Executive Summary
Between March 19 and March 23, 2026, a threat actor known as TeamPCP executed a high-impact supply chain campaign targeting major security vendors and software ecosystems. The attack originated from a compromised GitHub personal access token (PAT), allowing the adversary to force-push malicious version tags across multiple popular GitHub Actions, including Aqua Security's Trivy and Checkmarx's KICS. The campaign affected over 10,000 workflows and distributed a three-stage credential stealer dubbed the 'TeamPCP Cloud stealer.'
Technically, the attack involved tag-poisoning to inject malicious bash scripts into CI/CD pipelines, which harvested environment secrets, cloud credentials, and SSH keys. Stolen npm tokens were subsequently used to launch 'CanisterWorm,' a self-propagating npm malware that utilizes the Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) blockchain for command-and-control (C2), making standard domain takedowns ineffective. The adversary also deployed malicious VS Code extensions and destructive payloads targeting specific geopolitical regions.
This campaign represents a critical shift in supply chain tradecraft, specifically targeting security tooling to bypass traditional vulnerability management. Because the malicious code executed during the scanning phase and left no CVE or CVSS footprint, organizations must move beyond simple vulnerability scanning toward immutable CI/CD practices, such as SHA-pinning and strict secret rotation, to mitigate similar risks.