Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors Azure Active Directory (Microsoft Entra ID) audit logs for the addition or modification of application registrations that contain specific, potentially malicious redirect URI patterns ('brk-' or 'brk-multihub'). These patterns are associated with OAuth consent phishing or malicious application authorization where an adversary registers an app to intercept authorization codes.
This rule detects anomalous activity involving the legacy Microsoft Azure AD Graph API (graph.windows.net) originating from users who lack corresponding entries in standard Entra ID (AuditLogs) sign-in or management activity logs. A high frequency of these undocumented API calls (more than 5 in an hour) from a specific user and IP address indicates potential unauthorized reconnaissance or access attempts attempting to bypass standard audit logging.
attackers are continuously abusing Device Code phishing, convincing victims to authenticate using the legitimate Microsoft login page. The victim completes the password and MFA correctly, but the resulting tokens are delivered to the attacker.
And one point that I think is important: Device Code Flow should not be enabled if you don't really need it. The recommendation is clear: disable it where possible and only allow documented exceptions.
The KQL below takes Cmsi:Cmsi as a reference (which means a Device Code Authentication flow was used) point and looks 15 minutes backwards (the time that a Code is valid) for the same user, grouping the authentication flow together with countries, IPs, browsers and User-Agents. The aim is to identify authentication flows where we observe different Browsers, Countries, IPs or User-Agents, potentially showing the transition between the victim and attacker context.
The idea is simple: Look at the complete authentication sequence and identify what changes between the victim and attacker context.
And one point that I think is important: Device Code Flow should not be enabled if you don't really need it. The recommendation is clear: disable it where possible and only allow documented exceptions.
The KQL below takes Cmsi:Cmsi as a reference (which means a Device Code Authentication flow was used) point and looks 15 minutes backwards (the time that a Code is valid) for the same user, grouping the authentication flow together with countries, IPs, browsers and User-Agents. The aim is to identify authentication flows where we observe different Browsers, Countries, IPs or User-Agents, potentially showing the transition between the victim and attacker context.
The idea is simple: Look at the complete authentication sequence and identify what changes between the victim and attacker context.
Detects potential password spraying or brute force activity against Entra ID by monitoring for a high number of failed authentication attempts from a single IP address targeting multiple unique user accounts within a 15-minute window.
This rule detects anomalous activity involving the legacy Microsoft Azure AD Graph API (graph.windows.net) originating from users who lack corresponding entries in standard Entra ID (AuditLogs) sign-in or management activity logs. A high frequency of these undocumented API calls (more than 5 in an hour) from a specific user and IP address indicates potential unauthorized reconnaissance or access attempts attempting to bypass standard audit logging.
Detects registry-level signals of the SleeperGem RubyGems supply chain attack:
a long-dormant maintainer account publishing a new gem version, the trusted Dendreo gem receiving a new version that adds git_credential_manager as a dependency, and an unrelated maintainer (fastlane-plugin-run_tests_firebase_testlab) publishing a version referencing the same dependency within a short window - indicating coordinated, multi-account compromise rather than a single takeover.
a long-dormant maintainer account publishing a new gem version, the trusted Dendreo gem receiving a new version that adds git_credential_manager as a dependency, and an unrelated maintainer (fastlane-plugin-run_tests_firebase_testlab) publishing a version referencing the same dependency within a short window - indicating coordinated, multi-account compromise rather than a single takeover.
Detects registry-level signals of the SleeperGem RubyGems supply chain attack:
a long-dormant maintainer account publishing a new gem version, the trusted Dendreo gem receiving a new version that adds git_credential_manager as a dependency, and an unrelated maintainer (fastlane-plugin-run_tests_firebase_testlab) publishing a version referencing the same dependency within a short window - indicating coordinated, multi-account compromise rather than a single takeover.
a long-dormant maintainer account publishing a new gem version, the trusted Dendreo gem receiving a new version that adds git_credential_manager as a dependency, and an unrelated maintainer (fastlane-plugin-run_tests_firebase_testlab) publishing a version referencing the same dependency within a short window - indicating coordinated, multi-account compromise rather than a single takeover.
