Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,056 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
15,357
13,598
2,797
1,803
1,721
Contributors
7,678
5,999
5,315
4,504
4,191
Categories
18,109
9,757
3,851
3,758
3,713
Platforms
40,056
7,331
6,542
3,907
3,664
Products / Services
10,439
9,678
6,723
1,887
1,878
MITRE Techniques
13,737
13,116
8,066
5,949
4,414
CVEs
49
45
30
30
29
IDS Classtypes
214
56
43
23
19
IDS Protocols
183
172
20
16
8
This detection monitors the addition of the following ACLs to an Active Directory user object: "Full control","All extended rights","All validated writes", "Create all child objects","Delete all child objects","Delete subtree","Delete","Modify permissions","Modify owner","Write all properties". Such modifications can indicate potential privilege escalation or malicious activity. Immediate investigation is recommended upon alert.
This analytic is looking for when an ACL is applied to an OU which denies listing the objects residing in the OU. This activity combined with modifying the owner of the OU will hide AD objects even from domain administrators.
This detection identifies when users are added to privileged Active Directory
groups by leveraging the Windows Security Event Code 4728 along with a lookup
of privileged AD groups provided by Splunk Enterprise Security.
Attackers often add user accounts to privileged AD groups to escalate privileges
or maintain persistence within an Active Directory environment.
Monitoring for modifications to privileged groups can help identify potential security breaches
and unauthorized access attempts.
groups by leveraging the Windows Security Event Code 4728 along with a lookup
of privileged AD groups provided by Splunk Enterprise Security.
Attackers often add user accounts to privileged AD groups to escalate privileges
or maintain persistence within an Active Directory environment.
Monitoring for modifications to privileged groups can help identify potential security breaches
and unauthorized access attempts.
Detect when a user creates a new DACL in AD for their own AD object.
The following analytic utilizes Windows AppLocker event logs to identify attempts to bypass application restrictions. AppLocker is a feature that allows administrators to specify which applications are permitted to run on a system. This analytic is designed to identify attempts to bypass these restrictions, which could be indicative of an attacker attempting to escalate privileges. The analytic uses EventCodes 8007, 8004, 8022, 8025, 8029, and 8040 to identify these attempts. The analytic will identify the host, full file path, and target user associated with the bypass attempt. These EventCodes are related to block events and focus on 5 attempts or more.
The following analytic detects when DLLs with known abuse history are loaded from an unusual location.
This activity may represent an attacker performing a DLL search order or sideload hijacking technique.
These techniques are used to gain persistence as well as elevate privileges on the target system.
This activity may represent an attacker performing a DLL search order or sideload hijacking technique.
These techniques are used to gain persistence as well as elevate privileges on the target system.
The following analytic detects the execution of multiple offensive toolkits and commands through the process execution datamodel. This method captures commands given directly to powershell.exe, allowing for the identification of suspicious activities including several well-known tools used for credential theft, lateral movement, and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information within the environment.
The following analytic detects the creation or connection to named pipes used by potentially unwanted applications (PUAs) like VPNs or utilities like PsExec.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
The following analytic detects the loading of known vulnerable Windows drivers, which may indicate potential persistence or privilege escalation attempts. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 6 to identify driver loading events and cross-references them with a list of vulnerable drivers. This activity is significant as attackers often exploit vulnerable drivers to gain elevated privileges or maintain persistence on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with high privileges, leading to further system compromise and potential data exfiltration.
Detects suspicious network activity or credential exfiltration attempts occurring during package manager installation processes (npm, pip, yarn). The rule monitors for lifecycle scripts (e.g., preinstall, postinstall) spawning network utilities to external destinations or accessing common CI/CD secrets like AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY or GITHUB_TOKEN.
Detects a single host or account generating a high volume of LDAP queries (typical of reconnaissance tools like BloodHound/SharpHound) within a 10-minute time window. The rule specifically looks for more than 500 LDAP queries targeted at a limited number of Domain Controllers.
This rule detects unauthorized attempts to dump the memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. It monitors for common post-exploitation tools (such as procdump, mimikatz, nanodump, and sqldumper) or built-in Windows techniques (using rundll32.exe with comsvcs.dll) that are typically used to extract sensitive credential material from process memory.
Detects anomalous patterns of Kerberos Ticket Granting Service (TGS) requests using RC4 encryption (0x17), which is a common indicator of Kerberoasting attacks. The rule identifies accounts requesting a high volume of service tickets for distinct Service Principal Names (SPNs), excluding the krbtgt account.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility where the command line contains suspicious patterns such as execution of common scripting engines (PowerShell, wscript, cscript), use of common staging directories (temp, appdata, programdata), or naming conventions that mimic legitimate Windows system tasks.
This rule detects PowerShell processes initiated with command-line arguments that indicate obfuscation (e.g., -enc, -encodedCommand) or attempts to download or execute external content (e.g., IEX, Net.WebClient, Invoke-WebRequest). This pattern is commonly observed during the initial execution of malicious payloads or tool delivery.
Detects Microsoft Windows Event ID 4662 (Object Access) where specific GUIDs associated with sensitive Active Directory rights (specifically, those related to DCSync or sensitive extended rights) are accessed. The rule filters out events originating from Domain Controllers to identify potentially anomalous access patterns from non-DC endpoints.
Detects the creation of suspicious Windows services associated with remote execution tools like PsExec, PAExec, or custom tools that leverage SMB administrative shares (ADMIN$, IPC$). The rule correlates the service creation event (Event ID 7045, 4697) with preceding network connection attempts to SMB shares, and subsequent service termination or state change events within a short timeframe, which is a pattern characteristic of remote lateral movement and command execution.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, wbadmin.exe, bcdedit.exe) to delete volume shadow copies, backup catalogs, or modify boot configuration data to inhibit system recovery, a common behavior observed during ransomware and wiper attacks.
Detects indicators of Cobalt Strike activity, including the creation of default named pipes, process injection into common LOLBins without legitimate parent processes, and network communication patterns consistent with Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profiles.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a known web server process (e.g., IIS, Nginx, Apache) spawns a command shell process, followed shortly by the creation of a file with a web shell-like extension (.aspx, .jsp, .php) in the same environment. This pattern is indicative of an adversary exploiting a public-facing application to upload and potentially access a web shell.
Detects the invocation of powershell.exe or pwsh.exe using encoded command flags (-EncodedCommand/-enc) in combination with stealth-oriented arguments such as -WindowStyle Hidden or -NoProfile. This pattern is frequently utilized by threat actors to execute obfuscated, malicious scripts while bypassing command-line visibility and standard profile configurations.
Page 93 of 1908