Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous access to the Azure Portal Single Page Application (SPA) by monitoring sign-in logs. The rule flags users accessing this specific application from multiple devices or over an unusually long time span (exceeding 24 hours), which may indicate session hijacking, token theft, or unauthorized access attempts via stolen session tokens.
This rule detects potential mass email access or collection activities by an application (AppId). It monitors Microsoft 365 CloudAppEvents for actions like 'MailItemsAccessed', 'Send', or 'New-InboxRule' associated with an application. It triggers an alert when a single application interacts with 10 or more distinct mailboxes within a one-hour window, which is indicative of potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) or unauthorized mass data exfiltration via compromised OAuth applications.
Detects Microsoft Entra device registration events where the device name adheres to the 'Forg365-' prefix naming convention. This pattern is indicative of persistence mechanisms used by the Forg365 Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform, which registers devices to bypass conditional access or MFA.
Detects instances where a user accesses an Exchange email item and subsequently modifies, moves, or deletes the same item within a short 10-minute window using the same IP address. This behavior can be indicative of automated cleanup, unauthorized tampering, or mailbox manipulation.
This rule identifies potential account compromise or session hijacking by correlating anomalous outbound email patterns with risky sign-in events. It monitors for users who send outbound emails to a threshold of previously unseen external recipients within a short window after authenticating under suspicious conditions, such as high-risk sign-in flags, atypical locations, or unfamiliar applications. This pattern is indicative of attackers using stolen session tokens or compromised credentials to perform mass outbound phishing, spamming, or data exfiltration from an internal mailbox.
This rule detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity by correlating network events indicating a connection to a known phishing domain with subsequent suspicious authentication behavior. Specifically, it identifies sessions associated with non-corporate IP addresses that show evidence of token reuse (e.g., multiple distinct IP addresses for the same session identifier) occurring within a short window after accessing a phishing portal.
This rule detects potential mass data retrieval or excessive access to sensitive-labeled files by an individual user through Microsoft Copilot within a one-hour window. By monitoring the volume of distinct sensitivity-labeled objects accessed, it identifies behavior consistent with a user or compromised account performing high-volume information gathering.
This rule monitors Azure Active Directory (Microsoft Entra ID) audit logs for the addition or modification of application registrations that contain specific, potentially malicious redirect URI patterns ('brk-' or 'brk-multihub'). These patterns are associated with OAuth consent phishing or malicious application authorization where an adversary registers an app to intercept authorization codes.
This rule detects high-volume file access or download operations in SharePoint or OneDrive, performed by non-browser user agents (e.g., Python, PowerShell, cURL, Go). An elevated volume of such actions within a short timeframe is indicative of automated, scripted interaction, which may represent malicious data exfiltration, automated content scraping, or potential account compromise.
Detects the delivery of a malicious SVG data-URI payload targeting the CVE-2026-42897 vulnerability in Outlook Web Access (OWA). This exploit uses a base64-encoded SVG image embedded in an email body, which triggers an onload JavaScript handler when rendered by OWA, leading to potential code execution within the mailbox context.
Duo MFA Push Fatigue Activity
Cortex XDR
Detects a suspicious burst of multi-factor authentication (MFA) push request denials (such as user cancellations or ignored requests) originating from a single user within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of MFA fatigue, where an attacker repeatedly triggers MFA requests in an attempt to annoy or trick the legitimate user into inadvertently approving a push notification.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity by detecting two distinct patterns: first, network connections initiated by Java processes located in tomcat/catalina directories on high-risk ports; second, suspicious administrative audit actions (Add admin, Modify credential, Export device list) within N-central where the initiating user context is missing.
Slack Anomalous Activity
Cortex XDR
This rule detects anomalous activity reported by Slack's internal anomaly detection system. This includes events such as impossible travel, new device access, suspicious IP changes, and other behavioral anomalies that Slack identifies. The rule extracts relevant user and context information for further investigation.
This rule detects potentially malicious attempts to leverage different Microsoft cloud applications (FOCI family) in a short time frame following a conditional access block (AADSTS53003). The rule identifies scenarios where a single user account, within a 10-minute window, generates a 53003 failure while attempting to use multiple different client applications (such as Teams, O365, or Azure Portal), which may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass or probe security controls or testing token validity across multiple services.
This rule detects potentially malicious attempts to leverage different Microsoft cloud applications (FOCI family) in a short time frame following a conditional access block (AADSTS53003). The rule identifies scenarios where a single user account, within a 10-minute window, generates a 53003 failure while attempting to use multiple different client applications (such as Teams, O365, or Azure Portal), which may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass or probe security controls or testing token validity across multiple services.
This takes the earliest available snapshot per agent instead of comparing two states. If an agent is born already carrying MCP access and org-wide sharing there is no baseline to drift from, so this needs its own check rather than a diff.
This rule detects anomalous patterns of Microsoft Graph API activity involving the /calendar, /events, and /calendarView endpoints. It identifies application identities performing high-frequency create (POST/PATCH) and read (GET) operations within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of a compromised mailbox being used as a C2 dead-drop channel, where the calendar is used to exchange commands and results between the adversary and the compromised environment.
This rule detects potentially malicious modifications to agent configurations by monitoring for multiple significant changes within a short time frame (2 days) compared to a 14-day baseline. Monitored indicators include: changes to instructions, addition of new Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, addition of new owners, and expansion of access permissions to include the entire organization. An alert is triggered when an agent exhibits at least two of these signals simultaneously.
The query builds a 14-day baseline snapshot and a 2-day current snapshot per agent from AgentsInfo, computes the four signals independently, then correlates them by AgentId and surfaces only agents with 2 or more signals firing in the same window. Output is a prioritized triage list instead of four separate alert streams.
The query builds a 14-day baseline snapshot and a 2-day current snapshot per agent from AgentsInfo, computes the four signals independently, then correlates them by AgentId and surfaces only agents with 2 or more signals firing in the same window. Output is a prioritized triage list instead of four separate alert streams.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity by detecting two distinct patterns: first, network connections initiated by Java processes located in tomcat/catalina directories on high-risk ports; second, suspicious administrative audit actions (Add admin, Modify credential, Export device list) within N-central where the initiating user context is missing.
This hunting query identifies GitHub activites where there are a large number of deletions that may be a sign of compromise.
Detects anomalous access to the Azure Portal Single Page Application (SPA) by monitoring sign-in logs. The rule flags users accessing this specific application from multiple devices or over an unusually long time span (exceeding 24 hours), which may indicate session hijacking, token theft, or unauthorized access attempts via stolen session tokens.
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