Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
338 detections
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This rule detects DNS queries to known malicious domains associated with various APT groups and ransomware families. The domains are hardcoded indicators of compromise (IOCs) and their resolution suggests potential compromise or communication with adversary infrastructure.
This rule detects exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-0300 in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS. It identifies suspicious network connections to User-ID Authentication Portal ports (6081, 6082) from external IP addresses, excluding RFC1918 and loopback ranges. Additionally, it looks for a specific anomalous User-Agent string associated with the CL-STA-1132 threat actor, which has been observed during exploitation of this vulnerability.
This rule detects suspicious network communication patterns indicative of command and control (C2) activity by analyzing the jitter (variability) in connection gaps and byte transfer sizes. It identifies connections with a high number of events, a consistent average gap between connections, and low jitter in both connection timing and data transfer sizes (bytes out and bytes in). This pattern can suggest automated, scheduled communication often associated with C2 channels.
This detection rule identifies network activity associated with the Torg Grabber infostealer. It specifically looks for connections to known command and control (C2) domains and specific URL paths used by the malware for authentication, data upload, or core functionality. The rule leverages network proxy, firewall, or Zeek HTTP logs to extract and analyze URLs. A match indicates a strong reason to investigate the affected host and user, check for expected access, and review nearby activity for further compromise.
This detection rule identifies network traffic associated with the Powercat malware campaign by looking for specific URL patterns or domains mentioned in threat intelligence. It focuses on high-confidence indicators such as 'powercat.dog/(cool|watermelon5)' or 'ce953a0eb08246617b7f849486c4b26a7af37e9d2e8f0e13b3ae1bf0da8a70a.xyz' within network proxy, traffic, or HTTP logs. A match indicates potential communication with Powercat command and control infrastructure or distribution points, warranting further investigation into the source and destination IPs, URLs, and surrounding network activity.
Detects the macOS RAT com.apple.act.mond beaconing via HTTP POST with spoofed IE8 User-Agent which was spread via axios supply-chain attack
Detects DNS queries for domains that match the pattern used by the PLASMAGRID malware's Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA). This malware, delivered by the Coruna iOS exploit kit, uses a DGA seeded with "lazarus" to generate 15-character domains with a ".xyz" TLD for command and control fallback.
This rule set detects various stages of activity related to the 'OpenClaw' malware family and associated campaigns. It includes detection for OpenClaw process execution, exposure of a specific administrative port, execution of shell commands via curl (ClawHavoc delivery), outbound webhook exfiltration, and infostealer access to OpenClaw configuration files.
This rule detects various stages of an attack chain, starting from an Apache ActiveMQ exploit (CVE-2023-46604) leading to LockBit-style ransomware. It identifies process creation anomalies (java.exe spawning certutil.exe for downloads), network connections to known Metasploit C2 infrastructure, the presence of specific ransomware file hashes, and attempts to clear Windows event logs, all indicative of the described attack scenario.
Detects network and endpoint activity associated with the XWorm LATAM campaign, including C2 communication, payload downloads, CasPol.exe making outbound connections, WMI-spawned PowerShell with Cloudinary fetches and Assembly.Load, and a specific file hash.
This detection identifies network connections from non-browser processes to known Large Language Model (LLM) API endpoints. While some connections may be legitimate developer or application traffic, unexpected processes connecting to these services could indicate unauthorized data exfiltration, corporate espionage, or misuse of AI services.
OysterLoader uses a Windows scheduled task to keep itself running. It creates a task with a name that looks like a normal security or updater tool, so it blends in. The task runs repeatedly in the background, helping the malware come back even after a restart and making it harder to notice or remove.
The rule detects large file transfers where the MIME type is declared as 'text/plain' but the file size exceeds 1,000,000 bytes. It specifically looks for files originating locally and excludes transfers to internal IP addresses. This behavior is often used by C2 frameworks to disguise binary payloads or exfiltrated data as harmless text to evade proxy inspection.
Detects a high frequency of ICMP Echo Request (Type 8) packets, which could indicate a Denial of Service (DoS) attack.
Detects attempts to exploit an authentication bypass vulnerability in the Inetutils Telnet daemon. Attackers inject the '-f' flag into the 'USER' environment variable during Telnet negotiation to gain unauthorized shell access.
Detects attempts to exploit the SmarterMail authentication bypass vulnerability (WT-2026-0001) by sending a POST request to the /api/v1/auth/force-reset-password endpoint with 'IsSysAdmin' set to 'true'.
Detects ICMP Echo Request packets where the Identification field is set to the specific magic value 0xC0DE (49374). This value is used by the VoidLink rootkit as a trigger for its covert, out-of-band C2 channel, which can bypass standard firewall rules.
Detects network connections to domains associated with the DarkSpectre threat actor's campaigns, including GhostPoster, ShadyPanda, and The Zoom Stealer. These campaigns leverage malicious browser extensions for data theft, affiliate fraud, and corporate espionage.
Detects a URL containing common redirection or proxy parameters where the value appears to be a ROT13 obfuscated URL, indicated by the presence of 'uggcf' ('https') and common ROT13'd TLDs. This is an evolution of a TTP observed in Kimsuky campaigns.
Detects HTTP C2 beaconing patterns based on burst request counts with small response bodies (1-499 bytes). This rule correlates multiple HTTP requests to the same destination within a short timespan, where each response has a small body size. This pattern is indicative of command and control (C2) communication.
Detects Windows executable downloads with document or image file extensions, a common malware delivery technique
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