Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,264 detections
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Detects the execution of the 'reagentc.exe' utility with the '/disable' argument. This command is used to disable the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), which is a common post-compromise activity performed by ransomware and other malware to prevent system recovery and hinder incident response efforts.
Detects the execution of 'reagentc.exe' with the '/disable' flag, which is used to disable the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE). Adversaries often perform this action as part of an attempt to inhibit system recovery during ransomware operations or other destructive attacks.
Detects potential anti-forensic activity involving the clearing of multiple Windows Event Logs within a short time frame using the 'wevtutil' utility. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to remove traces of post-compromise activity.
Detects the execution of the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) management tool, reagentc.exe, with the '/disable' flag. This action disables the built-in system recovery features, which is a common tactic used by adversaries to prevent system restoration after data destruction or ransomware attacks.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using administrative tools like wevtutil.exe, PowerShell, or through the detection of mass log-clear audit events (such as Event IDs 1102 and 104) occurring in a rapid burst. This activity is often used by adversaries to hide evidence of post-compromise actions.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using administrative tools like wevtutil.exe, PowerShell, or through the detection of mass log-clear audit events (such as Event IDs 1102 and 104) occurring in a rapid burst. This activity is often used by adversaries to hide evidence of post-compromise actions.
This rule detects the presence, installation, or execution attempts of the known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys). Monitoring for this specific driver is a common practice to identify attempts to perform 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, which can be used for kernel-mode code execution and privilege escalation.
This rule detects the presence, installation, or execution attempts of the known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys). Monitoring for this specific driver is a common practice to identify attempts to perform 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, which can be used for kernel-mode code execution and privilege escalation.
This rule performs a hunting activity across multiple telemetry sources (Network, Email, Endpoint) to detect known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Anthropic threat intelligence reporting (September 2026). It looks for specific malware file names, command-line patterns, service installations, phishing email addresses, and C2 communication URLs.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'OneDriveUpdateScheduler' or the execution of a related VBScript, which are commonly used by adversaries for persistence and code execution. This rule monitors process creation events for indicators of malicious task scheduling or script execution mimicking legitimate update processes.
Detects potential tampering with Windows Event Logs or audit services by correlating manual service stops or log clearing events (EventIDs 1100, 1102, 104, 7036, 7040) with a sudden, significant decrease in total event volume on the same host. The rule accounts for planned maintenance and legitimate event log service restarts to reduce noise.
Detects the loading and service creation of the CcProtect/Alinubx kernel driver, a known technique for Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks. The rule identifies suspicious characteristics such as file name mismatches, unauthorized product/company signatures, and the creation of services associated with this malicious driver family (e.g., NvFsFilter) to facilitate EDR/AV termination or privilege escalation.
This rule performs a hunting activity across multiple telemetry sources (Network, Email, Endpoint) to detect known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Anthropic threat intelligence reporting (September 2026). It looks for specific malware file names, command-line patterns, service installations, phishing email addresses, and C2 communication URLs.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, wmic) to delete volume shadow copies, backup catalogs, or disable system recovery features. This behavior is a common precursor to or component of ransomware encryption operations intended to prevent system recovery.
Detects the execution of native Windows administrative utilities (vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit, wbadmin) used by the Monkey ransomware C++ variant to delete volume shadow copies, clear the backup catalog, and disable system recovery boot policies. This activity is a characteristic precursor to data encryption.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks named after Microsoft Edge updates or the execution of suspicious Wscript commands, which may indicate persistence or execution by the LxBaseRAT malware.
Detects the creation of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager', which is a known indicator of the SparroWocky backdoor attempting to establish persistence on a system.
This rule detects various persistence mechanisms associated with the NetSupport Manager remote access tool. It monitors for the creation of services, scheduled tasks, registry modifications (such as Run keys, Winlogon Notify packages, and keyboard filter drivers), and process executions related to NetSupport Manager (specifically client32.exe).
Detects the creation or execution of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager', which is utilized by the SparroWocky backdoor for persistence. The malware masquerades as a legitimate system audit service to evade detection.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager' via registry keys or command-line utilities. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or service manipulation for malicious purposes.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager' via registry keys or command-line utilities. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or service manipulation for malicious purposes.
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