Executive Summary
Huntress researchers observed a persistent threat actor compromising multiple web servers associated with a popular recreation management platform used by local municipalities. The attacker, suspected to be based in China due to language strings in their user-agent, initially attempted loud brute-force and enumeration techniques before successfully pivoting to an abuse of the platform's member file upload function. By registering legitimate accounts, the actor was able to upload malicious .aspx webshells to gain command execution and target cardholder data environments.
Throughout the campaign, the adversary demonstrated a rapid learning curve, moving from noisy enumeration to sophisticated stealth techniques, including timestomping metadata to match legitimate system files and using AI-generated PowerShell scripts for low-noise scanning. The ultimate goal involved stealing payment card details from webhook logs and deploying a real-time credential harvester by trojanizing common jQuery assets via WebRTC and WebSocket C2 channels.
