Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,666 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,077
189
170
102
53
Contributors
520
361
306
67
52
Categories
20,443
11,831
5,872
5,155
4,866
1,666
Platforms
1,091
591
441
252
122
Products / Services
1,130
476
189
125
117
MITRE Techniques
945
843
438
416
413
CVEs
12
12
9
6
5
IDS Classtypes
1
1
'Highlights accounts associated with multiple authentications from different geographical locations in a short period of time.'
'Identifies evidence of brute force activity against a user based on multiple authentication failures and at least one successful authentication within a given time window.
Note that the query does not enforce any sequence, and does not require the successful authentication to occur last.
The default failure threshold is 10, success threshold is 1, and the default time window is 20 minutes.
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimAuthentication)'
Note that the query does not enforce any sequence, and does not require the successful authentication to occur last.
The default failure threshold is 10, success threshold is 1, and the default time window is 20 minutes.
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimAuthentication)'
In this query, we are looking for emails containing malware accessed on a unmanaged device
'Query for new sign-ins from stale/inactive accounts. UEBA filters based on ActivityInsights. Results for accounts created in the last 7 days are filtered out.'
'This query detects instances where an attacker has gained the ability to execute code on an ADFS Server through remote WMI Execution.
In order to use this query you need to be collecting Sysmon EventIDs 19, 20, and 21.
If you do not have Sysmon data in your workspace this query will raise an error stating:
Failed to resolve scalar expression named "[@Name]"
For more on how WMI was used in Solorigate see https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/.
The query contains some features from the following detections to look for potentially malicious ADFS activity. See them for more details.
- ADFS Key Export (Sysmon): https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/ADFSKeyExportSysmon.yaml
- ADFS DKM Master Key Export: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/ADFS-DKM-MasterKey-Export.yaml'
In order to use this query you need to be collecting Sysmon EventIDs 19, 20, and 21.
If you do not have Sysmon data in your workspace this query will raise an error stating:
Failed to resolve scalar expression named "[@Name]"
For more on how WMI was used in Solorigate see https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/.
The query contains some features from the following detections to look for potentially malicious ADFS activity. See them for more details.
- ADFS Key Export (Sysmon): https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/ADFSKeyExportSysmon.yaml
- ADFS DKM Master Key Export: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/ADFS-DKM-MasterKey-Export.yaml'
'Identifies IPs with failed attempts to sign in to one or more disabled accounts signed in successfully to another account.
This analytic will additionally identify the successful signed in accounts as the mapped account entities for investigation.
References: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-sign-ins-error-codes
50057 - User account is disabled. The account has been disabled by an administrator.'
This analytic will additionally identify the successful signed in accounts as the mapped account entities for investigation.
References: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-sign-ins-error-codes
50057 - User account is disabled. The account has been disabled by an administrator.'
'This hunting query will help detect successful sign-ins from devices that are marked non-compliant along with bulk download activity.
Attackers may attempt to get a list of accounts, groups, registration details within an environment which could help in follow-on behavior.
Best practice is to block sign ins from non-complaint devices, however if allowed monitor these events to ensure they do not lead to other risky activity.
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in'
Attackers may attempt to get a list of accounts, groups, registration details within an environment which could help in follow-on behavior.
Best practice is to block sign ins from non-complaint devices, however if allowed monitor these events to ensure they do not lead to other risky activity.
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in'
'Any Alerts that fired related to a given IpAddress during the range of +6h and -3d'
'Identifies sign-in anomalies from an IP in the last hour, targeting multiple users where the password is correct after multiple attempts'
'Identifies a list of IP addresses with a minimum number (default of 5) of failed logon attempts to AWS Console.
Uses that list to identify any successful Microsoft Entra ID logons from these IPs within the same timeframe.'
Uses that list to identify any successful Microsoft Entra ID logons from these IPs within the same timeframe.'
This will show Active Directory Security Token Service (STS) refresh token modifications by Service Principals and Applications other than DirectorySync. Refresh tokens are used to validate identification and obtain access tokens. This event is most often generated when legitimate administrators troubleshoot frequent Entra ID user sign-ins but may also be generated as a result of malicious token extensions. Confirm that the activity is related to an administrator legitimately modifying STS refresh tokens and check the new token validation time period for high values.
Query insprired by Azure Sentinel detection https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/StsRefreshTokenModification.yaml
Query insprired by Azure Sentinel detection https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/StsRefreshTokenModification.yaml
'Detects when a user has successfully authenticated to another Microsoft Entra ID tenant with an identity in your organization's tenant.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'
'Identifies when a user account is enabled and then disabled within 10 minutes. This can be an indication of compromise and an adversary attempting to hide in the noise.'
'This query detects an abuse of the DSRM account in order to maintain persistence and access to the organization's Active Directory.
Ref: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1785'
Ref: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1785'
This query lists Active Directory accounts lockout and unlock events
This detection approach correlates a user accessing an email with image/document attachments and a risky sign-in attempt from non-trusted devices.
'This query looks for sign ins by the Microsoft Entra ID Connect Sync account to Azure where properties about the logon are anomalous.
This query uses Microsoft Sentinel's UEBA features to detect these suspicious properties.
A threat actor may attempt to steal the Sync account credentials and use them to access Azure resources. This alert should be
reviewed to ensure that the log in came was from a legitimate source.'
This query uses Microsoft Sentinel's UEBA features to detect these suspicious properties.
A threat actor may attempt to steal the Sync account credentials and use them to access Azure resources. This alert should be
reviewed to ensure that the log in came was from a legitimate source.'
'Identifies a list of IP addresses with a minimum number (defualt of 5) of failed logon attempts to Microsoft Entra ID.
Uses that list to identify any successful AWS Console logons from these IPs within the same timeframe.'
Uses that list to identify any successful AWS Console logons from these IPs within the same timeframe.'
Query #1: Look for public IP addresses that failed to logon to a computer multiple times, using multiple accounts, and eventually succeeded.
One of the indicators of compromise for the Nobelium (formerly Solorigate) campaign was that unexpected service principals have been added to privileged roles. This query looks for service principals that have been added to any role.
See Understanding "Solorigate"'s Identity IOCs - for Identity Vendors and their customers..
Reference - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-active-directory-identity/understanding-quot-solorigate-quot-s-identity-iocs-for-identity/ba-p/2007610
See Understanding "Solorigate"'s Identity IOCs - for Identity Vendors and their customers..
Reference - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-active-directory-identity/understanding-quot-solorigate-quot-s-identity-iocs-for-identity/ba-p/2007610
'Detects a successful logon by a privileged account from an ASN not logged in from in the last 14 days.
Monitor these logons to ensure they are legitimate and identify if there are any similar sign ins.'
Monitor these logons to ensure they are legitimate and identify if there are any similar sign ins.'
Page 75 of 80