Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential account takeover or persistent access via MFA manipulation by correlating recent MFA-related sign-in failures with subsequent successful identity management operations such as updating security info or registering a new MFA method. This behavior pattern is frequently associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing or vishing attacks where an attacker compromises credentials, overcomes MFA challenges, and then establishes their own MFA device to maintain persistent access.
This rule detects instances where a user grants an OAuth application consent to perform sensitive actions in an Azure AD environment. It specifically filters for high-risk scopes (such as Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite, or Directory.ReadWrite) granted to applications with publishers other than Microsoft Corporation, which is often indicative of OAuth consent phishing attacks or malicious application integration.
Detects user account lockouts or instances where a user has been flagged for frequent failed authentication attempts within the Duo Security platform. This activity is indicative of brute force attacks, credential stuffing, or attempts to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) via fatigue or repeated request generation.
This rule detects the creation of email monitors or mail routing destinations within Google Workspace. These actions are indicative of persistent access methods where an attacker redirects or copies sensitive emails to an external or attacker-controlled account, enabling long-term intelligence gathering.
This rule identifies potential post-Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session hijacking by correlating suspicious initial authentication events (e.g., AiTM indicators, unusual behavioral flags) with subsequent successful sign-ins originating from known residential proxies or anonymization VPN providers within a 24-hour window.
Detects instances where a user accesses an Exchange email item and subsequently modifies, moves, or deletes the same item within a short 10-minute window using the same IP address. This behavior can be indicative of automated cleanup, unauthorized tampering, or mailbox manipulation.
This rule detects 'impossible travel' activity performed by users assigned to sensitive Microsoft 365 Communication Compliance roles. It monitors Azure Sign-in logs for successful authentication events occurring within a short timeframe (1 hour) from multiple distinct geographic locations (countries) or different autonomous system numbers (ASNs). This behavior is characteristic of an adversary utilizing stolen session tokens or compromised credentials to access protected administrative functions.
This rule detects potential mass email access or collection activities by an application (AppId). It monitors Microsoft 365 CloudAppEvents for actions like 'MailItemsAccessed', 'Send', or 'New-InboxRule' associated with an application. It triggers an alert when a single application interacts with 10 or more distinct mailboxes within a one-hour window, which is indicative of potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) or unauthorized mass data exfiltration via compromised OAuth applications.
Detects MFA authentication attempts in Duo where the source IP address is identified by Duo as a known anonymous proxy, VPN, or Tor exit node. Such infrastructure is frequently used by adversaries to mask their true origin during credential stuffing, session hijacking, or post-compromise activity.
Detects anomalous OAuth application authorization behavior by a user, specifically monitoring for a spike in authorization events within a short timeframe. This activity is often indicative of consent phishing campaigns where an adversary tricks a user into granting excessive application permissions to a malicious OAuth app, or a compromised account performing bulk authorization grants.
This rule detects instances where a user enters a protected password into an application that has not been configured or registered for SSO (Single Sign-On). It achieves this by identifying 'Protected password entered' events and using a join-anti operation to filter out sessions where an 'SSO_PASSWORD_USED' event was previously recorded for the same user and domain.
This rule detects the generation of 2-Step Verification (2SV) backup/scratch codes in Google Workspace. Backup codes allow a user to bypass standard MFA, making their generation a significant security event that may indicate an attacker is attempting to maintain persistent access to an account, often following a compromise or as a preparation for further malicious activity.
Detects anomalous session activity where a single authentication session ID is associated with multiple IP addresses and multiple distinct countries within a 20-minute window. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking, such as an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack, where a session token is stolen and reused by an attacker from a different location.
This rule identifies Service Principals in Microsoft Entra ID that have successfully authenticated after a long period of dormancy (defined as 90 days or more). Reactivation of dormant service principals may indicate that an adversary is attempting to revive a persistent access method or abuse credentials that were previously set aside.
Detects anomalous session activity where a single authentication session ID is associated with multiple IP addresses and multiple distinct countries within a 20-minute window. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking, such as an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack, where a session token is stolen and reused by an attacker from a different location.
Detects network and DNS traffic targeting known infrastructure used by the Forg365 adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing kit. This kit clones Microsoft login pages to intercept credentials and session cookies via reverse proxy.
This rule detects instances where a user has explicitly marked an MFA push notification as fraudulent within the Duo Security platform. This indicates that an unauthorized party may have triggered an MFA request using stolen credentials, and the legitimate user is actively denying the authentication attempt.
Detects instances where a user who has not enrolled in Duo MFA successfully authenticates due to being connected to a defined trusted network. This behavior indicates an MFA coverage gap, potentially allowing an attacker to authenticate as an unenrolled user without MFA if they gain access to a trusted network or VPN.
Detects malicious script execution triggered by the CVE-2026-42897 XSS vulnerability in Outlook Web Access (OWA). The detection rule monitors AMSI script detection events for patterns associated with the OWAReaper exploit chain, which utilizes an 'onload=eval(atob())' loader to reconstruct a base64-encoded payload embedded in social-icon image tags within a browser session.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration by monitoring for anomalous user behavior across integrated SaaS applications. It flags accounts that perform high-frequency read, search, or view activities across three or more monitored SaaS platforms (Confluence, Jira, Slack, Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, or Bitbucket) within a 5-minute window, followed immediately by an upload or post activity to an external, non-integrated domain.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration by monitoring for anomalous user behavior across integrated SaaS applications. It flags accounts that perform high-frequency read, search, or view activities across three or more monitored SaaS platforms (Confluence, Jira, Slack, Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, or Bitbucket) within a 5-minute window, followed immediately by an upload or post activity to an external, non-integrated domain.
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