Executive Summary
Radware security researchers identified a coordinated attack campaign on September 1, 2026, targeting over 60 public GitHub repositories. The attackers utilized shell command injection (T1059.004) by embedding payloads within GitHub Issue titles, Pull Request bodies, and comments. This campaign specifically targeted automated GitHub Actions workflows that unsafely interpolated untrusted user content directly into shell scripts.
Technical analysis confirmed successful execution in at least two high-profile repositories. The payloads were designed to collect environment variables—potentially including GitHub tokens, cloud credentials, and third-party API keys—and exfiltrate them to an attacker-controlled server at 54.205.16[.]142. The campaign involved approximately 74 distinct GitHub accounts, some of which showed signs of compromise rather than being purely synthetic identities.
This activity represents a significant supply chain risk. Successful exfiltration of repository secrets could allow an adversary to modify source code or compromise build processes, affecting all downstream users. Organizations utilizing GitHub Actions should immediately audit workflows for unsafe interpolation of event data and enforce the principle of least privilege for CI/CD tokens.
