Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a high volume of authentication failures followed by a successful authentication from the same source IP address against edge devices like FortiGate or Palo Alto GlobalProtect within a specific time window.
Detects password spraying activity against Azure Active Directory / Microsoft 365 services where a single source IP attempts to authenticate against numerous distinct user accounts with low attempt counts per account and sustained over time, while excluding successful authentication IPs.
Detects password spraying: a single source IP generating failed
logins against many distinct accounts in a short window. AI-assisted planning
can produce low-rate credential attacks designed to stay under per-account
lockout thresholds; the distinguishing signal is breadth across users rather
than volume per user.
logins against many distinct accounts in a short window. AI-assisted planning
can produce low-rate credential attacks designed to stay under per-account
lockout thresholds; the distinguishing signal is breadth across users rather
than volume per user.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID sign-ins to specific third-party applications related to Updraft (TeamUpdraft, UpdraftCentral, UpdraftVault, UpdraftClone, UpdraftPlus) with anomalous characteristics such as multi-IP access, distinct countries, or failed-then-successful access attempts, indicating possible credential compromise or misuse.
Detects potential password spraying behavior in Entra ID sign-in logs, characterized by a single source IP attempting authentication against numerous distinct user accounts with a low number of attempts per user.
Detects potential Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) fatigue or push bombing attacks against Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) accounts by identifying a high volume of MFA failures followed by suspicious or fraudulent report actions, or successful authentications shortly after repeated failures.
Detects multiple distinct source IPs sending forged 'pitboss PPE' authentication failure messages to NetScaler authentication endpoints within a short timeframe, associated with a fetch-based FreeBSD payload download (kw2-freebsd-x64-s11).
Detects potential password spraying activity in Azure Active Directory by identifying a single source IP address that authenticates against multiple distinct user accounts within a short time frame. The rule flags instances where there are numerous authentication attempts across many users, characterized by a low per-user failure count followed by at least one successful authentication, which is indicative of a successful password spray attempt.
Detects password spraying activity against Azure Active Directory / Microsoft 365 services where a single source IP attempts to authenticate against numerous distinct user accounts with low attempt counts per account and sustained over time, while excluding successful authentication IPs.
Detects repeated authentication failures against the wireless controller. Wireless
authentication attacks require physical proximity, so unlike internet-facing
brute force this indicates somebody near the building — which changes the response
entirely.
Onboarding: CISCO-AIR-CT5508-K9 is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 201).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='CISCO-AIR-CT5508-K9' and action='LOGIN'
| duration 15m
| groupby srcip, reason
| select srcip, reason, distinct_count(user)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
authentication attacks require physical proximity, so unlike internet-facing
brute force this indicates somebody near the building — which changes the response
entirely.
Onboarding: CISCO-AIR-CT5508-K9 is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 201).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='CISCO-AIR-CT5508-K9' and action='LOGIN'
| duration 15m
| groupby srcip, reason
| select srcip, reason, distinct_count(user)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
Detects multiple failed sign-in attempts against specific high-privilege break-glass accounts in Microsoft Entra ID within a 1-hour window.
Define a baseline threshold for failed sign-ins due to Conditional Access failures
Identifies brute force attacks on SAP systems using RFC logons. Detects a single IP attempting to sign in to several systems or clients within a 1-hour interval, indicating potential credential stuffing or internal lateral movement.
Detects repeated authentication failures at the IBM Security Access Manager reverse
proxy. WebSEAL fronts internal applications for external users, so it is the first
thing an attacker reaches and frequently the only control between the internet and
a legacy application that has none of its own.
Onboarding: ISAM-WEBSEAL is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 85).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='ISAM-WEBSEAL' and action='LOGIN'
| duration 15m
| groupby srcip, status, reason
| select srcip, status, reason, distinct_count(user)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 8
proxy. WebSEAL fronts internal applications for external users, so it is the first
thing an attacker reaches and frequently the only control between the internet and
a legacy application that has none of its own.
Onboarding: ISAM-WEBSEAL is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 85).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='ISAM-WEBSEAL' and action='LOGIN'
| duration 15m
| groupby srcip, status, reason
| select srcip, status, reason, distinct_count(user)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 8
Detects a burst of failed authentications against Zimbra. Internet-facing webmail is
among the most consistently attacked surfaces in any estate, and Zimbra deployments
frequently sit outside the identity controls applied to the rest of the organisation.
Onboarding: ZIMBRA is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 123).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='ZIMBRA' and action='LOGIN'
| duration 15m
| groupby srcip, reason
| select srcip, reason, distinct_count(user)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 10
among the most consistently attacked surfaces in any estate, and Zimbra deployments
frequently sit outside the identity controls applied to the rest of the organisation.
Onboarding: ZIMBRA is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 123).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='ZIMBRA' and action='LOGIN'
| duration 15m
| groupby srcip, reason
| select srcip, reason, distinct_count(user)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 10
Detects repeated network policy access denials. NPS governs RADIUS-based access to
VPN and wireless, so a burst of denials for one identity is credential testing
against the remote access perimeter — often the first move against an organisation
from outside.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=win-audit where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='NPS_USER_DENIED'
| duration 15m
| groupby user, networkpolicyname, reasoncode
| select user, networkpolicyname, reasoncode, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
VPN and wireless, so a burst of denials for one identity is credential testing
against the remote access perimeter — often the first move against an organisation
from outside.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=win-audit where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='NPS_USER_DENIED'
| duration 15m
| groupby user, networkpolicyname, reasoncode
| select user, networkpolicyname, reasoncode, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
Detects credential stuffing in Entra ID sign-in logs: one source IP failing against many distinct accounts within an hour, then succeeding on a small number of them.
Detects failed internal SAP logon attempts (AU2) targeting an invalid or non-existent client, indicating potential misconfiguration or an unauthorized access probe.
Detects successful or failed logon activity by a privileged SAP account on a production system using SAP Security Audit logs.
Detects credential stuffing in Entra ID sign-in logs: one source IP failing against many distinct accounts within an hour, then succeeding on a small number of them.
The following analytic identifies a single source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique valid users using the NTLM protocol. It leverages EventCode 4776 from Domain Controller logs, focusing on error code 0xC000006A, which indicates a bad password. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information or further compromise of the Active Directory environment.
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