Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects user sign-in activity originating from more than two distinct countries within the same hour, which is often indicative of impossible travel or compromised credentials.
Detects sign-in events using the device code authentication flow (OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant) where the originating IP address is external to the organization's private network. This flow is often abused by attackers to bypass traditional MFA or interact with headless environments via common HTTP client libraries like Python requests, Go-http, or Axios.
Detects successful authentications to Microsoft Graph using the Microsoft To-Do (22098786-6e16-43cc-a27d-191a01a1e3b5) or Intune Company Portal (9ba1a5c7-f17a-4de9-a1f1-6178c8d51223) client IDs via the ROPC password grant flow without MFA being satisfied. This behaviour is associated with CVE-2025-0309 where hidden CA policy exclusions for low-privileged scopes allow MFA bypass.
Detects modifications to a computer account (Event ID 4742) that involve the addition or modification of Service Principal Names (SPNs) containing sensitive strings such as 'GC/' (Global Catalog), 'DRS' (Directory Replication Service), or specific GUIDs. These activities are often associated with techniques to facilitate Kerberoasting, domain trust exploitation, or unauthorized service manipulation.
Detects stolen session token reuse to bypass MFA by correlating a successful SSO/VPN login from one IP with a subsequent successful login from a different IP using the same user agent context, or a user-agent change between sessions for the same user within a short window. Targets access broker technique where infostealer-harvested session cookies are replayed from different source IPs.
This rule detects an unusually high volume of logon events (both successful and failed) or a large number of unique users attempting to log on within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potential brute-force attacks or credential stuffing attempts against Windows systems.
Detects signs of a session hijacking attack using the OAuth device code grant flow, specifically identifying the initial device code authorization followed by suspicious post-authentication activity like mass data access via Microsoft Graph API or the creation of mailbox forwarding rules.
This rule detects anomalous or risky sign-in events for user accounts that have recently configured an active out-of-office (OOF) auto-reply. An attacker may leverage a user's known absence to gain access to their email or other corporate resources using compromised credentials, as the user is less likely to notice suspicious account activity while away.
This rule detects anomalous or risky sign-in events for user accounts that have recently configured an active out-of-office (OOF) auto-reply. An attacker may leverage a user's known absence to gain access to their email or other corporate resources using compromised credentials, as the user is less likely to notice suspicious account activity while away.
Correlates a successful authentication from a new, untrusted IP address utilizing a Linux/Kali User-Agent, a known signature of the Kali365 framework.
Detects successful sign-ins to Microsoft Graph where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was expected but not applied or not enabled, and the authentication method used was not MFA or passwordlessMFA. This could indicate an MFA bypass or misconfiguration, allowing access to sensitive resources without the required second factor.
Detects potential exploitation of the Zerologon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) by identifying a high volume of Netlogon authentication requests followed by a successful login by a Domain Admin, indicating a machine account password reset attack.
This rule detects anomalous or risky sign-in events for user accounts that have recently configured an active out-of-office (OOF) auto-reply. An attacker may leverage a user's known absence to gain access to their email or other corporate resources using compromised credentials, as the user is less likely to notice suspicious account activity while away.
Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-20127 on SD-WAN controllers, specifically unauthorized SSH authentication to the vmanage-admin account followed by suspicious NETCONF activity, usage of unauthorized tenant list CSV files, or execution of suspicious tenant-upload scripts.
This rule detects persistent Microsoft 365 access established by an attacker using OAuth refresh tokens, typically following a device_code phishing attack. It correlates three key events: initial device_code sign-ins from non-compliant or non-managed devices, the subsequent consent to a new OAuth application (likely attacker-controlled) from the same user and within a short timeframe, and finally, Microsoft Graph mail API access originating from that newly registered application. This sequence indicates an adversary has successfully phished a user, gained consent for a malicious application, and is now using it to access the user's mailbox data.
This rule detects potential MFA bypass via stolen session cookies by identifying successful single-factor authentications from new or unmanaged/non-compliant devices, especially when originating from a new geographical location for the user or exhibiting medium/high sign-in risk. It correlates impossible travel, new device, and lack of MDM/EDR compliance signals.
Detects anomalous authentication patterns where a single source IP address exhibits multiple failed login attempts followed by at least one successful login within a 10-minute time window, indicative of credential stuffing or password spraying.
Detects successful authentication events from accounts identified as service, managed, or robot accounts (e.g., svc_, sa_, msol, robot) originating from external IP addresses or exhibiting an unusually high number of distinct source IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of potential credential theft, token replay attacks, or unauthorized usage of service account identities.
Detects non-interactive Microsoft Graph OAuth2 token requests originating from unmanaged, deviceless sessions that falsely claim MFA satisfaction. The detection focuses on specific user agents known to be associated with automated token replay attacks and looks for multiple unique token identifiers per user session, which is indicative of credential or token theft rather than standard service account or application activity.
This rule detects potential rogue SD-WAN peering attempts by correlating successful SSH public key authentication using 'vmanage-admin' from known malicious IPs with subsequent network activity on SD-WAN control plane ports (e.g., 48373 for OMP, 830 for NETCONF). It also flags logs containing references to an 'evil_tenant.csv' artifact, which is associated with adversary persistence or unauthorized configuration management in SD-WAN environments.
Detects unauthorized persistence mechanisms on Cisco SD-WAN management plane nodes (vManage, vSmart, vBond). The rule monitors for modifications to SSH authorized_keys files, execution of commands like ssh-keygen or user management utilities, and SSH authentication events or configuration changes (e.g., PermitRootLogin) indicative of backdoored access.
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