Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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'Identifies IPs with failed attempts to sign in to one or more disabled accounts signed in successfully to another account.
This analytic will additionally identify the successful signed in accounts as the mapped account entities for investigation.
References: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-sign-ins-error-codes
50057 - User account is disabled. The account has been disabled by an administrator.'
This analytic will additionally identify the successful signed in accounts as the mapped account entities for investigation.
References: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-sign-ins-error-codes
50057 - User account is disabled. The account has been disabled by an administrator.'
'This query searches for successful user logins from different countries within 3 hours.
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimAuthentication)'
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimAuthentication)'
'This query looks for unfamiliar Sign-in's thats not seen recently for the given user
with azure portal login attempts and audit logs to help detect and reduce the analysis timeline for defenders'
with azure portal login attempts and audit logs to help detect and reduce the analysis timeline for defenders'
'Identifies sign-in anomalies from an IP in the last hour, targeting multiple users where the password is correct after multiple attempts'
'This query look for accounts that have not been successfully logged into recently who then add or update an MFA method before logging in.
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access by adding MFA methods in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed. This query uses the Microsoft Sentinel UEBA features.
Ref: [LINK TO BLOG]'
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access by adding MFA methods in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed. This query uses the Microsoft Sentinel UEBA features.
Ref: [LINK TO BLOG]'
'This query over Microsoft Entra ID sign-in activity highlights Microsoft Entra ID apps with
an unusually high ratio of distinct geolocations versus total number of authentications'
an unusually high ratio of distinct geolocations versus total number of authentications'
'Identifies when a user account is created and then deleted within 10 minutes. This can be an indication of compromise and an adversary attempting to hide in the noise.'
Detects when there is a login attempt from a country that has not seen a successful login in the previous 14 days.
Threat actors may attempt to authenticate with credentials from compromised accounts - monitoring attempts from anomalous locations may help identify these attempts.
Authentication attempts should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate and if there is other similar activity.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins
Threat actors may attempt to authenticate with credentials from compromised accounts - monitoring attempts from anomalous locations may help identify these attempts.
Authentication attempts should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate and if there is other similar activity.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins
'Detects when a user has successfully authenticated to another Microsoft Entra ID tenant with an identity in your organization's tenant.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'
'Identifies when a user account is enabled and then disabled within 10 minutes. This can be an indication of compromise and an adversary attempting to hide in the noise.'
This query shows details about all approved Entra ID Governance Access Packages assignments. The results include the time the request was created and approved along with the justification text provided by the requestor and the approver.
This query helps hunting for Automated email notifications and suspicious sign-in activity
'Detects when a guest account in a tenant is converted to a member of the tenant.
Monitoring guest accounts and the access they are provided is important to detect potential account abuse.
Accounts converted to members should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'
Monitoring guest accounts and the access they are provided is important to detect potential account abuse.
Accounts converted to members should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'
This detection approach correlates a user accessing an email with image/document attachments and a risky sign-in attempt from non-trusted devices.
Non-local logons with the built-in administrator (-500) account.
'Access attempts to Azure Portal from an unauthorized user. Either invalid password or the user account does not exist.'
'This query identifies whether an Active Directory user object was assigned a service principal name which could indicate that an adversary is preparing for performing Kerberoasting.
This query checks for event id 5136, that the Object Class field is "user" and the LDAP Display Name is "servicePrincipalName".
Ref: https://thevivi.net/assets/docs/2019/theVIVI-AD-Security-Workshop_AfricaHackon2019.pdf'
This query checks for event id 5136, that the Object Class field is "user" and the LDAP Display Name is "servicePrincipalName".
Ref: https://thevivi.net/assets/docs/2019/theVIVI-AD-Security-Workshop_AfricaHackon2019.pdf'
'Detects a successful logon by a privileged account from an ASN not logged in from in the last 14 days.
Monitor these logons to ensure they are legitimate and identify if there are any similar sign ins.'
Monitor these logons to ensure they are legitimate and identify if there are any similar sign ins.'
'This query will dynamically identify Exchange servers using common web paths used by the application in the csUriStem. The query
will then collect MDE alerts from the SecurityAlert table using the identified Exchange Server hostnames.'
will then collect MDE alerts from the SecurityAlert table using the identified Exchange Server hostnames.'
'This hunting query will identify instances where a single user account has seen a high incidence of failed attempts from highly volatile IP addresses
Changing IP address for every password attempt is becoming a more common technique amongst sophisticated threat groups. Often threat groups will randomise
the user agent they are using as well as IP address. This technique has been enabled by the emergence of services providing huge numbers of residential IP
addresses. These services are often enabled through malicious browser plugins. This query is best executed over longer timeframes.
Reduce the timeRange if you have too much data. Results with the highest "IPs", "Failures" and "DaysWithAttempts" are good candidates for further
investigation. This query intentionally does not cluster on UserAgent, IP etc. This query is clustering on the highly volatile IP behaviour.'
Changing IP address for every password attempt is becoming a more common technique amongst sophisticated threat groups. Often threat groups will randomise
the user agent they are using as well as IP address. This technique has been enabled by the emergence of services providing huge numbers of residential IP
addresses. These services are often enabled through malicious browser plugins. This query is best executed over longer timeframes.
Reduce the timeRange if you have too much data. Results with the highest "IPs", "Failures" and "DaysWithAttempts" are good candidates for further
investigation. This query intentionally does not cluster on UserAgent, IP etc. This query is clustering on the highly volatile IP behaviour.'
'Identifies anomolies in signin events based on the volume of signin events over time. Use this to identify suspicious authentication patterns such as spikes in activity or out of hours events.
Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#things-to-monitor'
Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#things-to-monitor'
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