Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
176 detections
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Detects PowerShell execution spawning 7zr.exe to extract password-protected 7z archives using overwrite and password switches within a specified timeframe, or referencing specific malicious IOC file names and domains.
Detects potential data staging and exfiltration where sensitive or investigation-related files are compressed using archive utilities or PowerShell, followed closely by upload activities to Backblaze B2 cloud storage via CLI tools, rclone, or direct API connections.
Detects a specific sequence of behavior associated with Gryxa data collection and exfiltration. A single process queries system state or logs (scheduled tasks, WMI, event logs), creates an archive file (.zip, .7z, .rar), and establishes an outbound public network connection shortly thereafter.
Detects the sequential relationship of data staging using tools like WinRAR and subsequent exfiltration using tools like Rclone, WinSCP, or FileZilla on a single host within a 24-hour window.
Detects the execution of archiving utilities (7z, rar, tar, or Compress-Archive) targeting configuration directories of AI coding assistants such as Claude, Codex, Cursor, and Gemini.
Detects data staging and exfiltration preceding Play double extortion: WinRAR/RAR adding files to an archive (recursive or password-protected) followed within 4 hours by a WinSCP transfer from the same host and user.
Detects the use of legitimate archival utilities (such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, tar) or scripting engines (PowerShell) to compress or package sensitive browser profile artifacts like 'Login Data', 'Cookies', or 'Local State'. This behavior is a common indicator of credential harvesting and data staging activity by infostealers prior to exfiltration.
This rule detects potential browser-based credential and session theft by monitoring for a process that accesses multiple sensitive web browser artifacts (cookies, local state, session storage) across several user profiles in a short timeframe. It correlates this activity with the subsequent creation of a compressed archive in a temporary directory followed by an outbound network connection, indicating a multi-stage exfiltration workflow.
Detects the use of ntdsutil.exe to create an Install From Media (IFM) backup of the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) to a non-standard location, followed closely by the use of 7-Zip (7z.exe or 7za.exe) to archive that specific backup directory, which is a common indicator of credential dumping and exfiltration staging.
This rule detects the suspicious archival of browser credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, wallet.dat) or the transmission of data to common command-and-control (C2) services such as Telegram, Discord, or raw IP addresses using common system tools like PowerShell, curl, or certutil.
Detects usage of the Rclone utility (or renamed binaries) to transfer data to various cloud storage backends (S3, Mega, pCloud, SFTP, WebDAV). The detection correlates this activity with the execution of common archival tools (7-Zip, WinRAR, TAR) within one hour prior to the data transfer, which is a common behavior of adversaries preparing data for exfiltration.
Detects the installation of known AI-powered coding assistant extensions (e.g., Copilot, Tabnine, Cursor) on a device, followed by significant source-code repository cloning or archival activity by Git within two hours. This pattern is potentially indicative of intellectual property theft or sensitive source code exfiltration facilitated by a newly introduced AI tool.
Detects a multi-stage exfiltration sequence consisting of: (1) bulk file archival/compression using common utilities, (2) suspicious OAuth grant or service principal authorization, and (3) abnormal network egress volume to common ports. This pattern suggests an adversary is preparing data, establishing or leveraging an identity/application for cloud access, and subsequently exfiltrating data.
This rule detects potential browser-based credential and session theft by monitoring for a process that accesses multiple sensitive web browser artifacts (cookies, local state, session storage) across several user profiles in a short timeframe. It correlates this activity with the subsequent creation of a compressed archive in a temporary directory followed by an outbound network connection, indicating a multi-stage exfiltration workflow.
Detects the use of common archiving utilities (7zip, WinRAR, Tar, or PowerShell Compress-Archive) to bundle sensitive Google Chrome user data, such as cookies, login data, or the entire user data profile directory. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to stage sensitive information for exfiltration.
Detects a suspected infostealer activity chain involving the unauthorized access of credential and session cookie files, followed by the archival of these files into a temporary or staging directory, and concluding with an outbound network connection to an uncommon destination from the archiving process.
Detects a suspected ransomware double-extortion sequence: the bulk creation of password-protected archives using compression utilities (e.g., 7z, RAR), followed by significant outbound network connections to common cloud storage or anonymization endpoints, and concluding with mass file modifications indicative of encryption activity.
Detects the installation of known AI-powered coding assistant extensions (e.g., Copilot, Tabnine, Cursor) on a device, followed by significant source-code repository cloning or archival activity by Git within two hours. This pattern is potentially indicative of intellectual property theft or sensitive source code exfiltration facilitated by a newly introduced AI tool.
Detects the execution of command-line archiving utilities (e.g., 7z, rar, zip) to create potentially password-protected archives within common staging directories (Temp, Public, ProgramData), followed by an outbound network connection to an external destination. This behavior is consistent with data staging and subsequent exfiltration.
Detects the creation of password-protected archives using 7-Zip or WinRAR command-line utilities. Adversaries often use these tools to compress and encrypt data prior to exfiltration to bypass security controls and prevent inspection of contents.
Detects unauthorized data staging activities using archival utilities followed by data exfiltration to known public cloud storage providers. The rule specifically excludes hosts experiencing mass file renaming activity, focusing on extortion-only scenarios where data is stolen without encryption.
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