Executive Summary
Between September 30 and October 16, 2026, an adversary utilizing the CyberStrikeAI platform—an open-source framework pairing LLMs with offensive tools—conducted a multi-phase intrusion into four AWS accounts. The attack originated from the IP 43.240.29[.]11 and demonstrated significant automation, characterized by a burst of 56 EC2 user data requests in just 141 milliseconds.
The attack chain progressed from credential validation (STS GetCallerIdentity) to harvesting Secrets Manager values and EC2 startup scripts (userData), which often contain hardcoded credentials. Most notably, the actor decrypted SSM SecureString parameters and subsequently issued SSM SendCommand executions, potentially achieving remote code execution on target instances. The campaign was notable for a 14-day operational gap, designed to bypass short correlation windows in traditional monitoring tools.
This activity highlights the emergence of agentic offensive platforms that can operate at machine speeds while maintaining a low detection profile. The high volume of automated medium-severity alerts underscores the need for IP-based correlation and robust cloud identity protection strategies.