Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,866 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,525
525
299
218
131
Contributors
999
706
554
263
188
Categories
1,449
1,199
1,091
792
575
Platforms
39,936
7,266
6,537
3,866
3,647
Products / Services
1,755
1,449
1,121
438
406
MITRE Techniques
1,889
1,392
913
814
727
CVEs
12
5
4
3
2
IDS Classtypes
10
7
6
6
5
IDS Protocols
37
2
1
This rule monitors audit logs for anomalous OAuth application configurations, specifically focusing on excessive scope counts, Redirect URI mismatches, Client ID mismatches, and cross-client token exchange irregularities, which may indicate malicious OAuth application registration or configuration for token theft.
Detects failed authentication attempts using the BAV2ROPC user agent (Azure CLI / legacy OAuth2 ROPC token requests) in Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Logs. BAV2ROPC bypasses MFA by authenticating directly to the /token endpoint. Error codes 50053 (account lockout), 50126 (invalid credentials), and 50034 (user not found) are characteristic of password spraying activity. Observed in the LSHIY LLC password spray campaign (June 2026).
This rule detects the use of the OAuth 2.0 Device Code Authorization flow directed towards 'microsoft.com/devicelogin'. This authentication method is frequently abused by attackers in phishing campaigns to hijack device-based user sessions by tricking victims into entering a device code on a malicious site, effectively bypassing traditional password-based authentication.
Detects high volumes of file download operations from OneDrive or SharePoint occurring within one hour of a device-code authentication event. This pattern is indicative of potential data exfiltration by an adversary using a stolen access token obtained via an OAuth device-code phishing attack.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain originating from OAuth device code phishing. It tracks the sequence of events starting from device code authentication, followed by the registration of a new device or Primary Refresh Token (PRT) manipulation, potential password resets, and the creation of malicious inbox rules (e.g., auto-forwarding). The rule correlates these events within a 1-hour window to identify malicious intent, with critical alerts triggered if persistence mechanisms survive a password reset.
This rule detects successful Azure AD sign-in events (ResultType 0) that occur following a series of repeated failed sign-in attempts (ResultType 50126) from the same user account. The activity is specifically scoped to the LSHIY IPv6 address range and utilizes Azure CLI or similar mobile/desktop client applications, which is a strong indicator of an automated password spraying or credential stuffing attack followed by a successful compromise.
Detects the presence of specific Microsoft Entra (formerly Azure AD) authentication session cookies (ESTSAUTH, ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT, ESTSAUTHLIGHT) in web proxy traffic. This activity is indicative of session cookie theft and potential replay attacks (Pass-the-Cookie) where an adversary attempts to authenticate to Microsoft services using stolen session material from an unauthorized or non-enrolled device.
KQL Query from file: The Hunt for QR Phisher
This rule monitors for the execution of Azure CLI commands used to enumerate role assignments and Azure Container Registry (ACR) details. Adversaries often perform this reconnaissance to identify high-privilege accounts, discover container registries, or map out permissions to facilitate lateral movement or persistence within an Azure environment.
Detects attempts to retrieve Azure Container Registry (ACR) credentials, either by executing specific Azure CLI commands on a host or by initiating the Microsoft.ContainerRegistry/registries/listCredentials/action via Azure Activity Logs. Such activities may indicate an adversary attempting to gain unauthorized access to container registries.
Detects the restart of an Azure Container Instance via the Microsoft.ContainerInstance/containerGroups/restart/action operation. This could indicate an attempt to disrupt service availability or potentially hide malicious modifications made to a container by forcing a state change.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain originating from OAuth device code phishing. It tracks the sequence of events starting from device code authentication, followed by the registration of a new device or Primary Refresh Token (PRT) manipulation, potential password resets, and the creation of malicious inbox rules (e.g., auto-forwarding). The rule correlates these events within a 1-hour window to identify malicious intent, with critical alerts triggered if persistence mechanisms survive a password reset.
Detects non-interactive sign-ins to Azure CLI using the 'python-requests' User-Agent by non-administrative users. This pattern is associated with the LSHIY password spray campaign, which exploits the OAuth ROPC flow for credential abuse against Microsoft 365.
This rule detects potential device code phishing attempts by correlating URL click events with sign-in logs using the 'deviceCode' authentication protocol. It specifically looks for successful or failed sign-ins (result types 0, 50074, 50076, 500121) that occur after a user clicks on a URL.
Detects indicators associated with CVE-2025-2492 or AiCloud activity in security logs.
Detects instances where users grant broad permissions (e.g., Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite) to newly registered or unknown applications. It specifically correlates these grants with device code flow authentication, a technique frequently used in OAuth consent phishing to bypass traditional authentication hurdles.
Detects non-interactive sign-ins to Microsoft 365 using the OAuth Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) flow via the Azure CLI. This legacy authentication method enables attackers to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) by submitting credentials directly to the authentication endpoint, a technique observed in password spraying campaigns.
This rule identifies successful user sign-ins originating from IP addresses known to belong to VPN services. It leverages an external list of VPN IP ranges to correlate with Azure AD SigninLogs. This can indicate an attempt to bypass geo-restrictions, hide true origin, or could be legitimate use of a VPN by an employee.
Detects high-frequency MFA factor updates, resets, activations, deactivations, or deletions for a single user within a 30-minute window. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to compromise or take control of account authentication mechanisms after gaining initial access.
This use case detects a potential bypass of a conditional access policy. Most likely bypass would be your MFA policy, bypassing multi factor authentication via some sort of vulnerability or misconfiguration.
Detects the creation of applications or service principals in Azure AD that involve sensitive OAuth permissions (e.g., Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite.All) when performed by users identified with elevated risk levels or outside of standard business hours.
Page 93 of 185