This rule detects proxy requests directed to the legitimate Microsoft OAuth 2.0 device authorization endpoint (/common/oauth2/deviceauth). This activity is indicative of OAuth device code phishing, where a user is tricked into entering a malicious or attacker-provided device code into the legitimate Microsoft device login page to complete an authentication flow and grant unauthorized access to an attacker-controlled application.
Detects anomalous SOAP requests to 'GetScratchCodesRequest' within the 'zimbraSync' or 'zimbraAccount' namespaces in Zimbra logs. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting attempts, specifically the exfiltration of 2FA recovery scratch codes, often associated with the ZimReaper/Ulej payload used by threat actors.
This rule monitors Okta system logs for lifecycle events related to inbound Identity Providers (IdP), specifically creation, modification, activation, deactivation, or deletion. It flags these changes when initiated by clients identified as proxies or associated with known abused ASNs. This activity is indicative of potential cross-tenant impersonation where an attacker with administrative access adds a malicious IdP to federate and impersonate organizational users.
Detects deletion of GitHub Actions workflow files combined with anomalous branch names/commit hashes, indicating the attacker concealing the malicious CI workflow used in this supply-chain compromise.
Detects rapid outbound meeting-invite fan-out from a Telegram account to numerous contacts (RecipientCount >= 10), excluding accounts flagged as known legitimate bulk-messaging/bot accounts, consistent with BlueNoroff's GhostCall self-propagation pipeline where compromised trusted-contact accounts distribute fake meeting invites. This rule captures only the fan-out behavior; for full GhostCall self-propagation confirmation it should ideally be paired with a companion rule detecting Telegram session reuse on a new device/IP (same UserId, within approximately 15 minutes), since that temporal join between session hijack and invite fan-out cannot be expressed as a single Sigma query.
Detects successful Azure AD sign-in events authenticated via the device code flow that subsequently access Microsoft 365 resources such as Outlook, SharePoint, OneDrive, or Teams. This pattern is consistent with post-compromise use of OAuth tokens obtained through device-code phishing.
Detects high volumes of authentication failures within Okta, characterized by a single source IP address targeting a large number of distinct user accounts. This behavior is indicative of automated credential attacks, such as password spraying or credential stuffing, designed to discover valid credentials or exploit reused passwords while attempting to evade account lockout thresholds.
This rule detects proxy requests directed to the legitimate Microsoft OAuth 2.0 device authorization endpoint (/common/oauth2/deviceauth). This activity is indicative of OAuth device code phishing, where a user is tricked into entering a malicious or attacker-provided device code into the legitimate Microsoft device login page to complete an authentication flow and grant unauthorized access to an attacker-controlled application.
Detects the creation of a WordPress administrator account via the REST API using username prefixes associated with the 'wp2shell' exploit (e.g., 'wp2_' or 'w2s_'). This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence on a compromised WordPress site.
This rule aggregates SharePoint activity logs for a specific user within a defined timeframe. It groups activities by operation and file, intended to support investigation into potential mass file access or data staging behavior by a specific user in SharePoint.
Detects network requests to the Google OAuth device authorization flow endpoint, which is commonly abused in phishing campaigns to trick users into authorizing a malicious application on their behalf, allowing an attacker to steal session tokens.
Detects successful Azure AD sign-in events authenticated via the device code flow that subsequently access Microsoft 365 resources such as Outlook, SharePoint, OneDrive, or Teams. This pattern is consistent with post-compromise use of OAuth tokens obtained through device-code phishing.
Detects successful Azure AD sign-in events authenticated via the device code flow that subsequently access Microsoft 365 resources such as Outlook, SharePoint, OneDrive, or Teams. This pattern is consistent with post-compromise use of OAuth tokens obtained through device-code phishing.
This rule analyzes Microsoft Entra (Azure AD) sign-in logs over a 30-day period for access to sensitive administrative applications (e.g., Azure Portal, Microsoft Intune, Defender). It flags user-application-IP sessions that exhibit unusual characteristics, such as login successes following failures, access from multiple geographic locations, or the use of multiple client types, which may indicate account compromise or unauthorized access.
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