Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Monitors successful sign-in events that utilize the OAuth 2.0 Device Code authorization protocol. While legitimate for headless applications or IoT devices, this flow is frequently abused by attackers for credential harvesting and phishing attacks to gain unauthorized access to user accounts and cloud resources.
This rule identifies successful user sign-ins originating from IP addresses known to belong to VPN services. It leverages an external list of VPN IP ranges to correlate with Azure AD SigninLogs. This can indicate an attempt to bypass geo-restrictions, hide true origin, or could be legitimate use of a VPN by an employee.
Identifies when a service principal is created in Azure.
Detects a suspicious pattern where a user successfully authenticates via MFA, followed by another successful sign-in attempt for the same account within 10 minutes using a different IP address or user agent. This behavior is often indicative of session hijacking or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks where a session token is stolen and replayed from an attacker-controlled environment.
This rule detects potential developer workstation compromise by monitoring for suspicious child process creation (shells/interpreters) from common development tools (Code.exe, node.exe, python.exe) followed by subsequent authentication to cloud environments (Azure, AWS, or GCP) within a 60-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a developer's machine being compromised to harvest session tokens or credentials to access cloud resources.
Detects potential identity pivoting by correlating signs of developer workstation compromise (e.g., shell spawning from IDE/node processes) with subsequent anomalous cloud console or API access from the same or associated identity within a short timeframe. This rule monitors both Azure Sign-in logs and AWS CloudTrail activity for suspicious patterns following endpoint indicators.
This rule detects a potential MFA fatigue attack by identifying users who experienced a high volume of denied MFA requests (5 or more) followed by at least one successful authentication within a 15-minute window across Okta and Azure Active Directory platforms.
Detects Microsoft Graph API enumeration of privileged directory endpoints using a token with only User.Read scope and password-only authentication (amr: pwd). This activity is consistent with the exploitation of CVE-2025-0309, often associated with tooling like AzureHound/roadtx, which abuses hidden Conditional Access exclusion policies.
Detects enumeration of Entra ID (Azure AD) users, groups, devices, and service principals using the Microsoft Graph API, specifically when performed by tools like AzureHound or Roadtx. The detection focuses on activity originating from sign-ins that bypassed MFA, potentially leveraging a hidden CA policy scope exclusion (CVE-2025-0309). The rule identifies suspicious user agents and a high volume of requests to multiple Graph API enumeration endpoints.
Detects rapid deletion and recreation of cloud storage buckets (S3 or Azure Storage) within a short timeframe (60 seconds). This behavior is often indicative of an attempt to hijack a bucket name or gain unauthorized access to data by exploiting race conditions or misconfigurations in infrastructure management.
Detects high-volume data access or exfiltration from Azure/Office 365 cloud environments via common scripting/automation user-agents. The rule monitors API requests to users, mail, drive, or files endpoints by non-standard clients (e.g., python, curl, Go) from previously unseen locations, calculating a risk score based on the number of endpoints accessed and the total data volume.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to Azure AD device registration. It identifies instances where a single user principal name (UPN) performs 5 or more device registrations or adds members to groups within a one-hour window, specifically targeting device resources. This could indicate an adversary attempting to register multiple devices to bypass conditional access policies or gain persistent access.
Detects instances where a user grants an OAuth application sensitive permissions, which could indicate an illicit consent grant attack where an adversary lures a user into authorizing a malicious application to access their email, files, or directory data.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency account enumeration activity in cloud audit logs, specifically targeting user, group, device, and service principal listing operations. This behavior is indicative of potential reconnaissance or discovery efforts by an attacker who has compromised a user account.
Detects modifications to Azure AD/Entra ID application configurations, specifically updating the 'RedirectUri' or 'ReplyUrls' to point to potentially external or unauthorized domains. This technique is often used in OAuth-based application-consent phishing campaigns to redirect authorization codes to adversary-controlled servers.
Detects data transfer to potentially attacker-controlled cloud accounts
This rule detects suspicious sign-in attempts to Microsoft services (login.microsoftonline.com, graph.microsoft.com, outlook.office365.com) that occur within 30 minutes of a user clicking on a URL associated with these services. The sign-in is considered suspicious if it originates from a user agent commonly used by automated tools (e.g., axios, curl, python-requests, httpclient, Go-http-client) and is flagged with a 'atRisk' or 'high' risk level by Azure AD. This combination suggests a potential credential compromise following a phishing attempt, where an attacker might be using automated tools to leverage stolen credentials.
Detects an unusually high volume of successful operations related to Azure App Services originating from a single caller within a one-hour window. This could indicate automated activity, reconnaissance, or a misconfigured application.
This rule detects when a single caller performs five or more successful 'Create or Update Network Security Group' operations within a one-hour window in Azure Activity logs. This could indicate an attacker attempting to modify network access controls to facilitate lateral movement, C2, or data exfiltration, or a misconfigured automated process.
This rule detects repeated successful operations related to public access or firewall configuration changes within Azure Activity Logs. A high count (3 or more) of such operations by the same caller within an hour could indicate malicious activity, such as an attacker attempting to open up network access to compromised resources or exfiltrate data.
Detects potential Microsoft 365 session token replay attacks, often associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) kits. The rule identifies suspicious sign-in activity originating from proxy or anonymized IP addresses where MFA was bypassed or incomplete, coupled with a geographic location that deviates from the user's established 30-day baseline or constitutes a new, unseen location.
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