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Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects email activity where a user receives an email containing a link to 'tilda.ws' (often used for landing pages) with social engineering themes like invoices or document signing, and subsequently clicks the link to be redirected to a different destination. This pattern is indicative of a credential phishing or malicious landing page campaign.
Detects new device registrations in Microsoft Entra ID where the device display name is prefixed with 'Forg365-', a pattern used by the Forg365 PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) platform. This activity is indicative of an adversary establishing persistent, unmanaged device access to compromised Microsoft 365 accounts.
Detects anomalous activity in Microsoft 365 calendar events where potential C2 data is exfiltrated or synchronized. This is identified by the creation or modification of calendar events containing suspicious file names (e.g., File0.txt, File1.txt) or specific command-and-control markers within the event subject.
Detects suspicious modifications or deletions of Outlook calendar events using the Microsoft Graph API, potentially indicating the use of calendar infrastructure as a command-and-control (C2) heartbeat or exfiltration channel. The rule monitors for specific pattern-based event updates or deletions following calendar enumeration, which is a technique used to maintain persistent communication or exfiltrate small amounts of data.
Detects anomalous access to Outlook calendar attachments via the Microsoft Graph API, specifically targeting a file named 'file0.txt'. This activity may indicate a technique where attackers use calendar events as a covert channel for data exfiltration or delivery of malicious payloads.
Detects anomalous access to Outlook calendar attachments via the Microsoft Graph API, specifically targeting a file named 'file0.txt'. This activity may indicate a technique where attackers use calendar events as a covert channel for data exfiltration or delivery of malicious payloads.
Detects Microsoft 365 Outlook calendar events being updated via Graph API where the subject is changed to a suspicious C2-like string (e.g., 'Boss Report ID:' or 'Boss update ID:'). This behavior is consistent with attackers using Outlook calendar events as a covert communication channel or for command and control signaling.
Detects outbound network connections to identified infrastructure associated with 'Pink' (CL-CRI-1147) passkey-enrollment vishing campaigns. These operators use phone-based social engineering to direct victims to phishing domains that relay credentials and MFA tokens in real-time to register attacker-controlled passkeys. The rule monitors for specific DNS query patterns containing passkey-related keywords and known malicious IP addresses used by the threat group.
Detects instances where users click links directing to Proton Drive domains, a common vector for device code phishing and credential harvesting attacks.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) device registration, ownership assignment, or user assignment operations where the device display name matches a suspicious naming pattern, specifically 'GraphSpy-Device'. This naming convention is often associated with the GraphSpy tool, which is used by adversaries to enumerate and manipulate Entra ID resources, including registering rogue devices to bypass conditional access or MFA.
Detects incoming email messages containing common prompt injection strings aimed at manipulating Large Language Models (LLMs). The rule scans email bodies for directives such as 'ignore previous instructions', 'save this to your memory', or other obfuscation patterns frequently used in adversarial prompting to bypass LLM safety guardrails or perform unauthorized data extraction.
Detects the registration of a new FIDO2 security key or passkey in Entra ID that is associated with a sign-in from an unmanaged or non-compliant device shortly before or after the registration. This behavior often suggests a vishing or social engineering scenario where an attacker guides a user through an authentication method registration process while impersonating IT support.
Detects inbound or intra-organizational emails that contain URLs associated with Proton Drive services. This rule is specifically designed to identify potential device code phishing attempts or malicious document distribution utilizing Proton Drive's infrastructure.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID sign-in events using the non-interactive OAuth device-code protocol against the 'common' tenant endpoint where MFA was not applied. This behavior is consistent with OAuth device-code phishing campaigns (e.g., Storm-2372/DEBULL) that exploit Conditional Access device-code flow allowances to bypass standard authentication controls.
Detects the presence of known ransomware extortion note file names on endpoints or communication attempts with associated extortion contact email addresses in email logs.
This rule identifies emails containing URLs that point to known malicious domains used in phishing campaigns. It joins email URL information with core email event details to report the sender, recipient, subject, and the specific malicious domain associated with the URL.
Detects instances where a user receives an email containing a link to 'canva.com' with subject lines suggestive of document sharing or invoicing, and subsequently clicks a URL that redirects them away from the 'canva.com' domain. This behavior is indicative of potential document-based phishing where attackers use legitimate document hosting platforms as a lure to redirect users to malicious or credential-harvesting websites.
Detects email notifications regarding the addition of a new Personal Access Token (PAT) to a GitHub account. This activity is often a precursor to unauthorized API access if an adversary has compromised a user's account.
This rule detects suspicious sign-in patterns indicative of an EvilTokens-style Microsoft Device Code OAuth phishing attack. It identifies successful device code flow sign-ins where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was not applied or satisfied, suggesting an adversary has bypassed MFA using a stolen device code. The rule aggregates these suspicious sign-ins by user, listing associated applications, IP addresses, and locations for analyst review.
This rule detects incoming emails containing specific subject lines related to 'Request for Payment' and 'Shared Folder' that include links to the '/Team_Meets/' path. It flags instances where the sender's domain differs from the domain hosting the embedded link, which is a common indicator of phishing or credential harvesting attempts using domain masquerading.
Detects potential Microsoft Teams impersonation or social-engineering activity where accounts use IT, admin, support, or security-themed display names, especially when associated with external users or impersonation indicators.
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