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Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects suspicious modifications or deletions of Outlook calendar events using the Microsoft Graph API, potentially indicating the use of calendar infrastructure as a command-and-control (C2) heartbeat or exfiltration channel. The rule monitors for specific pattern-based event updates or deletions following calendar enumeration, which is a technique used to maintain persistent communication or exfiltrate small amounts of data.
Detects Microsoft Graph API requests targeting user mailboxes within a tenant or organization structure likely associated with Israeli legal entities, identified by .co.il domain patterns in the Request URI.
Detects anomalous activity in Microsoft 365 calendar events where potential C2 data is exfiltrated or synchronized. This is identified by the creation or modification of calendar events containing suspicious file names (e.g., File0.txt, File1.txt) or specific command-and-control markers within the event subject.
Detects Microsoft 365 Outlook calendar events with highly anomalous future dates (specifically the year 2050) or specific subject patterns, which are indicative of a command-and-control (C2) communication channel established via calendar item properties.
Detects Microsoft 365 Outlook calendar events being updated via Graph API where the subject is changed to a suspicious C2-like string (e.g., 'Boss Report ID:' or 'Boss update ID:'). This behavior is consistent with attackers using Outlook calendar events as a covert communication channel or for command and control signaling.
This rule detects incoming emails with subject lines containing keywords associated with invoice, payment, or banking detail changes. These patterns are highly characteristic of Business Email Compromise (BEC) and social engineering campaigns designed to redirect financial transactions to fraudulent accounts.
Detects Microsoft Graph API requests targeting user mailboxes within a tenant or organization structure likely associated with Israeli legal entities, identified by .co.il domain patterns in the Request URI.
Detects suspicious modifications or deletions of Outlook calendar events using the Microsoft Graph API, potentially indicating the use of calendar infrastructure as a command-and-control (C2) heartbeat or exfiltration channel. The rule monitors for specific pattern-based event updates or deletions following calendar enumeration, which is a technique used to maintain persistent communication or exfiltrate small amounts of data.
Detects Microsoft 365 Outlook calendar events being updated via Graph API where the subject is changed to a suspicious C2-like string (e.g., 'Boss Report ID:' or 'Boss update ID:'). This behavior is consistent with attackers using Outlook calendar events as a covert communication channel or for command and control signaling.
Detects instances where a user receives an email containing a link to SharePoint or OneDrive, but upon clicking the link, the user is redirected to a different, non-Microsoft domain. This behavior is indicative of a phishing attempt using legitimate file-sharing services to bypass initial URL filtering.
This rule detects scenarios where an email containing a specific URL has been soft or hard deleted from a user's mailbox (often by security automated systems), but a user has subsequently clicked that same URL. This often indicates a race condition or a failure in security controls where a malicious link was delivered and accessed before or during the removal process.
This rule monitors the Microsoft 365 AuditLogs to retrieve and investigate all actions taken by or against a specific user account. It expands the TargetResources field to extract the TargetUPN and filters for a specific account, providing a timeline of operations, the actor who initiated the action, and the result of the operation.
This rule detects potential OAuth Device Code Flow phishing attacks where users are directed to malicious lure pages on romnor[.]ca to enter a Microsoft device code. It also alerts on authentication activity associated with a specific malicious OAuth client ID (d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c) known to be used by a phishing backend to poll and claim OAuth tokens.
Detects anomalous activity in Microsoft 365 calendar events where potential C2 data is exfiltrated or synchronized. This is identified by the creation or modification of calendar events containing suspicious file names (e.g., File0.txt, File1.txt) or specific command-and-control markers within the event subject.
Detects anomalous access to Outlook calendar attachments via the Microsoft Graph API, specifically targeting a file named 'file0.txt'. This activity may indicate a technique where attackers use calendar events as a covert channel for data exfiltration or delivery of malicious payloads.
Detects Microsoft 365 Outlook calendar events with highly anomalous future dates (specifically the year 2050) or specific subject patterns, which are indicative of a command-and-control (C2) communication channel established via calendar item properties.
This rule monitors email traffic by aggregating data from email events, attachment information, and URL click interactions. It identifies emails that contain attachments and correlates them with specific file attributes (name, extension, hash, threat type) and any subsequent user interaction with URLs contained within those emails, including blocked or allowed clicks.
This rule detects potential phishing attempts by identifying emails that contain links to legitimate Microsoft Forms (forms.office.com) with lures commonly associated with document-related phishing (e.g., 'shared a document', 'invoice'). The rule then correlates this with user click activity to identify instances where the user was redirected from the Microsoft Forms site to an external, potentially malicious URL.
This rule detects access to known adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure mimicking Microsoft login pages. It identifies malicious URLs matching specific randomized path token patterns or those hosting a known phishing domain, while also monitoring for associated session-specific parameters such as 'rt=', 'PHPSESSID', and 'preload=1' cookies, as well as traffic interacting with legitimate 'login.microsoftonline.com' domains in a proxy context.
This rule identifies suspicious email messages that contain isolated blocks of text preceded by at least two whitespace characters (including newlines, carriage returns, or tabs). This pattern is often used by threat actors to obfuscate content, attempt to bypass email gateway filters, or hide malicious strings from security scanners by breaking up content flow.
Detects anomalous, automated data exfiltration cycles in Microsoft 365 environments consistent with the Helix threat group. The rule identifies a pattern of successful sign-ins followed within 6 hours by new MFA registration, suspicious SharePoint enumeration, and a high-frequency, non-human-paced burst of file downloads.
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