creation patterns where AutoIt launches jsc.exe, and sweeps for known SHA256 hashes associated with CastleLoader.
Detects network and endpoint activity associated with the XWorm LATAM campaign, including C2 communication, payload downloads, CasPol.exe making outbound connections, WMI-spawned PowerShell with Cloudinary fetches and Assembly.Load, and a specific file hash.
Detects successful VPN connections from various common security devices logging to CommonSecurityLog. Monitoring successful VPN logins is crucial for tracking remote access and identifying potential unauthorized access, especially when correlated with other events like logins from unusual locations or impossible travel scenarios.
This rule detects configuration changes to Fortinet FortiGate firewall policies that occur outside of standard business hours (before 8 AM or after 5 PM NZDT). It specifically looks for actions like 'Move', 'Add', 'Enable', 'Delete', or 'Edit' on firewall policies. This can indicate unauthorized access or malicious activity, as legitimate changes are typically performed during business hours.
Detects if the Fortinet firewall configuration has been exported.
Detects network connections to known C2 servers and payload delivery URLs associated with a PureRAT campaign. This activity is linked to a Vietnamese threat actor using AI to generate their toolset.
This rule detects successful SSO logins on FortiGate devices using usernames and source IP addresses associated with a known malicious campaign exploiting a SAML SSO bypass. The rule specifically looks for successful SSO logins (logid == "0100032001", method == "sso", status == "success") from a predefined list of malicious usernames or source IP addresses.
This rule detects when a system configuration file is downloaded from a FortiGate device within 60 seconds of a successful SSO login from the same user and source IP. This rapid sequence of events is indicative of automated scripts used by attackers to exfiltrate device configurations immediately after gaining initial access.
This rule detects the creation of a local administrative account on a FortiGate device with a generic name commonly used by threat actors for persistence following an initial compromise. The rule specifically looks for log events indicating the addition of a new system administrator account with names like 'secadmin', 'itadmin', 'support', 'backup', 'remoteadmin', or 'audit'.
Detects a successful SSO administrative login followed by a system configuration download from the same user and source IP address within 5 minutes. This sequence is a strong indicator of compromise related to CVE-2025-59718 and CVE-2025-59719.
This rule detects successful administrative logins to Fortinet devices (FortiGate, FortiWeb, FortiProxy, FortiSwitchManager) that leverage the FortiCloud SSO mechanism from an IP address not on an allowlist. This could indicate exploitation of CVE-2025-59718 and CVE-2025-59719, which allow for an authentication bypass.
Detects a distinctive User-Agent string used by the initial RedLoader DLL for command and control (C2) communications. This activity is associated with the GOLD BLADE threat group (also known as RedCurl).
Detects attempts to exploit a path traversal vulnerability (CVE-2025-64446) in FortiWeb. Attackers send a crafted POST request to create a new administrative user by targeting a specific URI and including keywords in the request body indicative of new admin creation.
Detects the unique User-Agent string "A WinHTTP Example Program/1.0" used by the MuddyViper backdoor for C2 communications, as reported in the MuddyWater campaign.
Detects the creation of a new administrative account with 'prof_admin' privileges on a FortiWeb device from an unknown IP address. This activity is highly suspicious if not performed by a known administrator and could indicate post-exploitation activity, potentially related to CVE-2025-64446.
This rule detects the use of common file transfer and remote access protocols (SSH, FTP, SMB, TELNET, FTPS, SMB.v3) communicating over non-standard ports. Adversaries often use non-standard ports to bypass firewall rules, evade detection, or obscure their command and control (C2) traffic. The rule specifically excludes the standard ports for these protocols to focus on anomalous behavior.
Detects HTTP/HTTPS POST requests to known Lumma Stealer C2 domain
Detects the creation of a new administrator account on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall. This activity could indicate an attacker establishing persistence or escalating privileges within the network infrastructure.
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