Executive Summary
Researchers have documented 'Bind Link Abuse,' a sophisticated evasion technique leveraging the Windows Bind Filter minifilter driver (bindflt.sys). This legitimate feature, used by Windows Sandbox and containers, allows a local administrator to redirect one file path to another in memory without modifying on-disk files. By virtualizing these paths, attackers can bypass critical security controls including AMSI, AppLocker, and Windows Firewall by presenting a 'clean' file view to security tools while executing malicious payloads.
The attack progresses through three stages: File-Binding (hijacking DLLs), Process-Binding (spoofing executable identity), and Silo-Binding (creating divergent filesystem views inside and outside an isolation silo). These techniques break the fundamental assumption that a file's path is a reliable indicator of its identity. This capability is particularly dangerous because it requires no vulnerable drivers (unlike BYOVD) and can fool asynchronous scanners and forensic tools that re-verify files after execution.
While Microsoft currently considers this a low-severity issue due to the requirement for administrator privileges, the technique provides a standardized method for ransomware groups and APTs to blind endpoint agents. Defenders must shift from trusting reported image paths to validating the actual backing file objects via specific kernel APIs.