Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects HTTP GET requests to a known malicious endpoint attempting to download a file named 'update_ms.msi', associated with the Chaos msaRAT trojan.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity associated with the AdaptixC2 framework. It identifies HTTP requests containing a specific 'X-Beacon-Id' header combined with known C2 URI patterns and a specific User-Agent string commonly observed in AdaptixC2 traffic.
Detects network traffic consistent with the SleeperGem loader communicating with a Forgejo instance hosted on git.disroot.org. The detection looks for GET requests containing specific path patterns (e.g., '/git-ecosystem/', '/raw/branch/main/') and file extensions (deploy.sh or git-credential-manager), along with a 'Git' user-agent, which is characteristic of the loader's C2 retrieval activity.
Detects DNS queries matching known malicious infrastructure domains identified in SourTrade malvertising campaigns. These domains are often used by threat actors to host malicious payloads or C2 infrastructure.
Detects a multi-stage network activity pattern characteristic of 'SourTrade' cloaking. The rule tracks an initial HTTP request with a referral to a known lookalike crypto/trading domain, followed by the fetching of a client-side JavaScript fingerprinting script, and finally, a subsequent HTTP response that appears to be a near-empty decoy page (used to mask malicious content from crawlers).
Detects HTTP request attempts to exploit WordPress vulnerabilities (associated with 'wp2shell' activity) targeting the 'author_exclude' or 'author__not_in' parameters with SQL injection payloads, such as sleep() functions or comment injection characters.
Detects an HTTP GET request to the Microsoft Graph API (/v1.0/users/*/calendarView) containing a specific hardcoded far-future date (2050-05-13) in the startDateTime parameter. This pattern is indicative of a command-and-control (C2) mechanism leveraging a legitimate cloud service to maintain persistent communication channels.
This rule detects UDP traffic patterns characteristic of the msaRAT C2 handshake. It specifically identifies initial WebRTC DataChannel connection frames containing the 0xFE marker combined with ChaCha-Poly1305 encryption indicators within the expected packet size range.
This rule detects unauthenticated HTTP requests to the WordPress REST API batch endpoint (/wp-json/batch/v1). Such requests are characteristic of attempts to exploit the wp2shell vulnerability (CVE-2026-63030), where attackers leverage the batch API to execute unauthorized actions without proper authentication headers (Cookie or Authorization).
Detects DNS queries matching the pattern used by the CAV3RN C2 infrastructure. The rule identifies specific subdomains under 'cloudlanecdn.com' that follow a structured format consistent with C2 configuration recovery and heartbeat beacons, specifically looking for a hex-encoded timestamp pattern.
Detects HTTP GET requests associated with the Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) campaign JC-46, specifically targeting GitHub for payload delivery and fetching dropper files (such as .vbs, .bat, .js, or .pif) from known command-and-control staging infrastructure.
Detects specific WebSocket JSON-formatted C2 agent registration and profiling traffic associated with the TAG-195/TinyEgg campaign. The rules look for specific registration markers (agent_register, request_register) and host profiling data (hostname, username, OS, domain, isAdmin status) characteristic of this threat actor's C2 communication.
This rule detects network traffic patterns characteristic of the 'ChonkyChicken' malware using a 'proxy_request' method within a JSON payload, suggesting the initiation of command-and-control (C2) communication or traffic relaying through the infected host.
Detection of network communications associated with the TAG-195 campaign, specifically targeting the 'ClickFix' social engineering lure. The rules identify TLS SNI, DNS queries, and HTTP requests involving known C2/staging domains 'screenly.cam' and 'xtrafftrck.net', as well as specific payload retrieval patterns for OCX files and 'curl' usage involving the infrastructure IP 70.34.205.43.
Detects network indicators related to the BlueNoroff ClickFix Kit, specifically targeting malicious TURN relay domains (edensun.xyz) used for WebRTC-based webcam exfiltration and Command and Control (C2) traffic involving Socket.IO signals that trigger malicious UI modals.
Detects multiple repeated web requests targeting WordPress 'author_exclude' or '/wp/v2/batch' endpoints that contain suspicious time-based SQL injection payloads. The rule specifically looks for patterns attempting to leverage SLEEP() functions to infer database information.
Detects network traffic indicating msaRAT behavior where a host initiates a STUN/TURN token request to a Cloudflare Workers (.workers.dev) domain. The rule identifies suspicious characteristics including spoofed Microsoft-related Origin or Referer headers and a HeadlessChrome User-Agent, commonly used by automated C2 communication.
Detects HTTP response bodies containing specific combinations of advertising tracking markers (Google gtag, Meta fbq, and Twitter twq) alongside known path indicators like '/config' or 'sw.js', which are characteristic of SourTrade malvertising landing pages.
Detects a specific DNS AAAA record response containing a hardcoded sentinel value (2001:4998:44:3507::8000) associated with the CAV3RN framework, which signals a failed configuration recovery process.
Detects the HTTP POST exfiltration pattern used by the mrmustard stealer to send harvested credentials/host data to its C2 endpoint at metrics.femboy.energy/v1/collect.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to a Polygon blockchain JSON-RPC endpoint containing the eth_call method and a specific hardcoded smart contract address and function selector associated with the TELEPUZ malware command-and-control communication.
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