Executive Summary
In July 2026, JFrog Security Research identified a new wave of supply chain attacks targeting the AsyncAPI ecosystem. Specifically, four legitimate npm packages—@asyncapi/generator, @asyncapi/generator-helpers, @asyncapi/generator-components, and @asyncapi/specs—were compromised via unauthorized commits to the project's 'next' branch. Because the packages were published through a legitimate GitHub Actions workflow using OIDC trusted-publisher integration, the malicious releases carry valid provenance attestations, making them difficult to distinguish from authentic updates.
Technically, this campaign delivers Miasma v3, a sophisticated Node.js-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT). Unlike previous versions that executed upon installation, Miasma v3 triggers when the poisoned module is loaded by an application or build process. Once active, it downloads a secondary payload from IPFS, establishes persistent access across Linux, Windows, or macOS, and connects to an attacker-controlled C2 server at 85[.]137[.]53[.]71. While the Miasma framework supports self-propagation and credential theft, this 'miasma-train-p1' campaign primarily focuses on establishing a persistent shell for remote access.
This incident highlights a critical vulnerability in modern CI/CD pipelines where valid provenance does not guarantee code integrity if the release-triggering branch is insecure. Organizations using AsyncAPI tools should immediately audit their environments, as compromised developer workstations or CI runners could lead to the theft of signing materials, cloud identities, and sensitive source code.