Executive Summary
A sophisticated two-pronged operation has been uncovered involving a coordinated npm supply chain attack and a purpose-built offensive panel named VHX Harvester. The campaign began with the publication of 85 malicious npm packages under the '@prime0' scope, designed to appear as search-findable typosquats of popular libraries like 'chalk' and 'semver'. These packages function as remote command execution agents that beacon to a centralized C2 server.
The infrastructure supporting the npm campaign also hosts the VHX Harvester panel, which targets the vast.ai GPU rental marketplace. The panel automates an eight-phase kill chain including host discovery, port scanning of GPU instances, credential harvesting via stored XSS in Caddy auth proxies, and lateral movement through Docker bridge network scanning. The operation is currently in a development and testing phase, as evidenced by multiple failed agent deployments and a lack of successful cryptocurrency miner installations to date.
The threat is significant due to its novel 'bridge agent' model, where the attacker rents legitimate containers on a target's physical host to bypass external firewalls via the internal Docker bridge. While the operator is currently focused on GPU hijacking for potential mining, the ability to exfiltrate environment variables and achieve root shells on machine learning instances poses a high risk to data and intellectual property in the AI/ML sector.
Key Details
Threat Name
VHX Harvester
Affects
ComfyUI-Manager, Caddy auth proxy
Adversary
@prime0 Other Adversaries and Aliases: TOPHIT; _prime0; Zaib Ali
MITRE Techniques
Malware/Tools
VHX Harvester, ComfyUI botnet, XMRig, lolMiner, Hysteria V2, Sliver, Diamorphine, GHAPPIER, PolinRider, TOPHIT
