Executive Summary
A sophisticated campaign attributed with medium confidence to North Korean threat actors (specifically APT37, Lazarus, and Kimsuky) has been identified targeting South Korean organizations in the automotive, media, and information technology sectors. The primary tradecraft involves the deployment of the 'ted' backdoor, which is compiled directly into legitimate HAProxy load balancer builds to intercept web traffic and serve malicious content to specific targets. This toolkit is part of a broader framework of Linux-based malware including variants like BirdTroy, DriveTroy, and CurlRAT.
The attack chain typically begins with the exploitation of vulnerabilities in public-facing applications, such as South Korean 'Groupware' portals or mail servers. Once inside, attackers pivot to trojanize critical system daemons (e.g., crond, sshd, polkitd) to establish persistent access and harvest credentials. The depth of integration—specifically within load balancers—allows the actors to bypass traditional server-side logging and monitoring, making this an extremely stealthy espionage operation.
This activity represents a high risk to organizations within the South Korean supply chain, as the actors have been observed compromising software vendors to facilitate downstream attacks on their customers. The use of commodity cloud services like Google Drive for C2 (in the case of DriveTroy) and custom UDP-based protocols (HTTP/3 in BirdTroy) underscores a continuing evolution in their detection evasion techniques.
Key Details
Threat Name
ted Linux Backdoor
Affects
—
Adversary
APT37 Other Adversaries and Aliases: Lazarus; Kimsuky; SideCopy; Lazarus Group
MITRE Techniques
Malware/Tools
ted, curlRAT, CurlBack RAT, GOMIR, Ted backdoor, BirdTroy, DriveTroy, HttpTroy, TrollStealer, DWAgent, SSH keylogger, GoBear
